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Abstract 
This dissertation adopts an institutionalist paradigm to examme the 
relationship between the state and the lawyers and doctors in reform China. It seeks 
to explain the two professions' differing courses of professionalization in terms of 
their evolving relationship with the state over the past two decades by lo~ing at the 
macro, meso, and micro institutional environments in which lawyers and doctors are 
located in the reform era. It argues that there is no linear relationship between 
economic development and professional development. The favorable conditions 
opened up for the professions at the macro level are essentially mediated by the 
different constellations of state interests at the meso level. As a result of the 
historical past in the legal and medical sectors, the state imposed differing logics in 
the institutionalization of law and medicine in the reform era. This shaped concrete 
reform polices at the micro level, particularly in the arenas of education and 
professional practice, and this in tum presented different institutional opportunities 
and constraints for lawyers and doctors to act upon and different niches from within 
which they could gain different senses of being a "profession". The dissertation 
argues that professionalization in China must be understood in such an interlocking 
institutional complexity, and that the interests and actions of actors, including both 
the state and professions, must be interpreted in terms of their institutional 
embeddedness. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
"The next generation of the Chinese leadership will definitely comprise 
lawyers, as in the West," a law professor from one of the prestigious universities in 
' 'F-·-
Beijing once said to me assuredly. 
There are good reasons to be skeptical about this professor's optimism. The 
present leadership is still by and large composed of technocrats; and the Chinese state 
is more interested in engineering a "strong" China in economic and scientific and 
technological terms than in building a society where everyone is guaranteed 
individual rights enforced by a sound system of rule oflaw. But Chinese lawyers did 
increasingly become a visible group in society, with an enhanced social status. 
Unlike during the 1950s through 1970s, Chinese lawyers today have gained a 
legitimate place in society. By the mid 1990s more than 400 lawyers were elected to 
people's congresses at all levels and more than 500 were members of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference committees at all levels (PD-OE 16/11/96: 
6). 
Their role became particularly notable when the Chinese government assured 
its people that China is establishing itself as a "lawful society" lfazhi shehui). To lend 
support to this legal enterprise, the legal profession has been developing in a vigorous 
. Ii way: the numbers of lawyers and of law firms increased more than four-fold and 
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thirteen-fold respectively during the first two decades ofreform (PD-OE 16/11/96: 6; 
CSY 2001: 751). Not only has law become a hot discipline sought after by potential 
entrants to universities, the occupation also ranks high in studies on occupational 
prestige in China (e.g. Cai and Zhao 1995). Foreign trained Chinese lawyers are 
given privileges to practice and even to open their own law firms in China. In 
notorious criminal cases, the right of the accused to defense attorneys is also 
underscored. As the economy develops, Chinese lawyers are also playing their part in 
this economic boom by contributing to the establishment of a regulated market 
structure. Lawyers are therefore seen as one of the important bridges in China's 
striving to link up with the rest of the world (yu guoji jiegui). They are becoming 
increasingly visible and organized. They are outward looking, and their role in 
economic development unambiguous. 
Chinese doctors, on the other hand, are much less visible within the context of 
China's reforms. Compared to the legal profession, doctors have faded from the 
public scene, hidden in their daily routines in public hospitals and clinics. If they are 
noted, it is more often through complaints about their relationship with patients, or 
about their pocketing "red packets" (hongbao ). Although health reform also tops the 
reform agenda, the role doctors could have played is largely disregarded, and they are 
seen as peripheral. Their voices regarding the policy and direction of health reform 
are little heard. Although an established profession since before the founding of the 
People's Republic, their presence in the wave of reforms is largely invisible. 
Studies of occupations and professions have commonly used doctors and 
lawyers as case studies (for a specific calculation see Abbott 1993: 193; more 
generally see for example Freidson 1970; Heinz and Laumann 1982; Starr 1982; Abel 
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and Lewis 1989; Wilsford 1991; etc.). Still others have used them for comparative 
purposes (e.g. Rueschemeyer 1972; May 1983; Macdonald 1995; Krause 1996; etc.). 
One reason is that law and medicine are the most well-established professions. In the 
Middle Ages, when all "learned men" were in some sense religious specialists, law 
and medicine stood out as ecclesiastical specializations and, along with the clergy, 
were regarded as the traditional professions. With the decline of the church and the 
rise of universities, intellectual training and technical competence became central in 
defining the professions (Parsons 1968). The clergy was marginalized in thi~ process, 
whereas law and medicine, together with engineering and the university professoriate 
(cf. Krause 1996), are now considered central to our understanding of the organization 
of modem professions. In studies of occupational prestige, these professions also 
tend to rank high. Another reason to account for the focus on law and medicine is that 
many studies stress the way specific professions shape public discourse (e.g. ')ustice" 
and "health") and the private lives of ordinary citizens (e.g. "illness" and "individual 
rights"). In this regard, engineering and university professoriate are considered to 
have lesser influence. 
The differences in the professional standing oflawyers and doctors in China in 
the reform era therefore makes good comparative case. This is particularly so if we 
take into account their differing histories: law suffered a lacuna of two decades 
whereas medicine enjoyed a continuous presence during the tumultuous years of the 
1960s and 1970s. The different situations of lawyers and doctors in China pose a 
challenge to popular wisdom that economic development and market liberalization 
allow professions the opportunities to develop (cf. Macdonald 1995: 72). Arguably, if 
"an industrializing society is a professionalizing society" (Goode 1960), one would 
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surmise that medicine should be in a better position to benefit from economic reforms, 
since it was better established than law at the beginning of the race. But the two 
decades of reforms show that law is now far ahead of medicine in the professional 
project of collective upward mobility. Whilst there is little doubt that professional 
development in China is state-led, economic development seems also to exert a 
differing effect on the development of lawyers and doctors. 
This dissertation argues that while the overall macro institutional environment, 
i.e. economic development, is favorable to overall professional developme~;its exact 
impact on professions is mediated by the mesa-institutional environment, including 
differently implemented reforms in different sectors. While legal reform is seen as 
one of the priority objectives in China's overall reform agenda, health reform is only 
remotely related. The logic behind these two areas of reform also differs: while the 
health sector reform inherited, at least on the surface, the Maoist ideology to "serve 
the people", law's pivotal role in economic development means the rationality of 
reform here is necessarily one of "serve the economy." ("Serve the people" is 
supposed to serve as a larger ideal whereas "serve the economy" is the more 
immediate concern since it is instrumental to the rhetoric of "linking up with the 
globe".) It is precisely this differing rationality that drives state involvement in the 
two sectors apart. Drawing on Peter Evans' Embedded Autonomy (1995), I argue that 
in socialist China state involvement is basically a given fact in every arena of 
development. Thus it is more meaningful to look at how state involvement differs 
than to ask how much the state is involved. Given the differing kind of state 
involvement and rationality in the two respective areas of sectoral reform, I will argue 
that lawyers are pretty much "reactive actors" in legal reform while doctors are at best 
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"inactive actors" in health reform. State involvement in tum sheds light on the 
everyday micro-institutional environment in which the two professions exist. The 
arenas of education, workplace, and the structure of professional practice open up 
differing opportunity structures the two professions could act upon. The new 
institutionalist approach thus equips us to see how actors' actions and perceptions are 
structured by their immediate environment. 
The Sociology of Professions Revisited 
The sociology of professions is a sub-field of the sociology of work and 
occupations. One of the fundamental issues in studying the professions involves the 
question of how the occupations commonly known as the professions come to be 
known as such. In popular usage, the term "profession" conveys an aura of prestige, 
respect, and positive evaluation. To speak of a particular kind of work as a profession 
is to accord it a high position, and hence individuals, as professionals, also generally 
assume a high social status in society. To refer to a person as unprofessional is to 
charge that he or she is incompetent. But what counts as a profession? In the 
literature there are basically two views. The earlier approach adopts an essentially 
static view in that it was preoccupied with delineating the fundamental characteristics, 
or traits, that define the professions. Criticisms have been leveled at this static view 
and later approaches take a more dynamic view by examining how some occupations 
actually succeed over time in claiming the status of professions. 
''i i 
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The Static View 
It has long been suggested that "an industrializing society 1s a 
professionalizing society" (Goode 1960: 902) and a professional class eventually 
becomes "the heart of the post-industrial society" (Bell 1973: 374). The rise of such a 
professional society has been regarded as a "third revolution" in the modern world 
(Perkin 1996). But to speak of a professional society we are necessarily confronted 
with a core definitional exercise, "What constitutes the professional class?" 
Discussion therefore essentially starts with identifying the professio'IJ-sf. .. as such -
outlining the traits and attributes that differentiate them from other occupations that 
are also aspiring to seeking the title. This preoccupation with definitions resulted in 
the monumental volume by A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson (1933). They 
surveyed some thirty vocations that were then considered as professions in England, 
and concluded that the chief distinguishing characteristic was "the application of an 
intellectual technique ... acquired as the result of prolonged and specialized training" 
(p. 491), and that "professions can only be said to exist where the practitioners come 
together in free associations. Desire to associate and ability to do so are the 
pre-requisites of professionalism" (p. 495; see also Goode 1957). 
Other defining attributes are more normative and evaluative. The "ethical 
approach" widely held before the 1930s maintained that professional people were 
altruistic (cf. Marshall 1964) and that the professional community was a 
"disinterested" one (Haskell 1984). Professionals also were supposed to enjoy work 
autonomy, on t~e assumption that their self-regulation and self-control through 
professional associations differentiate them from other work groups that do not have 
the freedom and power to regulate their own work behavior and working conditions. 
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Hence a profession is of itself a "community" (Goode 1957). It is generally agreed 
that the cognitive dimension of an expertise based on theory and knowledge, a 
normative dimension of a professed ethics of serving the public, and an evaluative 
dimension of organized autonomy in and monopoly of the service, are the shared 
attributes of the professions (Johnson 1972: 23; Larson 1977: x; Pavalko 1988: 19-29). 
But a survey of the literature points more to a lack of consensus among the trait 
theorists than about what actually "defines" the professions (Millerson 1964: 5). 
By delineating the attributes of the professions, the trait ap~oach also 
·.' 
suggests an end-state to the ideal of professionalism, and that there exists an order or a 
natural history of professionalization (Hughes 1958: 133-7; Goode 1969). After 
examining the history of eighteen occupations, Harold Wilensky (1964) uncovered an 
order of "events" through which the established professions developed: 
Men begin doing the work full time and stake out a jurisdiction; the 
early masters of the technique or adherents of the movement become 
concerned about standards of training and practice and set up a training 
school, which, if not lodged in universities at the outset, makes 
academic connection within two or three decades; the teachers and 
activists then achieve success in promoting more effective 
organization, first local, then national - through either the 
transformation of an existing occupational association or the creation 
of a new one. Toward the end, legal protection of the monopoly of 
skill appears; at the end, a formal code of ethics is adopted (pp. 145-6). 
On the basis of how far occupations moved along this process, Wilensky classified the 
professions into four types: namely, the established professions (e.g., law and 
medicine), professions in process or marginal (e.g., librarianship and nursing), new 
professions (e.g., city planning and hospital management), and finally doubtful 
professions (e.g., advertising). Wilensky thus instilled a temporal dimension to the 
study of professions, and even critics agreed that the process he identified "does have 
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a certain regularity" (Abbott 1991: 379). Nonetheless, his model takes as a given the 
validity of the trait approach, that professionalization ultimately involves acquiring 
the traits at the ideal-typical end of the continuum (Pavalko 1988: 35). In this vein, 
studies of professions and professionalization are tautological because surveys on 
professions to examine and evaluate the characteristics of professionalism essentially 
helped to construct and further reinforced the existing professions as the professions 
(Freidson 1994: 23). 
Emphasis on traits to some extent overlaps with the functionali&{.;.approach, 
which until the 1960s dominated the sociology of the professions. In the main, 
functionalists considered the professions as stabilizing elements in society. To 
paraphrase Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), 
That professional organizations are stable elements in society ... their 
members are conscious of the past; they are aware of a long chain of 
endeavours towards the improvement and adaptation of the technique. 
The old formula presses upon them; they inherit, preserve, and hand on 
a tradition. They know that nothing is to be achieved in their own 
sphere by destruction or revolution, and they assume that the same 
applies in other spheres. . . . They engender modes of life, habits of 
thought, and standards of judgment which render them centres of 
resistance to crude forces which threaten steady and peaceful 
evolution. The family, the church, the universities, certain 
associations of intellectuals, and above all the great professions, stand 
like rocks against which the waves raised by these forces beat in vain 
(p. 497). 
The functionalist approach is in particular informed by Emile Durkheim's ( 1958) 
contribution on professional ethics. In his view, the formation of moral communities 
based upon occupational membership is a positive force in societal development and 
helps save a society from a breakdown in moral authority. Other functionalists have 
emphasized the professions' socially functional traits. T. H. Marshall (1939) argued 
that a service ethic such as altruism was central to the nature of professionalism. The 
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view that professions were actuated by the common good was restated by Talcott 
Parsons (1954), who pointed out that professions were to be distinguished from 
business by their collectivity-orientation rather than self-orientation. 
What the trait model thus reveals is a highly value-:laden perspective of 
professions. It implies that professions are intrinsically desirable, and 
professionalization something actively sought after by other occupations. But Eliot 
Freidson (1994: 24) has pointed out that the "essence" of a profession should cease to 
be an issue. A "profession," as he succinctly put it, is pretty much a folk CfJl-Cept and 
is therefore phenomenological in character. It is a folk concept for lay people in the 
society to determine whether an occupation is or is not a profession, or is a 
semi-profession (cf. Etzioni 1969), or is more or less professional than other 
occupations. To ascertain an occupation to be a profession is therefore a constructed 
enterprise. In other words, no occupation is sui generis a profession. It is always up 
to social theorists to construct why one occupation is regarded as a profession and 
others excluded. The social construction of professions therefore involves a dual 
process. One is the effort, conscious or unconscious, by the professionals themselves 
to claim such a status in society. The other is the effort by social theorists to construct 
and formulate theories to explain the profession. Sociologists, however, should do 
more than just outlining the traits but instead should focus on how a particular 
occupation becomes a profession. Instead of adopting a static view to define what a 
profession is, one should opt for a more dynamic view that involves both action and 
process to examine how the professions have arrived at their present status. 
Freidson (1986) pointed out that the problem of defining professions lies in 
the attempt "to treat professions as if it were a generic concept rather than a changing 
·I 
JO 
historic concept with particularistic roots in those industrial nations that are strongly 
influenced by Anglo-American institutions" (p. 32). As such, the present study 
adopts Macdonald's (1995) definition of professions that simply refers to them as 
"occupations based on advanced, or complex, or esoteric, or arcane knowledge" (p. 1). 
Thus, even though critics might argue that doctors and lawyers in China are devoid of 
the kind of ideal of organized autonomy, they can be treated as professions defined by 
knowledge. Terms like professionals and professions therefore get used as a kind of 
shorthand and not a closely defined technical term. 
The Dynamic View 
Starting from the 1960s critiques have been leveled at the functionalist "trait" 
approach. Critics argued that the trait approach failed to answer the questions of why 
professions came to be structured in the way they are, and how they acquired the 
status and influence they have. To illuminate these questions, one must look at the 
process of how the groups made their claims in order to gain legitimacy. In the words 
of Everett C. Hughes (1958): 
In my own studies I passed from the false question "Is this occupation 
a profession" to the more fundamental one "what are the 
circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to tum it into 
a profession and themselves into professional people?" (p. 45) 
In studying "process" a power perspective came to dominate the field, in 
which "the key to the nature of the professions is thus the possession of power" (Hall 
1983: 12). This power perspective is best embodied in the work of Eliot Freidson 
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(1970, 1986, 1994, 2001). 1 According to Freidson, professions are fundamentally a 
phenomenon of labour market organization. Their basis "lies in the capacity of 
occupations to become organized groups independent of firms and other occupations 
in the same class or stratum" (1994: 75-6). Through the monopoly of knowledge and 
gatekeeping, the professions achieved dominance and extended this over other 
kindred occupations. Another variant of the power perspective derives from Terence 
Johnson's Professions and Power (1972), which focused on the relations between 
producer and consumer of professional services and the extent to which the producer 
' 'f~·-
could or could not control the relationship and thereby benefit from it. Ill his view, 
"Professionalism arises where the tensions inherent in the producer-consumer 
relationship are controlled by means of an institutional framework based upon 
occupational authority" (p. 51). 
Building on the power perspective, Magali Sarfatti Larson explored the 
question of process in a matrix of historical complexities. Her seminal work, The Rise 
of Professionalism (1977), represents a major departure from earlier emphasis on 
structure to that of action. Instead of addressing the functional question that was so 
prevalent in previous literature of "What part do the professions play in the 
established order of society?" Larson shifted to ask "How did the occupations that we 
call professions organize themselves to attain market power?" Larson conceptualized 
the rise of professionalism as a conscious attempt on the part of the professionals to 
engage in a "professional project," which involves two aspects. First, 
professionalization is the process by which producers of special services sought to 
constitute and control a market for their expertise; and second, professionalization is 
1 For a review ofFreidson's work see Brint (1993). 
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also a collective assertion of special social status and collective upward social 
mobility. In other words, professionalization entails both market control and social 
mobility, and the professionals are seen as conscious actors in this project. Larson 
summarized her approach as follows: 
Professionalization is thus an attempt to translate one order of scarce 
resources - special knowledge and skills - into another - social and 
economic rewards. To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to 
monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of status in 
a system of stratification. The focus on the constitution of professional 
markets leads to comparing different professions in terms of the 
"marketability" of their specific cognitive resources .... The foc~.on 
collective social mobility accentuates the relations that professions 
form with different systems of social stratification; in particular, it 
accentuates the role that educational systems play in different 
structures of social inequality (p. xvii). 
Andrew Abbott, on the other hand, sees the study of professionalization as 
entirely misleading because it looks at form rather than content. In his The System of 
the Professions (1988), Abbott started with the question; "what work do professionals 
do?" In his view, it is the content of work and the control of work and the 
differentiation of work which give rise to internal occupational divisions and to 
conflict with other occupations, and hence to a conflict over jurisdiction. Professions 
therefore develop when there are jurisdictional vacancies, which may happen because 
they are newly created or because an earlier tenant has left them altogether or lost its 
grip on them. He asserted that "a fundamental fact of professional life is professional 
competition. . . . It is the history of jurisdictional disputes that is the real, the 
determining history of professions" (p. 2). 
Regardless of whether it is a collective social mobility project or a competition 
over jurisdiction, both pointed to professionals as social actors actively engaged in the 
project. These authors followed Freidson's line ofinquiry as to how professions come 
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to achieve power and dominance. But one element is conspicuously lacking in these 
analyses of the dynamics ofprofessionalization: that is, the role of the state. Hence, if 
Larson and Abbott symbolize a bottom-up approach that places the professions at 
centre stage, a state-centred view (Rueschemeyer 1989) represents a top-down 
approach that argues for the pivotal role of the state in the process of professional 
development. 
The Role of the State 
Douglas Klegon (1978) has stated that the ability to obtain and maintain 
professional status is not only related to concrete occupational strategies but also to 
wider social forces, which he referred to as external dynamics. Economic growth and 
change is one such external factor. For instance, Klegon pointed out that development 
in the late nineteenth century, with the growth of railroads and increased capital 
investment etc., gave American lawyers ample opportunities to apply their legal 
expertise to the needs and problems of large corporations. Lawyers thus contributed 
to the growth of these corporations and also succeeded in claiming their professional 
status through their relationship with corporate power. In addition to changes in the 
economy, however, the role and power of the state also constitutes an important 
external factor, but this is generally ignored in the work of both Larson (1977) and 
Abbott (1988). 
Both Larson and Abbott are concerned with the conscious effort of the 
professions themselves as a group to attain their market position and thus consolidate 
their privileged status in the society. Both portrayed professionals as groups relatively 
free from state intervention. Although Larson (1977) did refer to the state, it was 
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treated at most as a background factor only. However, all professions, in their pursuit 
of monopoly and privilege, have to enter into a special relationship with the state. To 
establish a legal monopoly professions generally require the state's mandate in a 
licensure system (Zhou 1993). For the lawyers in particular, the relationship with the 
state often goes beyond merely securing a monopoly in practice, but involves actually 
becoming integrated into the state apparatus. As Terence Halliday (1987) also argued, 
since lawyers have a specific relationship with the judicature, this gives lawyers an 
interest in the law itself which could lead them to act in ways which have nothing to 
do with the pursuit of monopoly but are in fact public-spirited. 
Studies on professional autonomy have assumed that autonomy held an 
inverse relationship with intervention. However, even in Anglo-American societies, 
where it is recognized that professionalization is "spontaneous" in the sense that it has 
largely been the result of voluntary association (Neal and Morgan 2000), the state was 
instrumental in shaping the development of professions (Fielding and Portwood 1980; 
Johnson 1982; Krause 1996, etc.). More specifically, Terry Johnson (1982) has 
argued that the professions emerged as an aspect of state formation, which was a 
major condition of professional autonomy. He found that the state was actively 
instrumental in the development of the professions in the nineteenth century. Along 
this line of inquiry, it is argued that even in liberal democratic society the state is 
needed to provide the legal environment in which the professions practice their 
autonomy. For instance, in the United States, 
The state uses the profession as its source of guidance, exercising its 
power in such a way as to support the profession's standards and create 
a sociopolitical environment in which the profession is free from 
serious competition from rival practitioners and firmly in control of 
auxiliary workers. Within that state-protected environment, the 
profession has sufficient power of its own to control virtually all facets 
of its work without serious interference from any lay group (Freidson 
1970: 44). 
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Other theorists on the professions stressed the role of the state by noting that 
the Anglo-American experiences where there was minimal state intervention could 
not be easily transposed to other countries (e.g. Cleaves 1987; Jarausch 1990; Krause 
1991, 1996). For instance, in Continental Europe the state serves as the professionals' 
prime employers and thus plays a more active role in initiating the institutionalization 
of some professions and reorganizing others. Thus, unlike their counterpcµts in the 
' r,.._ 
Anglo-American setting, professions in Germany are the "unfree professions" 
(Jarausch 1990), as professional development has been a state-sponsored one. There 
is therefore no unilineal process of professionalization that is of universal 
applicability (Johnson 1972: 29). Instead, professionalization must necessarily be 
time- and context-bound (Jarausch 1990: 6). 
This is all the more true when we tum to look at the professions in socialist 
societies, where the central role of the state is a given fact and state intervention is 
expected. The significance of the state goes well beyond its status as an employer; it 
also shapes the general environment in which all occupations operate. For instance, in 
the former Soviet Union "the state-supported monopoly grants professional autonomy 
solely to determination of the technical content of work. Administrators and 
policy-makers representing the state control the economic terms of work, its location, 
and its social organization, leaving the profession no option but to accept their terms." 
(Friedson 1970: 44). This is also true of other socialist societies such as China, where 
the omnipresence of state power exists in almost every facet of life. This study 
therefore echoes Elliott Krause's (1991) dictum that "Sociological approaches to the 
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study of professions are incomplete if they do not focus on a central aspect of their 
existence - their relation to the state" (p. 3). Krause also suggested a continuum of 
profession-state relations, "ranging from the essentially 'private' professions with 
limited state involvement and employment (the American example), to the 
state-involved professions of Western Europe, to the primarily state-located and 
state-employed professions" of socialist societies (p.4). These three kinds of 
relationship correspond to three patterns of state-society relations: pluralism, 
corporatism, and state socialism (Gu 2001). 
In asserting the role played by the state, however, several qualifications need 
to be made. First, taking note of the state does not mean a reversion to a wholly 
structuralist view that perceives professionals as entirely recipients of whatever the 
state has endowed upon them. States are, for sure, "weighty actors" (Skocpol 1985: 3) 
but as Barkey and Parikh (1991) have noted, even a state-centred analysis does not 
preclude the role of society. The nature of the state-society relationship has always 
received attention. In the case of socialist China, whereas state interventions are 
crucial to the creation of a regulatory environment in which the transitional market 
economy operates, the Communist political order does not stand apart from the 
society. The very gradual pace of reform in China, in contrast to the big-bang policy 
in Eastern European societies, reflects the very cautious stance of the Chinese 
government, and almost every policy step taken depends on a reaction generated from 
society. The state is bound to society through a concrete set of institutionalized 
channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (Evans 
1995: 12). In this vein, state policy in restructuring the professions is not seen entirely 
in hegemonic terms and as entirely unresponsive to societal demand. Rather, the state 
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and society is always relational and the interaction dialectical. The state enjoys only 
"embedded autonomy" (Evans 1995) and is therefore a "limited state" (Migdal 1997). 
It is in this sense that Migdal et al. proposed a state-in-society approach which 
"focuses on the process of state engagement with other social forces [and] highlights 
the mutual transformation of the state and other social groups, as well as the 
limitations of the state" (Migdal 1997: 232; see also Migdal et al. 1994). 
Second, in analyzing the state and industrial transformation in three newly 
industrializing countries, Peter Evans (1995) noted that "state involvell\~nt [in the 
contemporary world] is a given." As already noted, therefore, the appropriate 
question is not to ask "how much state involvement" but to address "what kind of state 
involvement." To deal with this, one must look at both the general environment 
shaped by the state as well as the specific policies that work to facilitate or constrain 
professional development. What is at issue is to see how the state is actually 
constituted, the particularities of its institutional arrangements, and the institutional 
junctures of state and society in the arena of professional development. 
State structures are "crystallized," in that the state in different societies took 
on different forms in relation to various aspects of political and other power networks 
(Mann 1993). Variations in involvement are conditioned on these differing 
"crystallizations" of state structures, which in tum create different capacities for 
action (Evans 1995). This pointed to a third issue. To say that professionalization in 
China is necessarily state-led does not answer the question of why state action differs 
in the development of lawyers vis-a-vis the doctors. The state must therefore be 
disaggregated (Migdal et al. 1994: 3). The state is not a single entity but must be 
conceptualized as a constellation of diverse and at times conflicting interests. While it 
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is long recognized that the Chinese state is far from a unified one, previous studies 
often made the distinction along the administrative lines of hierarchy between the 
central state and the local state agents (e.g. Oi 1989; Walder 1995). Less apparent, 
however, is the state's fractures at the ministerial level across sectoral lines. 
The above qualifications about the role of the state point toward the adoption 
of an institutionalist paradigm to ascertain how the state and professions actually 
interact and their relationship as mutually transformative. To assert that professional 
development in China necessarily hinges on the state's mandate is not- t!~lose sight 
that the way professions react and respond to state policies could also result in a 
negotiation and renegotiation of the policies. Thus, although professions are acting 
within the parameters set by the state, the way they react would also shape the 
boundaries of the parameter. 
The State and Professions in Pre-reform China 
For a long time in China no particular distinction was made between 
"professions" and "occupations." Professionals arose at the turn of the twentieth 
century as a new breed of educated Chinese. With the abolition of the imperial civil 
service examination and the establishment of Western-style schools, new career paths 
were opened to the educated in which they could pursue roles different from the 
traditional literati. During the Republican era, the Nationalist Party used the term 
ziyou zhiye zhe to identify professional groups, including doctors, lawyers, 
accountants, journalists, engineers, and professors. Professionalization therefore was 
a concomitant process of modem state building at a time of rising nationalism in the 
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face of foreign privileges and aggression. Xiaoqun Xu's (2001) study of journalists, 
lawyers, and doctors and their interaction with the Republican state revealed that the 
relationship was mutually dependent and interpenetrated: "both the state and society 
struggle to define themselves in relation to each other with overlapping and shifting 
boundaries. . . . Legitimacy and authority on either side were often contingent and 
contested; private, group, and public interests and cross-purposes overlapped and 
negotiated" (p. 271). Xu therefore referred to this rich and complex process as a 
"symbiotic dynamics in the state-society relationship." This early process of 
professionalization, however, came to an abrupt end when the Communists came to 
power in 1949. 
The Western social sciences discourse normally perceives intellectuals as the 
highly educated who "create, distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world 
of man, including art, science, and religion," and hence "professionals like physicians 
and lawyers" are regarded as a peripheral group only because they "apply culture as 
part of their jobs" (Lip set 1969: 311 ). In socialist China, however, professionals were 
all collapsed into the broader category of "intellectuals," due largely to the fact that 
Communist ideology defines the composition of society as comprising three social 
groups only, namely, intellectuals, workers and peasants2 (cf. Lane and Kolankiewicz 
1973). Social demarcation of groups was very crude. Occupational or professional 
groups were not customarily used as classificatory categories, and relatively few 
studies were done using the professions as the unit of analysis. 3 Even when 
occupational groups were occasionally alluded to, the analysis was essentially about 
2 However, sometimes a fourth group, the bourgeoisie, is also included. 
3 But see White (1981) for a study of the teaching profession. 
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the peasants, intellectuals, students, the industrial managers and workers, the military, 
and party and government bureaucrats etc. (cf. Oksenberg 1968). 
In Chinese, the notion of "intellectuals" (zhishi fenzi, literally meaning 
"elements of knowledge") is very inclusive and refers to all mental labor. In the 
1950s the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCP proposed 
three definitive criteria for the term "intellectuals": (i) state cadres holding a diploma 
from technical high schools or above; (ii) those holding technocratic titles; and (iii) 
teachers. These three criteria were restated again in 1985 (Zhang and Huf:989: 261). 
Because of this loose definition, in China the term "higher intellectuals" (gaoji zhishi 
fenzi) largely designates professions in the cultural and scientific realms. Writers and 
artists who do not have college degrees are also included in this category. 
The existing literature on Chinese intellectuals is numerous but, most of the 
writings tend also to focus on the higher intellectuals in the literary and cultural realm: 
on their relationship with the state (e.g. Goldman 1967, 1981; Hamrin and Cheek 
1986; Goldman et al. 1987, 1993; Cheek 1989, 1992; Franklin 1989; Ding 1994); and 
on their self-perceptions and experiences (cf. Link 1992). There are two reasons for 
the stress on their relationship with the state. First, even though in the post-Mao era 
intellectuals were allowed greater autonomy in their work, the party-state still adopted 
a zigzag policy, oscillating between periods ofrepression (shou) and relaxation (fang). 
This was more the case in the party's stance towards intellectuals in the 
literary-ideological realm than in the scientific and technological sphere (Goldman 
! 
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1985).4 Second, intellectuals in the humanities are more often outspoken and more 
politicized. While the political bent of such intellectuals is also true for their Western 
counterparts, in particular for the intelligentsia in Soviet societies (e.g. Kagarlitsky 
1988; Shlapentokh 1990; Torpey 1995), the political activism of Chinese intellectuals 
is complicated by the cultural and historical legacy of their intellectual predecessors, 
the literati, who felt a duty to serve the state but at the same time sometimes took on a 
role as moral critics of the ruler. There is therefore an inherent historical distrust of 
intellectuals on the part of rulers. In a country such as the People's Republic where 
' '(;. 
state policies have been guided by ideological concerns, intellectti~ls in the 
humanities have regularly been suppressed and hence have gained further scholarly 
attention. 
Compared to the cultural intellectuals, the professional elite has been 
relatively apolitical. They have defined themselves more on the basis of their 
respective professions and their possession of technical knowledge than in terms of 
any ideological commitments. But they were by no means immune from the 
party-state's skepticism towards intellectuals at large. During the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign (1956-57), quite a significant number of them demanded the right to 
practice their professions without political interference, arguing that they would be 
better able to serve their country. This invited the suspicion of the Party, which saw 
their demand as posing an implicit political threat (Goldman and Cheek 1987: 6). In 
the subsequent Anti-rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, many 
professionals, including lawyers, doctors, and scientists, were singled out as targets. 
4 Both the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1983 and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign 
in late 1986 and early 1987 were targeted towards intellectuals in the literary realm, even though Fang 
Lizhi, an astrophysicist, is a key figure in the 1986-87 campaign. 
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Only a few were co-opted to work with the power elite, but even some of these 
suffered from direct political interference. Professions in the conceptual sense 
therefore were non-existent. 
Even though professionals from the 1980s onwards have gradually gained in 
recognition and respect, and their assertion of professional norms has been welcomed 
due to China's modernization drive, they have still been working within the confines 
of state control. 
An Institutional Framework 
In expounding Max Weber's idea of rationalization, George Ritzer argued that 
the professionalization process is itself a rationalization process. Along this line of 
logic, bureaucratization is not antithetical to professionalization smce 
bureaucratization is itself a process ofrationalization (Ritzer 1975). More importantly, 
the professionalization process is at the same time an institutionalization process 
whereby norms, values, and expectations about forms and practices are shared, 
diffused, and taken for granted. I will argue in this dissertation that to understand the 
intricate state-profession relationship one must look at the institutional specificity that 
constrains the choice of action of both parties. 
The analytical tools of this study are influenced by new institutionalism, 
which takes the analysis of institutions as critical determinants of political and 
economic performance as well as objects of inquiry in their own right. There exist 
four different branches of scholarship that differ in terms of the problematic, the 
inquiries of conditions and mechanisms of institutional change, and the 
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epistemological and methodological conventions. The four schools are: (1) rational 
choice institutionalism in general political science (Shepsle 1989); (2) historical 
institutionalism in comparative politics (Steinmo et al. 1992); (3) sociological 
institutionalism, which has arisen primarily in the field of organizational studies 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991); and (4) discursive institutionalism, which initially 
emerged in the analysis of public policy and economic performance among 
corporatist countries in Scandinavia (Table 1.1) (see also Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Immergut 1998). Despite their differences, they stem from a common critique of 
' 1,:. 
behavioralism that focuses primarily on observable behavior as the bask dictum of 
analysis. Behavior occurs in the context of institutions, the new institutionalists 
contend, and can only be so understood. They share in common the view that there 
exist diverse sources of individual and collective interests and that institutions 
influence their articulation and expression in politics. Thus, the core question is how 
social choices are shaped, mediated, and channeled by different institutional 
arrangements. The shared system of rules within the institutional environment serves 
to constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to optimize their interests and 
privilege some groups but not others. Thus, institutions shape the contexts in which 
individuals can act, and goals and strategies get structured in a fashion that 
alternatives cannot be conceived. In this sense, then, "institutions do not just 
constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their 
preferences" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 11 ). Institutions are therefore both 
constraining and enabling (DiMaggio 1988). 
This dissertation mainly adopts an historical institutionalist approach to 
analyze the state and professions in China. The study takes note of the recent call for 
Table 1.1 A Comparison of the Four Schools of New Institutionalism. 
Rational choice Historical 
References Shepsle (1989) Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth, eds. (1992) 
Major field of General political science Comparative politics 
study 
Problematic How rationally motivated How variations in political 
actors build institutions to or other institutions shape 
solve problems of exchange actors' capacities for action, 
and collective goods policy making, and 
production institution building 
Conditions of Actors transform institutions Actors perc;eive that it is in 
change when material factors shift their political or economic 
and they perceive that the interests to pursue change 
benefits of doing will notably in times of crisis; 
exceed the costs Contradictory institutional 
logics 
Mechanism of Interest-based struggle, Interest, idea, and 
change conflict, bargaining, or ideologically-based struggle, 
strategic gaming conflict, bargaining 
Epistemology and Positivist deductive search Comparative inductive 
methodology for general theory search for historically 
specific theory 
Source: Adapted from Campbell and Pedersen (2001: 8-14). 
Organizational Discursive 
Powell and DiMaggio, eds. Pedersen (1993) 
(1991) 
Organizational studies in Public policy 
sociology 
How rationality and the How institutions are 
rationalization of institution constituted, framed, and 
are culturally and cognitively transformed through the 
constituted and legitimized confrontation of new and old 
discursive structures 
Increased environmental 
uncertainty prompts actors 
to adopt whatever culturally 
appropriate practices; 
Political-cultural shifts 
Imitation, diffusion, 
translation 
Positivist deductive search 
for theory; 
Interpretive ind~ctive search 
for historically specific 
explanation 
Perceived political-economic 
cns1s; 
Presence of alternative 
discourses 
Translation and displacement, 
through discursive alliances 
or bricolage 
Interpretive inductive search 
for historically specific 
explanation; 
Archaeology of texts 
w 
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a "second movement" in institutional analysis (Campbell and Pedersen eds. 
2001) which argues for "a more constructive dialogue among paradigms in order to 
identify complementarities and explore the possibilities for rapprochement, 
cross-fertilizations, and integration" (Campbell and Pedersen 2001a: 2). Analytical 
strategies include linking the causal arguments, blending the insights, identifying the 
common analytical problems, or even subsuming one school under another (Campbell 
and Pedersen 2001b). The dissertation will wed this to a particular interest in the 
themes of power and interests and how their representation is shaped l;>yf;ollective 
actors and institutions that bear traces of their own history. It is for this last reason that 
I will be adopting an historicist approach. More specifically, I will argue that in the 
Chinese professions' interactions with the state, they have been very much embedded 
in institutional arrangements that shape how they could act. This institutional 
environment is "characterized by the elaboration of the rules and requirements to 
which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy. The requirements may stem from regulatory agencies authorized by the 
nation-state, from professional or trade associations, from generalized belief systems 
that define how specific types of organizations are to conduct themselves, and similar 
sources" (Scott and Meyer 1991: 123). The institutional environment therefore 
encompasses the cultural belief systems, normative frameworks, and regulatory 
systems that provide meaning and stability to a sector (Scott 2001). In this sense, the 
environment creates the lenses through which actors view the world and the very 
categories of structure, action, and thought (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 13). 
In the context of professional development in China there exist three 
analytical levels of institutional environment: namely, the macro-, meso-, and 
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micro-institutional environments (Table 1.2). They provide the frames of reference 
for the professions' reaction or inaction towards state policies. In theory the state's 
mandate to bring about economic reform and to bring China onto the global stage -
the macro-institutional environment - facilitates professional development. In reality 
the impact of this overarching project is mediated at the meso level by the differing 
reform agendas each professional sector: i.e., legal reform and health reform. These 
differing logics of rationality at the meso level are defined by different constellations 
of state interest as a consequence of the state's own historical past. Rationality is itself 
the defining institutions that structure the opportunities and constraints opened up at 
the micro level - the respective arrangements in education, certification, work setting, 
and the structure of professional practices - which vastly differ in the two professions. 
How they frame their interests are therefore institutionally embedded and their 
rationality context-bounded. I argue that the professional development of the doctors 
and lawyers and their evolving relationship with the state must be understood in terms 
of their institutional embedment and context-bounded rationality. 
Arguing that the perceptions and action of the two professions are necessarily 
bounded does not mean that the relationship between institutions and individual 
action is one-sided. In fact, the state and the professions are highly interactive and 
mutually constitutive (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 22-4; Hall and Taylor 1996: 
948-9). Although individuals' choices of action are embedded in the institutions, 
institutions also change as a response to individual action. For instance, we will 
observe in the ensuing discussion on the legal profession's development in China that 
the government's changing policies vis-a-vis the legal profession are to some extent 
spurred by the lukewarm responses of Chinese lawyers in the initial stage. 
Table 1.2 A Sketch of the Institutional Paradigm. 
Macro-institutional environment: 
Economic reform provides the 
context in which professions 
emerged 
Meso-institutional environment: 
Sectoral reform defines the policy 
parameter within which the 
profession responds 
Micro-institutional environment: 
Immediate social environment 
confines and constrains 
professionals' choices of action 
A general trend towards "expertocracy": 
(i) Depoliticization of the cadre system; 
(ii) Formation of a competitive labor market 
State interest 
Logic of rationality 
Model of 
institutionalization 
Institutional actors 
Education 
Certification 
Employment structure 
Workplace setting 
Professional practice 
Legal reform: 
Material 
"Serve the economy'' represents both 
"logic of instrumentality" and "logic 
of appropriateness" 
Technical 
State and reactive lawyers 
Legal realm: 
Quantitative expansion 
Relatively lax 
Health reform: 
Normative 
"Serve the people" represents "logic 
of appropriateness" 
Institutional 
State and inactive doctors 
Medical realm: 
Quality control 
Restrictive 
An emergent professional labor market Bureaucratic labor market 
Private law firms increasing 
<fl 
Public hospitals and clinics 
predominate 
Private practice actively encouraged by Lack of institutional support in 
the state private practice 
~ 
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The conceptual schema laid out above is necessarily parsimonious since it 
focuses mainly on the role of interest and agency. It is parsimonious in the sense that 
it provides a relatively simple but concise explanation that will attempt to account for 
the observed phenomenon. The mode of reasoning will therefore be inductive and 
interpretive. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter Two posits a resurgence of professionalism in China in the context of 
the broader economic reforms under way since the late 1970s. Economic reform calls 
for greater efficiency and efficacy in every aspect oflife and hence a general tendency 
towards "expertocracy" is deemed by the state to be warranted. This essentially gives 
rise to a process of depoliticizing the cadre system as well as the formation of a 
competitive labor market. Within this context, the chapter will identify who the 
professionals are in China and how they are represented in official records and in 
society. 
Chapters Three to Five form the backbone of this study. By way of 
voluminous documentary materials as well as interview data that I collected during 
field trips to Beijing, I aim to present a picture of how the state's interests in 
institutionalizing the practice of law and of medicine have produced different policy 
frameworks within which the respective professions act and react. Professions are not 
mere recipients of state policies, and it will be seen precisely how their relationship 
with the state has been mutually constitutive in the sense that the way they responded 
to particular reform policies also represents a subtle negotiation with state power. 
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Chapter Three lays out this politics oflegal and health reform in China in terms of the 
underlying rationalities. 
Reform policies at the sectoral levels opened up niches, opportunities, and 
constraints in the immediate environment in which these two sets of professionals 
were embedded. Chapter Four deals with the realms of professional education and 
certification. Because of the general trend towards "expertocracy" since the 1980s, 
the higher education sector has been expanding in order to meet the demand for highly 
qualified manpower. However, because of the interest of the state to.qJtoduce a 
··.-
specific target of lawyers to serve the needs of economic development, the balance 
between quantitative growth and quality control could not always be guarded, and 
institutional irregularities and sudden shifts in the size of enrolments became evident 
in the provision oflegal education. The certification process allowed the state leeway 
to increase or restrict the numbers of lawyers when deemed necessary. By contrast, 
medical education emphasized upgrading quality and the prolonged specialized 
training that this called for. fu addition, because most doctors are assigned directly to 
work in public hospitals or clinics they were more indifferent towards the licensing 
system than were the prospective lawyers. 
Chapter Five will examme the institutional arrangements that shape the 
professional practice of lawyers and doctors in China. It singles out the employment 
j structure, including the structure of the professional labor markets and the structure of 
. I 
a professional practice, to compare how lawyers and doctors are faced with a different 
set of opportunities and constraints that shape their perception of alternatives to state 
employment. 
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Chapter Six concludes the dissertation. It argues that to understand the 
complexity of state-society relations in transitional China one must not simply look at 
the larger picture as a coherent whole. Neither models of civil society nor of state 
corporatism hold since both look at the state and society as a whole. Instead, one 
should take note of the institutional circumstances upon which the state and society 
act and interact. Emphasis on institutional specificity will also raise the attendant 
issue of whether there exists a distinct pattern of "sinicizing" professions. 
Note on Sources and Methodology 
In addition to a voluminous amount of materials found in compilations of 
documents as well as Chinese newspapers and periodicals, this study is based upon 
interviewing. The methodology adopted deviates somewhat from the mainstream 
sociology of the professions in view of the fact that most of the literature employs 
historical and documentary materials alone, without attempting to probe into the 
social world of individual professionals. Documentary material very often deals only 
with collectivities and their elites but not the ordinary individual members whose 
voices too often go unheard. Whereas the internal diversification within a profession 
has readily been acknowledged, thus far too few attempts have been made to bridge 
the gap between individual aspirations and collective action. In other words, if we are 
to relate the individuals to collectivities we need to take heed of what the rank and file 
members within the collectivity really think and perceive and whether they actually 
identify with the action and strategy taken up by the collectivity claiming to represent 
them. In essence, we need to understand how the action taken by the collectivities is 
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made intelligible from the individuals' point of view. Such an attempt would also 
shed light on the consolidation of the profession as a political community. 
Second, in the case of China, documentary materials represent the official and 
"politically correct" view and the unofficial view has far less chance to be recorded. 
By talking to individuals we can obtain a glimpse of how far their perceptions and 
opinions diverge from the official/collective scenario. 
Third, while the western sociological literature on the emergence of the 
' '(' .. 
professions normally focuses on the past, as the emergence occurred iri:;-~m earlier 
historical period, in China the process of professionalization commenced only with 
the relatively recently reforms and are therefore still an on-going process. It becomes 
possible to see through interviewing how individual members actually participate in 
the present process of construction. 
Interviews were conducted during a six-month span in China in 1997 as an 
AND-Beijing University Exchange Scholar. Most of the time I was therefore 
stationed in Beijing, but I also took the opportunity to spend a couple of days in Sanhe; 
Hebei. There, I conducted interviews with doctors and lawyers working at the 
township level so as to provide comparisons and contrasts with professionals working 
in metropolitan Beijing. Altogether fifty-six informants were ip.terviewed, more than 
half of whom are practicing professionals. These include twenty-three lawyers and 
twenty-one physicians. The others are from a variety of other categories, such as 
professors and students at the universities, officials from the ministries and 
professional associations etc. Casual comments by knowledgeable people over the 
dinner table are also recorded but they have not been classified as informants. 
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Most of the informants were located through the friendship networks that I 
developed in Beijing. A few of the interviewees were referred by the original 
informants. For informants of different backgrounds, a variety of different questions 
were asked. For the practicing professionals, questions were asked about their 
educational background, their career path, their opinions and understanding about 
state policies, about the arrangements in their work unit, their participation and 
identification with their respective association, their perception and evaluation of 
their own economic and social status, etc. 
' '(' . 
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Chapter Two 
The Rise of Professions in China: 
Setting the Context 
The suggestion that professionalization goes hand in hand with 
'~ 
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industrialization (cf. Goode 1960; Bell 1973) implies that the rise of professions 
marks the distinction between pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies; 
that only in modem societies is knowledge unified and autonomous; and that only 
with the existence of free markets are there opportunities for professions to emerge 
(Macdonald 1995: 72). The rise of professions and of professionalism is also seen as 
representative of the unquestioned progress of modem societies toward greater 
rationality in decision-making and in organizing societal activities. However, such a 
sense of inevitability might essentially blind us to a critical assessment of the specific 
historical and socio-political trajectories in which the rise of professions is made 
possible in different societies. This section therefore sets the socio-political context in 
which the (re)emergence of professions and of professionalism is to be understood in 
contemporary China. 
The reform policies of the past two decades saw China moving from an 
authoritarian to a regulatory state. Decision-making has been decentralized and social 
control over people's lives has been relaxed. Societal activities have become more 
diversified and new social groupings have emerged. Before the 1980s the social 
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demarcation of groups was very crude in Chinese writings, and occupational, not to 
mention professional, groups were not often referred to. In ordinary daily lives people 
were more readily identified by their work unit, the danwei, than by the actual work or 
occupations they engaged in. Analysis of the rise of professions in China has to be 
located in the interlocking complexity of a vastly changing society. I argue that two 
distinctive trends in the reform era are most conducive for the full emergence of 
professions: first, a depoliticized cadre system, and second, the gradual formation of a 
competitive professional labor market. The chapter will identify the profes~ionals in 
China and, in particular, the lawyers and doctors in the contemporary context. 
The Depoliticization of the Cadre System 
One of the main premises put forward in this study is that the rise of 
professions and of professionalism in China has to be understood in the context of a 
depoliticized cadre system. The depoliticization of the cadre system is at the same 
time a move towards greater rationalization and professionalization in the political 
process. After all, in communist societies "the party was the profession at the head of 
all the professions" (Simirenkop 1982: 23, italics in original). In China it denotes a 
reversal of policy in the reform decades to place more emphasis on merits and 
credentials instead of political virtues in the selection and promotion of cadres, a 
move from "virtuocracy" (Shirk 1982, 1984) to meritocracy and "expertocracy" 
(Hendrischike 1994). This is best exemplified in the series of efforts in the civil 
service reform beginning in the 1980s to give expertise precedence over redness. 
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The term cadre in Chinese has always been regarded as very general and all 
embracing, including "all those, both Party members and non-Party cadres, who hold 
any post as a functionary in the bureaucratic hierarchies in China, from top to bottom" 
(Barnett 1967: 39). The bureaucratic hierarchies include not only Party and 
government organs but also state enterprises and service organizations (shiye danwei). 
In this vein, lawyers and doctors were state cadres. The cadre was ideally expected to 
be both "red and expert" (Schurmann 1968: 8). But "red and expert" is itself a 
contradiction, which was correctly identified by Mao Zedong as one of the major 
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contradictions in the society. In its manifested form it is a competition between two 
elites, the political cadre and the educated professional. In reality, however, Mao's 
idea of "politics in command" in almost every sphere of life meant that the cadres' 
expertise, if any, had to be subsumed under their "redness" in the decision-making 
process. 
In 1956, there were efforts on the part of the Party to be more professionalized 
by trying to admit more intellectuals to become Party members; and it was proposed 
that year that even intellectuals who were not Party members were to be given a larger 
role in decision-making, and that in certain specific areas specialists should be 
consulted in policy research. Throughout 1956 and early 1957, press reports 
indicated that the policy-making process was in fact becoming more professionalized, 
and that economic problems were being discussed more actively and openly in 
meetings with non-Party specialists (Harding 1981: 107). But this effort to 
professionalize decision-making was tarnished and rolled back in the subsequent 
Anti-Rightist Campaign and then the Cultural Revolution. The next two decades 
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witnessed a highly politicized Chinese bureaucracy, with an intensification of the 
pursuit of political virtue and loyalty. In essence, political virtuocracy dominated. 
After Deng Xiaoping returned to power in 1976, the Cultural Revolution 
decade was blamed for economic stagnation, and a decisive effort was made to shift 
toward meritocracy. Although the 1983 Handbook on Party Organization Work made 
it clear that the fundamental principle of cadre management is Party management 
(Manion 1985: 207), in reality in the move towards greater rationalization, the Party 
did retreat somewhat. With the open-door policy and the pursuit 'ot:.economic 
development officially enunciated in late 1978, the Party progressively began to 
decentralize personnel administration and transferred grater formal authority over 
personnel matters to state institutions. Moreover, to manage a more complex 
economy, there also began a process to select and promote professionals and 
specialists based more on their technical qualifications and job performance. The 
Party had therefore begun to place personnel management in the hands of experts 
competent to assess the qualifications and work of their peers, and directly in the 
hands of the institutions that employed them, although the extent of this by the close 
of the 1980s remained somewhat limited (Bums 1989: 741). This process of 
professionalization nonetheless saw a shift of power, status, and income from the 
generalists to the specialists. Expertocracy gained recognition and a process of 
"intellectualization of the bureaucracy" was in place (Szelenyi and Martin 1991). 
Hence, instead of stressing commitment to revolution, a staff member's ability 
and productivity were more frequently mentioned as important qualities for a cadre 
after 1978. Before this shift Renmin Ribao, on 2 March 1978, had proposed five 
criteria for leaders: (1) support of the pragmatic policy of revolutionary cadres, (2) 
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Party spirit, (3) personal integrity, ( 4) ability, and (5) understanding the real-life 
conditions of the masses (quoted from Lee 1991: 229). The news media soon 
thereafter became more explicit in saying that cadres should possess some practical 
and functional knowledge. This was officially endorsed by Deng Xiaoping in January 
1980: "Regardless of position, every [cadre] has to have a certain amount of 
specialized knowledge and work ability in a functional field. Those without such 
knowledge must study. Those with some amount must continue to study. Those who 
cannot or are not willing to study must be changed" (Deng 1984: 208-24). Although 
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"redness" was to be insisted upon, Party cadres (and Party members generally) were 
now expected to undergo the "four transformations" (si hua): i.e., to be 
"revolutionized, rejuvenated, intellectualized and professionalized (geminghua, 
nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua)" (White 1993: 186). In 1980, Hu Yaobang 
publicly stated that "Cadres should be recruited from the graduates of colleges, 
middle schools, and specialized schools or equivalent ones. [We should] generally 
not directly select [cadres] from among workers and peasants who have little 
education" (quoted from Lee 1991: 231). Although political factors were still 
operative, there was a decisive emphasis on age and formal education as recruitment 
criteria of cadres. This was further strengthened in persistent efforts from the 
mid-1980s onwards to implement open and competitive examinations when 
recruiting Party and government officials, in a move towards establishing a state civil 
service system. Thus, after thirty years of revolutionary turmoil, emphasis on 
political qualifications waned and professional capabilities topped the agenda in the 
recruitment of cadres. 
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The fact that the regime was prepared to introduce a civil service system 
indicates its determination to develop rational, efficient, and competent corps of 
administrative bureaucrats. This determination was also reflected in terminological 
changes. The term "civil servants" was adopted, to imply that government officials 
are "public servants" who will manage public affairs as the guardians of public 
interests, whereas the term "cadres" refers to those leadership abilities necessary to 
lead the masses in revolutionary struggles for social change. The term "civil 
servants" also connotes a merit-based recruitment, whereas the cadre's rol~ requires 
political skills and ideological consciousness (Lee 1991: 381-2). The end result of 
these reform measures did in fact witness an increase in the educational levels of 
cadres. For instance, in 1989, 22.9 percent of state cadres in government organs had a 
university education or above, while in the various organs under the State Council 
university graduates or above accounted for 58.8 percent of all the cadres (Zhongguo 
renshi nianjian 1988-89: 738). A parallel trend towards "expertocracy" could also be 
seen in the recruitment drive of Party members with higher educational qualifications 
or technical expertise. Starting in the 1990s increasing number of Party members 
were classified as professionals and technicians. In 1992 this amounted to eight 
million, although the exact percentage of those having a tertiary education was not 
given (cited from Hendrischike 1994). 
In addition to the emphasis on age and formal education in the recruitment of 
cadres, their promotion was to be based on a performance appraisal, including 
measures like assessment of the cadres' competence (jianding and kaoche), a political 
investigation (shencha), and screening (kaocha liaojie) (Manion 1985: 224-9). 
Although these measure have not always been carried out in an objective and 
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standardized way, the need for an adequate performance appraisal system was at least 
recognized. 
In essence, the depoliticization of the cadre system means greater role 
specialization, greater autonomy for the officials in their own areas of expertise, and 
shifts in the criteria for occupational recruitment. Henceforth, it was to be expected 
that professional politicians and administrators, managers, accountants, and so on 
would emerge, each with their own precise roles, their own area of autonomy and their 
own standards of professional competence. In fact, in the case of lawyer~; the state 
has moved a step further by allowing them to cease becoming state employees. 
Without the connotation of being state cadres and with the blessing of the state, 
lawyers can now engage in private or semi-independent practice. This move, as will 
be seen in later chapters, enhances the lawyers' status as members of a profession and 
encourages greater professionalization. 
Formation of a Competitive Professional Labor Market 
One of the drastic changes in the transition from a planned economy to the 
officially endorsed "socialist market economy" is the commodification of labor, in 
particular the commodification of professional labor, and it will be seen that this has 
led to the gradual formation of a competitive professional labor market. Before the 
1980s, labor markets were virtually non-existent in two senses: labor was not 
considered a commodity; and the labor force was not allowed to flow freely between 
jobs. Once a person was allocated to a work unit she or he was virtually guaranteed a 
life-long "iron rice bowl". Transfers among work units were extremely difficult and 
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labor mobility was seldom observed. But the two decades of reform policies have 
seen the "iron rice bowl" gradually crushed, a labor market is in formation and 
horizontal labor mobility across different occupations has become more frequent 
(Zhongguo gaige bao, 17/9/96: 2). The gradual formation of a professional labor 
market has much to do with the drastic changes occurring in the educational sector. 
Two aspects are of particular importance: the marketization of higher education and 
the concomitant abolition of the national job allocation system for university and 
college graduates. 
One important aspect of the marketization of higher education in China is the 
emergence of fee-paying students (Yin and White 1994). Prior to the 1980s, higher 
educational institutions were in the tight grip of the Ministry of Education, as the 
training of professional manpower was seen as primarily serving national 
construction. Ever since the dual system of a national unified examination for 
university admission and a nation-wide job placement for all graduates was instituted 
in 1955, higher education had been shouldering the responsibility for adjusting to the 
precise needs of industrialization and socialist nation-building. Each year, the 
Ministry had drawn up quotas of the number of students who could be admitted, and 
candidates were distributed to different institutions according to their academic 
standing. The cost of university and college education was entirely covered by the 
. i 
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state, and all students were guaranteed employment upon their graduation. Each year, 
a detailed job placement ifenpei) plan would be mandated from the central 
government. When the plan was transmitted, the tertiary institutions began to allocate 
their graduating students to designated locales and positions. By centralizing the 
allocation of jobs the state was able to match graduates in a mechanistic way to posts 
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in state enterprises and government ministries (Hayhoe 1996: 87). Thus, it was 
almost certain that students would assume the identity of state cadres upon finishing 
their studies. The system did not leave much choice for the students, and they were 
constantly admonished to "subordinate their own needs to those of the state, obey the 
assignment and go wherever they are needed" (Du 1992: 84). One of the functions of 
the job placement system was to guarantee the supply of manpower to remote areas 
where graduates might not want to go voluntarily (Wang 1998: 25). It gave the state 
even more control over meaningful employment opportunities for the educated than 
did the famous imperial examination system that for millennia tied Confucian elites to 
the state (Perry 1992: 159). 
In the early stages of state-building in the PRC, this system did serve the 
purpose of assigning graduates to industries in need of personnel and helped in 
socialist construction. But the overcentralization of this job allocation process has 
always met with difficulties when there was a disparity between the supply of students 
in different fields of study and the needs of the enterprises. The state had therefore 
resorted to administrative means to allocate graduates to specified work units 
regardless of whether the jobs matched with their specialties. For instance, among the 
graduates of 1981 and 1982, i.e., the first two batches of graduates after the 
resumption of university entrance examinations in 1978, some ten to fifteen percent 
reported a mismatch between the student's specialty and the resultant job, and some 
twenty percent were considered overqualified or not appropriate for the job and hence 
were made idle (CHE 7-8/93: 38). 
As China prepared to embark on the Four Modernizations in 1978, it came to 
be recognized that these problems stemmed largely from excessive governmental 
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control. Thus, in the early 1980s, the Ministry of Education proposed some sweeping 
changes in the higher education sector. First, higher education was to open up to 
students who are not financed by the state. These fee-paying students generally fell 
into two categories: commissioned students (weipei) whose expenses are paid through 
contracts with enterprises, and private students. This was formally endorsed in the 
1985 reform statement, "Reform of China's Educational Structure: Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Party," which declared that in addition to state-planned 
enrolments for higher education, the enrolment scheme would be extended to contract 
' '('.;. 
training and self-paying enrolments, the so-called regulatory enrolments. "' 
Second, universities were to be given a greater role in the deliberations over 
job placements for regular students, and a "meeting between the demand and supply 
sides" (gongxu jianmian ), involving student applications and interviews with work 
units, was to be promoted. Then in 1989, an interim reform proposal on job 
assignments made it clear that in the long term the state envisaged only an advisory 
and policy role in the job markets, and graduate employment would be based on the 
mechanism of competition. Employing units would have to attract graduates on 
mutually satisfactory terms. The general policy thus advocated is "mutual selection" 
(shuangxiang xuanze) between the employer and the graduate, though students 
enrolled at state expense would have certain privileges in terms of job opportunities in 
the state sector over those enrolled under the alternative funding methods. In relation 
to both groups, the state's role was merely to be a regulatory one (Hayhoe 1993: 2). 
This was a breakthrough away from the all-encompassing dual system over students' 
enrollment and job placement. Coinciding with this, from 1992 onwards the 
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proportion of regulatory enrollments increased tremendously and thus the method of 
"mutual selection" spread further (CHE 7-8/94: 21). 
But the trend towards a more marketized higher education sector was not 
without setbacks. Especially in the aftermath of the student movement in 1989 the 
government showed a brief tendency to slacken the pace in recruiting fee-paying 
students (Yin and White 1994: 220). In the area of job placement, some hard-line 
ideologues argued that even with the economic reforms, market regulation should 
always be secondary to the planned socialist economy. University gradit~tes, being 
..,, 
the most important component of human resources in production, should always 
remain in the tight grip of the state or else China would deviate from the socialist ideal 
(CHE 7-8/93: 38). Because of this there was a return in practice to more directive 
policies in 1991 and 1992. But essentially the opposition gave way to the more 
pressing concern to rationalize the allocation of human resources. Especially after 
Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992 the call for a socialist market economy was 
reinforced and the market mechanism was recognized as a key to distribute all 
resources, including of course human resources and the deployment of professional 
personnel. Finally, in a document issued in 1993 entitled "Program for China's 
Educational Reform and Development", it was proposed that the conventional 
practice of the state covering all expenses of higher education would gradually be 
changed to a tuition-fee-paying system, and the system of post-graduation job 
allocations would eventually be abolished. A small proportion of graduates would 
still have jobs arranged by the state, but a large proportion would have to find jobs on 
their own (CHE 7-8/94: 21). Essentially, higher education being non-compulsory, the 
extension of a market logic to this sector confirmed. A labor market for professional 
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personnel has been in formation ever since, although whether it is genuinely 
competitive is debatable, as will be seen in later chapters. 
There has been skepticism as to the over-hastiness of abolishing the job 
placement system without first establishing a proper mechanism for fair competition 
(Wang 1998: 33). Concerns were also raised over the disparities between central and 
hinterland regions in their relative advantages and disadvantages in attracting needed 
educated talent for development (Hayhoe 1993: 9). Nonetheless, a definitive move 
towards greater professional mobility was in sight and more career opport~p.ities have 
become available for the graduates. As will be observed, this certainly has played a 
role in enhancing the emergence of more identifiable professional groups and their 
striving towards greater professionalization. 
The eventual abolition of the job placement system has also exerted an 
enormous impact on student career aspirations. In the 1980s students did not have 
much of a career aspiration since under centralized state planning it was not up to 
them to decide their future jobs. In effect they were more concerned with the work 
units they were allocated to than with the actual job content (e.g. Lin and Bian 1991 ). 
A study done in 1988 and 1989 showed that a large proportion of the youth surveyed 
were quite ignorant in their choice of specialties and careers. Even though many of 
them would prefer to choose a job they like, in the end 77.9 percent of the respondents 
had landed their job through the allocation system. When asked if they would choose 
the same specialty or career again if given a chance, more than half of the respondents 
(56.2 percent) reported that they would choose differently (Yao 1990). In contrast, 
students admitted in the 1990s were more certain in the choice of their specialties. In 
view of the gradual change to tuition-fee paying in higher education and the need to 
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hunt for a job by themselves upon graduation, students would be more clearheaded in 
their fields of study and career aspiration. It is expected that a career or a profession 
would be the most important factor shaping the life course of the younger generation. 
Relaxation of the hukou system also contributes to the mobility of professional 
labor and hence the formation of a professional labor market. Although the hukou 
system stillis in place, in essence the restrictions are much relaxed and people are not 
nearly as bound by it as before. Non-local university graduates usually deal with the 
hukou problem in two ways. Some students look for jobs which can hel~:;.them get a 
hukou in a desirable city regardless of whether they like the job or not. Some, 
however, would take on jobs they like in a locale regardless of whether the work units 
can promise them a hukou or not. In private enterprises, where a local hukou is not 
usually guaranteed, the students' dossier would be sent back to their hometowns but 
they can always secure a temporary residency permit as long as they are verified by 
the new work unit. In essence, the hukou ceases to pose a restriction on mobility for 
people at this level of education, and university graduates are allowed a greater 
chance to develop a career without bothering so much about the residential permit. 
To summarize, although the rise of professions in China can be understood in 
the broader context of an industrializing and hence modernizing society, this conceals 
from us a more nuanced critical assessment of the concrete state policies that led to 
such a rise. In the end, what is suggested in this dissertation is that changing state 
polices have unintentionally opened up opportunities that make it possible for 
professional groups to assume a more distinct identity and to allow for professional 
mobility and professionalization. The different courses of professionalization depend, 
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though, very much upon how the professional groups make use of this opening up to 
maneuver and advance their interests as a group. 
The Professionals in China: Who Are They? 
In China's official population census, Chinese people are categorized into 
eight classifications according to the nature and field of work they engage in. These 
in tum are divided into 59 major groups and a further 306 sub-categories (Table 2.1). 
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Since statistics from the Fifth National Population Census conducted in 2'600 are not 
yet fully available, references can only be made here to the Third and Fourth National 
Table 2.1. The Official Occupational Classification System and Census Statistics 
Major Sub- Percentage oftotala 
Classifications: groups categories 1982 1990 
1. Professional and technical personnel 11 84 5.07 5.31 
2. Heads of government agencies, parties, 
social organizations, enterprises and 
institutions 4 16 1.56 1.75 
3. Office clerks and related staff 4 14 1.30 1.74 
4. Workers engaged in commerce 4 8 1.81 3.01 
5. Workers engaged in service trades 4 22 2.21 2.40 
6. Laborers engaged in farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery 8 23 71.98 70.58 
7. Workers engaged in industrial 
production, transportation and related 
activities 27 138 15.99. 15.16 
8. Other laborers not otherwise classified 1 1 0.09 0.05 
Note: a Figures not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
Sources: Zhongguo renkou nianjian 1985, pp. 633-4; Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou pucha ziliao, pp. 
729-71. 
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Population Censuses, conducted in 1982 and 1990 respectively. In both censuses, 
more than seventy percent of China's workforce were engaged in primary production. 
Professional and technical personnel accounted for only about five percent of the total. 
Compared with the early 1980s, the Fourth National Population Census in 1990 found 
only a slight increase (0.24 percent) in the makeup of professionals. 
Professional and technical personnel are further classified into eight major 
groups. These are: scientists and social scientists, engineering and technical 
personnel, administrators in scientific fields, pilots and mechanics, phytjcians and 
other medical personnel, economic personnel and administrators, lawyers and legal 
workers, teachers, artists, athletes and coaches, cultural workers and, lastly, religious 
personnel (Table 2.2). Education, notably, is not the defining attribute of 
professionals. Although a trend towards intellectualization and professionalization 
was clearly seen, in 1990 university graduates or above still accounted for just about 
22 percent of all professional and technical personnel. Up to half were graduates of 
high schools or two-year technical colleges only, and slightly less than five percent 
received only an elementary education or even no formal schooling at all. They are, 
therefore, regarded as professionals because the state has defined them as such. 
Among the eight professional groups, scientists and social scientists had the 
highest educational level. More than eighty percent of them had a university 
education or above. For personnel in medicine and law, the Fourth National 
Population Census in 1990 showed that college and university graduates accounted 
for only 16.21 percent and 34.91 percent respectively. In the area oflaw, however, the 
percentage of legal workers with a college or university education increased by 
Table 2.2. Educational Levels of Professional and Technical Personnel, 1982 and 1990. (%) 
Technical 
College or College and High Junior High Elementary No Formal 
above a Schoolb School School Schoo lint 
1982 1990 1982 1990 1982 1990 1982 1990 1982 1990 
Professional and technical personnel: 13.05 21.79 44.45 49.47 32.49 24.22 10.01 4.38 -- 0.16 
1. Scientists and social scientists 77.10 80.35 16.65 15.58 3.72 3.11 2.63 0.87 -- 0.10 
2. Engineering and technical personnel 42.37 46.14 36.57 36.51 13.61 12.79 7.46 4.39 -- 0.16 
3. Administrators in scientific fields 7.66 45.34 49.01 35.59 37.85 15.24 5.44 3.48 -- 0.35 
4. Pilots and mechanics 9.72 10.60 22.06 24.74 29.08 31.34 39.14 29.59 -- 3.73 
5. Physicians and medical personnel 10.06 16.21 38.03 49.80 36.19 27.49 15.72 6.30 -- 0.20 
6. Economic workers and administrators 1.90 9.51 36.25 50.60 45.19 33.95 16.66 5.89 -- 0.05 
7. Lawyers and legal workers 8.94 34.91 33.71 43.48 46.34 18.20 11.01 3.36 -- 0.05 
8. Teachers 13.91 25.33 58.05 56.10 25.86 17.42 2.19 1.13 -- 0.02 
9. Artists, athletes and coaches 5.76 12.67 32.54 57.43 41.45 38.56 20.25 11.03 -- 0.61 
10. Cultural workers 19.99 35.30 40.86 41.52 32.12 20.36 7.04 2.77 -- 0.06 
11. Religious workers 2.86 2.34 8.17 8.09 20.59 25.08 68.38 48.91 
-- 15.58 
-
Notes: a Figures derived from adding up "university graduates" and "studying at universities" in 1982 and "university" and "college" in 1990. 
bFigure in 1982 contains only entries for "high school". <fl 
c Entered as "illiterate and semi-illiterate" in census statistics. 
Sources: Zhongguo renkou nianjian 1985, pp. 657; Zhongguo 1990 nian renkoupucha ziliao, pp. 729-71. 
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almost four-fold, from about 9 percent in 1982 to 35 percent in 1990, suggesting a 
greater effort is being made to upgrade the legal realm. 
This trend towards expertocracy is clearly seen in the increasing emphasis on 
professional qualifications. This is manifested in the forms of executing a 
professional qualifying examination and a certification system. This is linked to 
another aspect of the state's definition of professions. Since the first national lawyers' 
examination was implemented in 1986, the state has also designed qualifying 
examinations for a number of other professions, in part in order to promot(.-their status. 
This includes the accountants, architects, engineers, pharmacists, teachers, 
statisticians, and even economists. Altogether there are now 35 occupations requiring 
certified qualifications in order to engage in professional work (Editorial Group 
1998). 
It was widely acknowledged in the late 1980s that the professional elites, and 
the larger group of intellectuals, were not at all happy about their social and economic 
situation. A commonly observed syndrome was their initial dissatisfaction with the 
Chinese leadership's program of reforms. Their dissatisfaction was particularly 
reflected in their complaints about the wage disparities between intellectuals and 
private-sector people in the service trades (nao ti dao gua), that there existed an 
inverse relationship between the degree of one's mental labor and the income they 
received. They complained that they were not getting their fair share as the value of 
their contributions to society was not realized in monetary returns. This was 
expressed in the following widely known doggerel (shunkouliu): 
The one who operates on the brain makes less than the one who shaves 
the scalp; 
The one who plays the piano gets less than the one who moves it; 
The missile researcher makes less than the egg seller. 
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However, as the evolving reforms proceeded into the 1990s the dissatisfaction of the 
professional elite gradually ceased. This was particularly true after the wage reforms 
in 1993. The professionals found that they were doing far better than workers as the 
reforms accelerated, with the latter suffering from massive lay offs in the restructuring 
of state enterprises. 
A recent national survey on social stratification in China ranked the 
professional and technical personnel fourth among the ten strata identified (Lu Xueyi 
2002). The professionals came after the state administrators, the managerial class, 
and the private entrepreneurs. The industrial workers now ranked seventh in this new 
schema of social classes. The professionals achieved a far higher status and a more 
secure income by possessing "cultural capital" (wenhua ziyuan) that enables them to 
maintain an advantageous position in the changing market economy. In 2001, when 
the survey was conducted, it was estimated that the professional stratum constituted 
just about 5 .1 percent of the total population. In the economically developed cities, 
however, they could add up to 10 to 20 percent. For instance, in Shenzhen they 
represented 19.9 percent of the population, with an average monthly income of about 
5,800 yuan (pp. 11 and 27). The professional class was also the most educated. Their 
average years of education amounted to 14.25, whereas the state administrators and 
the managerial stratum had attained 13.80 and 13.46 years of education respectively 
(p. 32). 
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Lawyers and Doctors in China 
In social surveys conducted in China, lawyers and doctors are very often 
classified as "high professionals" alongside scientists, university professors, 
engmeers etc. (cf. Walder 1995), presumably because they have had a higher 
educational level. The 1990 Population Census showed that almost 60 percent of the 
lawyers and 35 percent of the doctors had achieved a college or university education 
(Table 2.3). Two different interpretations of these figures should be noted. First, 
considering that law as a profession was only reestablished in 1978, su~h a high 
concentration of college and university graduates suggests that the state put in a great 
effort to develop the legal profession in order to serve the larger purpose of economic 
development. Second, the data suggest that lawyers in general are a more urban 
profession than doctors. This again has to do with the state's mandates about how to 
utilize law and medicine. Law is to serve the economy and to link China up with the 
rest of the globe and therefore requires highly educated personnel, who presumably 
would be concentrated in the cities. Medicine, on the other hand, serves the larger 
population, and a significant proportion of the populace reside in the countryside and 
require health care. The almost 33 percent of doctors who have graduated from 
technical colleges (Table 2.3) are likely to serve in medical clinics and hospitals at the 
county and rural township levels. 
As in other "civil law" countries in Europe (e.g., Germany, France, Italy etc.), 
the state dictates the division of the legal professions. Although the Chinese term, 
lilshi, is generally translated as lawyers, it has a much narrower meaning than its 
American counterpart and the boundary is very clearly delineated. There is a much 
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Table 2.3. Educational Levels of Lawyers and Doctors, 1990. 
Lawyers Doctors• 
University 19.24% 16.36% 
Tertiary College 40.49% 18.80% 
Technical (secondary) College 11.74% 32.96% 
j High School 18.75% 11.57% 
I 
Junior High School 8.80% 17.21% 
Primary School 0.91% 3.04% 
No Formal Schooling 0.07% 0.07% 
Note: •Figures do not add up to 100 because ofrounding. 
Source: Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou pucha ziliao, pp. 730-1. 
greater splitting of the roles that are combined among American lawyers. Graduates 
in law do not constitute a corporate group. Instead, under the national job assignment 
system, graduates were streamlined into different careers in law. Either they could 
become judges (in the court system), procurators (in state procuracy), lawyers (state 
law firms), legal counsels (state enterprises), or simply civil servants in the bureaus of 
justice (state organs). Lateral mobility among these occupations did not exist until the 
privatization of law firms got under way in 1992. Moreover, job mobility is 
uni-directional: i.e., many judges and procurators have become private lawyers but 
the reverse is not found. Regardless of the state's formal definition, the Chinese term 
Wshi in common parlance today by and large refers to lawyers working in law firms, 
which is the subject of this study. 
Before the 1990s, lawyers as well as the members of all of the other legal 
occupations were state employees. The 1982 Lawyers' Regulations defined lawyers 
as "state legal workers" and their duty was to "serve the legitimate interest of the state, 
the collectives, and the citizen" (Article 1). To cope with the changing economy, 
! 
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however, starting from 1989 the Ministry of Justice began to draft a new Lawyers' 
Law, which was not promulgated until 1996. The law shifted its definition oflawyers 
away from the nature of their status to an emphasis on professional qualifications: 
lawyers are "practitioners who have obtained lawyers' license to practice and provide 
legal services to the society" (Article 2). 
By contrast, the Chinese term for doctors, yisheng, is very embracing. In 
colloquial daily usage . Chinese doctors are also called daifu, which is actually the 
more traditional form of the professional title of doctors. In any case,.. ~~h yisheng 
and daifu are honorific titles only. Chinese people tend to address anyone who treats 
other people's sickness as doctors. Thus, the "barefoot doctors" who receive only 
elementary training in the provision of health care also enjoy the title of "doctors." As 
early as 1985 the Ministry of Health had been drafting a Doctors' Law, one of the 
main aims of which is to regulate the expanding team of medical personnel. This law 
was not promulgated until 1998. Similar to the lawyers, the government now defines 
the doctors according to the professional qualifications they obtain. Accordingly, 
doctors are "practitioners who have obtained a doctor's license to practice and register 
in medical, preventive, and health care organizations" (Article 2). Doctors in this 
study refer to registered physicians who work in hospitals and health clinics. 
Chapter Three 
Differing Rationalities: 
The Politics of Legal and Health Reform 
"Serve the people" (wei renminfuwu)! 
In the early years of the People's Republic these few words could be seen 
almost everywhere. Originally a speech made by Mao in 1944 to commemorate the 
death of Zhang Side, a loyal communist army officer (Mao 1986: 587-8), the phrase 
later was translated into one of the guiding principles of the party's work. "Serve the 
people" conveys a sense of selflessness and a willingness to work for the common 
good of the society. Members of the communist party, therefore, were expected, or 
demanded, to selflessly serve the interest of the larger and general public. However 
rhetorical it was, the ethos of "serving the people" was particularly prevalent in the 
arena of medical and health services. In the first national conference on health in 
1950, the minister of health proclaimed that the principal stance of health workers was 
to "serve the people," that is, the workers, peasants, and the military (Liu et al. 1998: 
146). A study of medicine in pre-reform China also suggested that "[the ethic] 
seemed not at all an empty cliche" (Sidel and Sidel 1973: 202). 
When reforms were introduced in 1978, however, ideological rigor began to 
give way to pragmatism. Mao's emphasis on "politics in command" - where every 
decision, no matter whether political, economic, or social, is essentially of a political 
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nature - was no longer favored in a society marching towards a market economy. In 
its place came "economism in command," i.e. economic construction should be put at 
the center of all activities (yi jingji jianshe wei zhongxin) and every step forward or 
every policy decision taken was to be broached within the hegemonic discourse of 
economic development. 1 In most areas, the policy stance gradually shifted away from 
"serve the people" to one that instead prioritized the need to "serve the economy." 
This is best illustrated by reforms in the legal sector, which are predominantly 
concerned with establishing a stable environment for the economy to further develop. 
' f~­
Scholars on China's legal system have generally acknowledged that the state adopts a 
very pragmatic approach to law, that law is explicitly meant to function as a tool of the 
state (e.g. Alford 1994; Brown 1997; Potter 1998; Lubman 1999). At the beginning of 
the reform period, Deng Xiaoping openly called for a "two hands policy," which 
meant that on the one hand the economy must be developed while on the one hand, the 
legal system must be strengthened (Chen 1999: 40). In line with this, one of the first 
laws to be adopted during the early reform period was the Economic Contract Law in 
1981. Law was, and still is, treated as an instrument serving the goal of economic 
development, which was illustrated by the CCP policy that all government leaders and 
economic units must use legal means, supplemented by other means, to maintain 
economic order. Besides, law in China is not understood in terms of morality and 
rights and freedom. Instead, legislation is legitimated primarily by the actual needs or 
the actual conditions (shiji) as defined by the party, and in the reform era general 
1 The use of the word "economism in command" over "economy in command" has to do with the 
overriding ideology of"putting economic development first" in the past two decades of reform, which 
has become an everyday, but hegemonic, discourse. 
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economic construction and the needs of development are the guiding "actuality" (Yu 
1989: 42). 
Yet, in the area of medical care delivery the ethos of "serve the people" does 
retain its hold. However formalistic it is, reform in the health sector is still largely 
framed by the rationality to better serve the public. In particular, the rhetoric of 
medicine as a "life-and-death" matter predominates. Time and again the government 
has reiterated its commitment to ensure that every person in the country would be able 
to enjoy the provision of health care. Although raising economic efficacy i~·ne of the 
prime concerns, the health of the population is not to be compromised by the logic of 
the market. Medicine in China, therefore, still is rhetorically committed to "serve the 
people." 
Hence, reform in China does not have just one logic and one direction but 
must be understood in a multiplicity of reforms. In their study of the postsocialist 
pathways in East Central Europe, David Stark and Lasazl6 Bruszt (1998) argue that 
even within one single country "there is also not one transition but many occurring in 
different domains and the temporality of these processes is often asynchronous and 
their articulation seldom harmonious" (p. 81 ). The actual processes involve the 
introduction of new elements "in combination with adaptation, rearrangements, 
permutations, and reconfigurations of already existing institutional forms" (p. 83). 
They therefore choose to speak of transformations over transition, since the word 
"transformations" does not presuppose a hypothesized end-state. Stark and Bruszt's 
skepticism about cookbook capitalism is useful here. Reform in China has always 
been incremental in the sense that wholesale replacement by capitalism had never 
been considered. There were not any substantive and detailed blueprints nor a 
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coherent theoretical formulation but only some guiding principles - even the 
formulation of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" together with a "socialist 
commodity economy" was only vaguely conceived when the terms were initially 
introduced in 1987. China is therefore not imitating any "ism" by design but is pretty 
much "open-ended" (Lin 1989; see also Naughton 1995). The reform process itself is 
governed by its own internal logic rather than any predestined objectives. At the 
sectoral level we can find transformations in different domains ruled by differing 
rationalities. The pace and strategies of the reforms reflect the constraints imposed by 
' 1f-
not only the existing institutional configurations but also the underlying logic of 
rationality in the process of institutionalization. "Institutions," therefore, "limit the 
field of action, preclude some directions, and constrain certain courses. But 
institutions also favor the perception and selection of some strategies over others" 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998: 81). It is within this context that the institutionalization of 
law and medicine in China follows two differing logics of rationality, i.e. "serve the 
economy" versus "serve the people". I shall argue that these differing rationalities are 
to be explained by an interest-based argument that emphasizes a different 
constellation of state interests in the institutionalization process. 
Rationality is defined as "the controlled and unified mapping of human 
activity around purpose and the corresponding segregation of this activity from the 
more irrational, chaotic, or corrupt aspects of social life and activity" (Meyer 1992: 
261 ). On expounding the Weberian distinction of formal rationality and substantive 
rationality, Habermas points out that formal rationality involves both "instrumental 
rationality" and "the rationality of choice," in contradistinction to substantive 
evaluation of the value systems underlying the preferences that characterizes the 
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substantive rationality as value-rationality (Habermas 1984: 168-85). In cases where 
the choice does not reflect the underlying preferences, the formal rationality deviates 
from the substantive rationality and inconsistencies and incompatibility might arise. 
The logics of rationality therefore operate in two respects here: first, among the 
different logics of formal rationality of reform at the sectoral level; and second, 
between the formal and substantive rationality in an area of reform. On the one hand, 
competing logics of rationality and their locus underlie different areas of sectoral 
reform across China. On the other hand, the logic of rationality governing th~ policy 
directives of an area of reform may or may not adhere to the overall rationality of the 
larger economic reform, which defines the substantive rationality. 
Paul DiMaggio (1988) has commented that institutional theory would be 
limited in the scope of organizational changes it purports to explain if it does not pay 
explicit attention to the role of interest and agency. Institutionalization should not be 
taken only as an outcome but also a process, and, as a process, it "is profoundly 
political and reflects the relative power of organized interests and the actors who 
mobilize around them" (p. 13). In the model of institutionalization I propose here 
(Figure 3 .1 ), I argue that how the state interprets its interests has an essential bearing 
on the kind of rationality it adopts in the areas of legal and health reform. Although 
both sectors face common institutional pressures to reform as the national economy 
progresses at the macro level, an orientation towards "serving the economy" versus 
"serving the people" results in divergent paths in the process of institutionalization of 
law and medicine respectively. Consequently, we find that the profession as a target 
included in the reform package is more prevalent in the legal sector than the health 
sector. While professional development in a socialist context is necessarily a 
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state-sponsored one and the active engagement of the professionals is therefore not 
called for, Chinese lawyers are found to be more reactive to the reform policies 
whereas doctors are largely inactive towards the reform agenda in the health realm. 
Figure 3.1 
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The institutionalization of law follows a technical model while that of 
medicine an institutional model. These divergent tracks are primarily results of the 
different interpretations and representation of interests. Historical institutionalists 
have argued that actors' interests are very much shaped by collective organizations 
and institutions that bear traces of their own history. Consequently, not only the 
strategies but also the goals that actors pursued are shaped by the institutional context 
(Steinrno et al. 1992).2 Ellen Irnrnergut (1992a, 1992b) finds that the same proposal 
of national health insurance yielded varied outcomes in France, Switzerland, and 
Sweden not so much because of the differing demands and resources of social groups 
but rather as a result of the specificities of the legislative process in these countries. It 
was the different "rules of the game" established by the political institutions that 
2 For a comparison ofhistorical institutionalism with other schools of institutionalism, see for example, 
Hall and Taylor (1996), Immergut (1998), and Campbell and Pedersen (2001) 
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actually constructed and formulated actors' interests and hence their representation. 
Thus, different institutional frameworks create different constellations of interests and 
different cleavages and political conflicts, the corollary of which are different 
responses to a common problem. Drawing on the insights in the studies of historical 
institutionalism, I employ an interest-based argument here to account for the different 
models in the "institutionalization project" (DiMaggio 1988: 14) of the legal and 
health enterprises in China. In the two areas of reform the state holds different 
constellations of interest, inasmuch as the legal and medical histories differ. In this 
sense, the divergent tracks are also path-dependent. 
The Institutionalization of Law to "Serve the Economy" 
When legal reform started in 1978, it was less about restoring the legal system 
than building up an entirely new one as a result of a virtual vacuum in the legal system 
for two decades (e.g. Chiu 1994). In the early years of the People's Republic, eff01is 
had been made to establish a stable legal order. A State Constitution and organic 
legislation for the courts and procuracy were passed during the first session of the 
NPC, and a series of procedural and substantive laws were also enacted. Efforts were 
also made to draft civil, criminal, and procedural codes. All these efforts, however, 
were brought to an abrupt end when Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Movement in 
1957. Legal scholars and officials who dared to suggest that law should not succumb 
to politics during the Hundred Flowers Campaign were branded as rightists and 
purged. Lawyers ceased to practice; law schools not only were reduced in number but 
the curriculum was also increasingly politicized; and the Ministry of Justice was also 
abolished in 1959. The legal system was further paralyzed during the Cultural 
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Revolution when "smashing the Public Security, the Procuracy, and the Courts" (gong 
jianfa) was the slogan of the day. Procuratorates were formally abolished in 1969 and 
law schools were closed down. Thus, the Cultural Revolution marked an era of legal 
anarchy "bereft of the laws of man or heaven" (wufa wutian).3 It was not until after 
the arrest of the "Gang of Four" that the Cultural Revolution officially came to an end 
was the legal system revived. 
Legal reform had included the reestablishment of some institutions -
procuratorates were resurrected in 1978 and the Ministry of Justice re-in~tuted in 
1979, but a lot more had to do with the creation of entirely new legal institutions 
(Lubman 1996: 3).4 The new leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping now appealed to 
the consolidation of law so that political power could be upheld more firmly and the 
past errors of the Maoist era would not recur (Chen 1998: 34-5). In the interest of 
restoring order and also to steer the modernization program, strengthening of the legal 
system was seen as tantamount to providing a secure and orderly environment for 
economic development. As noted by Ronald Brown (1997), law has been functional 
and instrumental ever since China committed itself to reform: 
The uses of law began to evolve in three discernible stages: (1) the 
1979 Open Door policy and national drive for modernization, 
including the use oflaws as an inducement for foreign investment; (2) 
the 1990's transition to a socialist market economy - using laws as a 
means to achieve increased competitive efficiency and certainty for 
economic development in the international market; and (3) the 
government's move into global participant and leadership - which 
required 'membership' in this club,' adherence to international 
standards and rules, including meaningful law enforcement (p. 115). 
3 For a review of the legal history in the Mao era see Wu Jianfan (1983), and Chen (1998: 20-38). 
4 For a discussion oflegal reform in China since 1978 see generally Chiu (1980, 1994), Baum (1986), 
Dicks (1989), Hsia and Zeldin (1987), and Lubman (1996, 1999). 
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The reform era therefore witnessed an explosion in legislative activities since 
1978. Up to 1988 the NPC and its Standing Committee has enacted 67 laws and the 
State Council has also issued more than five hundred regulations (Chiu 1994: 6). 
Among these are the Law on the Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment (1979), Economic Contract Law (1981), Trademark Law (1982), Patent 
Law (1984), and Foreign Economic Contract Law (1985).5 During the eighth session 
of the NPC (1993-98), 111 laws or decisions on related laws have been approved, 
accounting for 39 percent of the 319 laws adopted by the NPC and its Standing 
' r-:-·· 
Committee since late 1978. And most of these 111 laws have to do with the economy 
(BR 29/9/97: 13), in line with the saying that "the market economy is an economy 
governed by law" (shichang jingji shi fazhi jingji). 
As it strives towards legal modernization, the Chinese state appeals to a set of 
numbers as the yardstick of how far legal development has gone and how well it 
serves the increasing volume of economic and business transactions and in particular 
transactions with foreign investors: the number of laws promulgated in each NPC 
session, the number and the educational credential oflawyers, and the number of civil 
and economic cases brought to the courts, etc. In one sense this echoes the "late 
industrialization syndrome" in which numerical figures rule. The interests of the state 
are therefore material and the process of institutionalizing law technical, in the sense 
that reforms in the legal sector are only a means whereby the ends of economic 
development could be guaranteed. 
5 See Chiu (1994: 6-9) for a list of the major laws, decisions, and regulations promulgated during this 
period. 
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Such a technical model of institutionalization is therefore institutionally 
constituted. Measures in the legal reform are mapped in a unified means-ends relation 
leading to goals, defined by the state as providing a stable environment for China to 
further develop. To employ March and Olsen's (1989) term, "serve the economy" 
represents not only the "logic of instrumentality" but also the "logic of 
appropriateness." It therefore entails both formal (instrumental) and substantive 
(value) rationality. Such a model of institutionalization in tum impacts on the 
concrete reform policies pertaining to the development of the legal profession. 
' "("".; .. 
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The Institutionalization of Medicine to "Serve the People" 
Studies on health care systems in liberal democracies find that they are the 
results of particular historical circumstances (e.g. Starr 1982; Wall 1996). Similarly 
in China, the health system is also an historical contingent. To develop a strong and 
powerful China required first of all a healthy population. As Foucault (1980) has 
argued, since the eighteenth century "the emergence of the health and physical 
well-being of the population in general [has become] one of the essential objectives of 
political power" (p. 170). This was compounded by the Soviet ideology that people's 
health was a resource to the society (Field 1967). Against this backdrop Mao placed 
health care on the priority list as early as the 1930s. Mao's orientation to "serve the 
people" could further be seen in the charges laid against the Ministry of Health just 
prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution. In 1965 Mao criticized the ministry as 
serving only fifteen percent of the population and ignoring the medical and health 
needs of the rural masses. Subsequently, medical education was drastically shortened 
to three years, urban doctors were sent down to villages to practice, and a large 
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number of barefoot doctors were trained to serve the vast rural population (Sidel and 
Sidel 1973: 29-31 ). It could be concluded that "serve the people" was not just rhetoric 
but actual practice at that time (Croizier 1975). 
During the period of socialist construction public health was seen as an 
element of national strength and human welfare, and tremendous efforts were made to 
improve the nation's health status. The "first health care revolution in China" 
(Jamison et al. 1984) did achieve noticeable results. Life expectancy doubled from 34 
years in 1931 to 69 years in 19S 1. Infant mortality rate had been dramatically,;.reduced 
'·' 
to 34.7 per 1000 live births. The ratio of hospital beds to population increased 
fifteen-fold, and the ratio of physicians to population doubled (Yang et al. 1985: 482). 
In 1949, China possessed only 84,000 hospital beds and 540,000 medical workers. 
By 1983, the number of hospital beds had risen to 2.11 million and the number of 
medical personnel totaled 4.09 million (BR 14/11/84: 24; MOH 1988: 1). These 
figures clearly indicate that China has indeed developed a vast network of health care 
services albeit with very limited resources. 
Contrary to the technical model in legal reform, this history of health 
development in the first three decades of the People's Republic renders the state to 
adopt a different model in the institutionalization of the health enterprise. When 
China espoused health reform in the 1980s, it built substantially on the rhetoric and 
achievements of the past three decades. "Serve the people" still topped the principles 
of health development, with a gradual policy shift from the rapid expansion of the 
"quantity" of medical personnel and institutions to an emphasis on "quality" of health 
care provisions. While pressures unleashed by the general economic reform compel 
the state to also observe cost-containment and efficacy in the health sector, its moral 
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and political commitment in the health of the population makes it not possible to 
adopt a wholesale marketization in its delivery of health services. Not only is it 
against the socialist ideology but also politically illegitimate and therefore not viable. 
In fact, the Ministry of Health had guarded against a tum to a profit-orientation by 
public hospitals. A directive issued in August 1985 made it clear that health care 
provisions should not pursue profits in the interest of upgrading economic efficacy, 
but must "uphold the principle to serve the people" (MOH 1988: 7). The introduction 
of a "contract responsibility system" (cheng bao zhi) also sparked a decade-long 
' '{:.. 
" debate about the nature of medicine. Although scholars and health admirustrators 
alike invariably dismissed the Maoist system which treated health care as entirely a 
government welfare benefit, there were questions as to whether the accommodation of 
different forms of health care provisions would tum medicine into an economic 
product and hospitals into business enterprises. Some maintained that medicine 
should be treated as a public good, while others argued that hospitals should become 
more entrepreneurial.6 At the center of the debate was the social responsibility and 
moral commitment of the state. The debate was drawn to a close when the National 
Health Conference held in December 1996 finally concluded that "medicine serves 
primarily the cause of public good (gongyixing) and the government practices welfare 
policy towards the delivery of health services" (HN 10/12/96: 1). Health reform 
therefore involves an "ethical dimension" (HN26/l/97: 2). Consequently, "serve the 
people" is not only ideological but moral and political, and it continues to dominate 
the agenda of health policy reform. Although the actual practices of doctors and 
6 On the various views see for example CHP (6194: 20, 1/96: 13-4, 6/96: 21-2, 9/96: 22-4); and HN 
(6/10/96: 2, 26/1/97: 2). 
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hospitals might seem otherwise, the formal rationality of the state in health reform is 
unmistakable here.7 
Hence, the institutionalization of the health sector follows a different logic and 
a different route from that of the legal sector. Since the state is committed to the 
provision of health care to the population, its interests are normative and the model of 
institutionalization an institutional one: health reforms call for a change in the system 
and are mainly about hospital reform and health insurance reform. Even though 
reform policies also include the "re-professionalization of medicine" and:'4:1;vestment 
..,!'-
in high-technology medical care" (Henderson 1989), on the whole the policy 
orientation is more "communal" than "clinical" (Scott 1985). Whereas a clinical 
orientation would aim at securing individual practitioners the right to decide and act in 
an autonomous manner, a communal orientation seeks to improve and rationalize the 
delivery of medical services. Consequently, Chinese doctors are under far more 
constraints in the reform of the healthcare sector. 
Hence, concerns with organizational legitimacy and the normative pillar of 
institutions (Scott 2001) prompted the health sector to follow the "logic of 
appropriateness," that the state sees it as obligatory to shoulder the social and moral 
responsibility for the populace's health. Even if the state has been under huge 
7 Disagreements could have been raised about the notion that health reform is dictated by the "serve the 
people" rationality. True, provision and delivery of health care in China has been marketizing and thus 
privatizing, and stories are abound about doctors demanding "red packets" (hongbao) on the operation 
table and that hospitals require a good sum of money as down payment before treating patients. 
However, what is needed to make clear is to distinguish here the state ideology in putting forward 
health reform and the actual practices by doctors and hospitals in the craze of marketization. Even 
though the state is implementing a fee-for-service program in the health sector, the idea behind is to 
make the delivery of health care services more cost-effective and efficient so as to better serve the 
public. Thus, the "serve the people" rationality here juxtaposes with the "serve the economy" 
rationality in the area of legal reform and development. 
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budgetary constraints, at least it commits itself to ensure the health of its urban 
population. "Serve the people" therefore rules here. Although the substantive 
rationality would be to follow the kind of pragmatism endowed by the national agenda 
of economic reform to raise efficiency and efficacy, the moral commitment to its 
urban population compels the state to adopt a formal rationality to "serve the people." 
Thus, not only we see the logic of rationality of health reform departs from that of 
legal reform, but the formal and substantive rationality also diverge here. 
" "(' . 
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The Politics of Reform and the Role of the Professionals 
The differing models adopted by the legal and health fields are institutionally 
constituted. Consequently, the orientation of concrete reform measures differs and 
professionals find their own roles vary in these two areas of reform. Following John 
Meyer (1978: 357), the power and resources a given professional group has depends 
upon its links to the environment and the dependencies on the environment that it 
controls and mediates. In this vein, the meso institutional environment - the specific 
measures of sectoral reforms - defines the niche in which Chinese lawyers and 
doctors can maneuver, and whether they can protect or expand their niches depends 
on their interaction with the environment. As reform measures are dictated by the 
state, it assumes an active role in defining and determining the parameters in which 
the two professions could act and react. Two types of institutional actors could be 
identified. To draw on DiMaggio (1988) again, the state is an "institutional 
entrepreneur" with sufficient resources to realize interests that it values highly and to 
carry the logic of rationality through, whereas the two professions are "subsidiary 
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actors" who "provide legitimacy to the new organizational form by providing 
resources that render its public accounts of itself plausible" (p. 15). 
In the realm of legal reform, the state sees a greater need in soliciting lawyers 
to (re)establish the legal system. Many policy changes and reform measures targeted 
growth in the ranks of lawyers as an indicator of how far the legal system has been 
moving towards serving economic construction and in particular to link up China with 
the global world (yu guoji jiegui). While lawyers per se still cannot themselves 
introduce any proactive reform initiatives to develop themselves into a pr~,}essional 
group, they respond to the reform policies as "reactive lawyers," and as a 
distinguished and visible professional group in society they are able to hope for a 
tacitly negotiated outcome. In contrast, since health reform in China calls for a 
systemic change that comprises mainly hospital reform and health insurance reform, 
doctors consequently only have a peripheral role to play. Even though early on there 
were provisions allowing doctors to go into private practice, in reality the number of 
private doctors was subject to strict control, a result of the "serve the people" 
rationality that the state needs to make sure that "quality care" would be provided to 
the general public at affordable prices. In sum, doctors are "inactive" in the realm of 
health reform and the logic of "serve the people" works to the disadvantage of doctors 
going private, an important indicator of their circumstance as a professional group. 
The Politics of Legal Reform and "Reactive Lawyers" 
To serve economic construction, lawyers are seen as both functional and 
instrumental to an increasingly complex economic environment. The rapid 
development of lawyers from the 1980s onwards has been attributed to the attention 
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given to the three areas of international commercial transactions, the representation of 
criminal defendants, and management of the domestic economy (Feinerman 1987). 
The reiteration in the 1990s that lawyers should be proficient in their mastery of law, 
knowledgeable in economics, and fluent in foreign languages further reinforces these 
emphases. 
Before the complete abolition of the legal profession during the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign of 1957, there were some 2,900 full- and part-time lawyers practicing in 
about 800 legal advisory offices throughout China (BR 17/11/80: 4; Lan Qurppu 1995: 
304). When the profession was re-instituted again at the start of economic reforms, it 
had to start virtually from scratch, with only 212 lawyers and 79 legal advisory offices 
(SCMP 22/6/98).8 The Ministry of Justice therefore faced a grim task in attempting to 
develop an adequate corps oflegal specialists to "serve the economy." Consequently, 
the reform objectives were technical and targets of quantitative growth were set. The 
institutional environment upon which the legal profession develops must of course be 
attributed to the policy parameters set forth by the state. Since lawyers themselves are 
the policy target, they however have the niche to choose to react to some policy 
changes with skepticism and to others with enthusiasm, in a way that helps push 
forward reform in the direction that the lawyers themselves see appropriate. 
8 The Lawyers' Regulations (1980) stipulated that the business organization where lawyers worked 
were "legal advisory offices" ifa!U guwenchu). Since 1984, however, the term "lawyers' firms" (liishi 
shiwusuo) has been adopted. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the changes in the numbers of lawyers over the past two 
decades. Three phases of development can be discerned: 1979-1988, 1988-1992, and 
1992 till the present. Table 3 .1 gives a list of selected laws and decisions that impact 
on the development of the ranks oflawyers during these three phases. 
Phase I (1979-1988) The profession grew only modestly during the first phase of 
legal development.9 The Ministry of Justice faced a paucity oflawyers when it was 
9 The abrupt decline in the total number of practitioners in 1986 is more a definitional than a real one. 
Before 1986, part-time lawyers included also part-time legal workers who had not obtained lawyers' 
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Table 3.1 A List of Selected Laws and Decisions Pertaining to the Development 
of Lawyers 
Date of Promulgation 
I 19 Dec 1979 
26 Aug 1980 
7 Oct 1984 
8 Oct 1984 
II 3 June 1988 
15 Nov 1989 
6 July 1990 
III 4 Aug 1992 
26 Dec 1993 
15May1996 
Source: Tong Baogui (1996). 
Selected Laws and Decisions 
Notice on Lawyers Work 
Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Lawyers 
(Provisional) Measures on the Supervision of Part-time 
and Specially-Invited Lawyers 
On Strengthening and Reforming the Work of Lawyers 
Experimental Program for Co-operative Law Firms 
Notice on Strengthening the Leadership and Supervision 
of Lawyers Work by Judicial Administrative Organs 
Notice on Rectifying the Team of Lawyers ~rid Their 
Management 
Opinion on Furthering Reform of Lawyers Work 
Program for Deepening Reform of Lawyers Work 
PRC Law on Lawyers 
reestablished in September 1979, and in December it issued a notice urging regional 
governments to quickly establish legal advisory offices in large and medium cities. 
By October 1980, 381 such offices were established with more than 3,000 full-time 
lawyers (Lan Quanpu 1995: 308). These lawyers were recruited through various 
channels. About 15 percent had practiced law during the 1950s; forty percent had had 
experience in various judicial organs, and the remaining 45 percent were drawn from 
various other government organs as well as state enterprises and other public 
credentials. For instance, in 1985 there were 18,218 part-time lawyers, of which 11,645 were 
categorized as legal workers. Exclusion of this category in the statistical definition since 1986 
therefore resulted in the seeming decline, camouflaging the actual increase in the number of part-time 
lawyers from 6,573 in 1985 to 7,046 in 1986. 
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institutional units (Lan Quanpu 1995: 313). Most of these new recruits had good 
political credentials, but less than one fifth of them possessed a higher education in 
law (Lan Quanpu 1995: 318). The low percentage of old lawyers returning to practice 
suggests that many of them were still not regarded as politically reliable by the 
authorities, and they themselves also reportedly had doubts about the new political 
tum (BR 20/7/79: 4). 
The Ministry of Justice initially set a target of having at least 36,000 full-time 
lawyers by the end ofl985 (Lan Quanpu 1995: 313; Zhang Geng 1997: 14Jr-.... In reality 
··.' 
the growth of the profession fell far short of the proposed agenda, and the set target 
was not achieved until 1993. The Lawyers' Regulations (1980) defined lawyers as 
state legal workers on the state's payroll. Law firms, as institutional units (shiye 
danwei), were to be part of the state apparatus and were therefore subject to the 
overall personnel management of the state. Any income (not profit, as institutional 
units are supposedly non-profit-making) went entirely to the state treasury while all 
expenses in operating the firm, including lawyers' salaries, were provided for in the 
state budget (Zheng 1988: 495; Lan Quanpu 1995: 343; Chen 1998: 133). For a legal 
advisory office to recruit an additional lawyer, it would first need to secure an extra 
establishment quota (bianzhi) from the state budget in order to cover the lawyer's 
salary and welfare benefits etc. This arrangement also meant that law firms were 
subject to the system of national job assignments for any new staff. This fundamental 
linkage between the profession and the state thus put a paradoxical constraint on the 
development of the ranks of lawyers. To deal with this problem, in 1984 the Ministry 
of Justice suggested that regional governments should provide extra quotas from local 
institutional establishments for the expansion of the number of full-time lawyers so as 
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to supplement those allocated directly from the central government. These lawyers 
would have their salaries covered through the local government budgets (Tong 
Baogui 1996: 184-8). This in essence decentralized to local governments the 
responsibility for developing the profession, making it contingent on the latter's 
initiative to provide for necessary institutional support. 
At the same time, the Ministry of Justice also experimented with other forms 
of financial management. Instead of being wholly state-funded, law firms, depending 
on their own financial well-being, were encouraged to become self-sup~?rting or 
having the state subsidize them only to make their accounts balance. But this was 
sometimes done in an autocratic manner that invited the dismay of lawyers. For 
instance, two lawyers from a city in Hebei said in an interview with me that the state 
law firm in which they originally worked was in effect forced to become 
self-supporting in 1985, when the local financial bureau made an agreement with the 
bureau of justice to cease funding the firm without its knowledge and consent. They 
were therefore shocked to learn that they had all suddenly become "unemployed" 
almost overnight and had lost all their welfare benefits. 10 Apparently the lawyers 
themselves were unprepared to be liberated from state employment. 
Between 1981 and 1988 the number of full-time lawyers grew only very 
slowly. Lawyers were largely receptive to policy changes and their growth was 
mainly state mandated. During this period the state relied on a pool of part-time 
lawyers in order to ameliorate the shortage of legal practitioners. In 1984, the 
Ministry of Justice called for a greater development of part-time lawyers, and 
10 Interviews Nos. 54 and 55, 1997. 
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regulations governing part-time and specially-invited (teyao) lawyers were formally 
issued (Tong Baogui 1996: 182-4). Apparently the growth of the profession had been 
so slow in previous years that the Ministry of Justice saw the development of 
part-time lawyers as a desirable complementary measure, and the number of part-time 
lawyers was increased two-fold from 1984 to 1985. 
Phase II (1988-1992) Later periods of expansion and contraction reflect, on the 
one hand, the state's revised vision of its relationship with the profession in order to 
keep in line with the broader economic reform (Alford 1995: 31 ), and,,o~ the other 
... 1'-
hand, a changing attitude towards part-time and specially-invited lawyers. In 1988 
the Ministry of Justice put forward an experimental program for collective law firms 
(Tong Baogui 1996: 251-5), 11 which represented a key breakthrough for legal 
personnel to dissociate themselves from mandatory government employment and to 
shift closer to the market. Lawyers were encouraged to organize among themselves to 
form co-operative law firms and to share both profits and losses pro rata without any 
kind of financial intervention by the state. They were to be administratively and 
economically independent without receiving any state funding nor taking up an 
establishment quota, thus solving the fundamental problem that had inhibited the 
development of the profession in previous years. As long as the firms were 
financially capable they could hire extra lawyers. They also had more autonomy in 
hiring procedures in the sense that they were no longer part of the national job 
11 It was said that the trial program had actually begun a year earlier (LCHR 1998: 34). For a 
discussion of the development of co-operative law firms in this period see Gelatt (1991: 789-92), and 
Chen (1992: 134-5). 
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allocation system. Moreover, to ease lawyers' suspicion and hesitation about this new 
move, they were allowed to retain their position with their salary suspended (tingxin 
liuzhi) during the trial period instead of resigning altogether from their original job. 
Among the lawyers who chose to go into co-operative law firms, 41.9 percent actually 
resigned from their former positions while 55.8 percent opted forthe alternative (Qing 
Feng 1997: 223). At the end of 1988, 41 law firms of this kind were established 
nation-wide (LYC 1989: 26), with the number increasing to seventy firms in the 
following year, containing some 300 lawyers (LYC 1990: 60). In Beijing, the first 
' "\-. ,, 
co-operative law firm was set up in July of that year by five lawyers, a product of "the 
mandates of the Beijing Bureau of Justice."12 Several of my informants admitted that 
they were not enthusiastic about this change as the ownership structure of 
co-operative law firms was less than clear. Whereas lawyers themselves were not 
employed by the state, it was not clear who actually owned the law firm. Because of 
this organizational murkiness, by 1989 only four such law firms were found in Beijing 
and the number of full-time lawyers increased only incrementally. 
However, the ranks of part-time lawyers experienced a period of substantial 
growth. In 1988, the first nation-wide qualifying examination for lawyers was held, 
through which people working in other professions could obtain a lawyer's 
credentials and became available to practice law on a part-time basis. But the 
Ministry of Justice apparently changed its mind regarding the pool from which 
part-time lawyers should be drawn. A provision issued in October 1988 stated that 
only legal educators in law institutes could apply to become part-time lawyers (Tong 
12 Interview No. 15, 1997. 
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Baogui 1996: 256-8). Obviously this had to do with the oft-heard complaints about 
the malpractice of some of the part-time lawyers, who were accused of using their 
social connections (guanxi) instead of proper legal means to do their business. The 
provision, in a sense, reflected "the PRC's effort ... to create what is at least in 
organizational terms an independent legal profession" ( Gelatt 1991: 7 68). By limiting 
the pool of adjunct lawyers, it was hoped that they would be less subject to influences 
in their own immediate work environment. But this was clearly not checked strictly in 
reality, and the number of part-time lawyers continued to climb. 
In the aftermath of the 1989 protest movement the trial program of 
cooperative law firms almost came to a halt as a result of the return to political 
conservatism. In November, the Ministry of Justice issued a notice on tightening up 
the supervision of lawyers' work, thus setting the tone for stricter monitoring of 
lawyers and· of law firms (Tong Baogui 1996: 292-6). Subsequently, a rectification 
campaign to clamp down on professional misconduct was launched. Subsidiaries of 
law firms as well as firms other than those approved by the Ministry of Justice were 
all to be shut down (Tong Baogui 1996: 322-5). 13 Development of adjunct lawyers 
was also controlled (LYC 1991: 45). The consequence was clear. The total number of 
practicing lawyers plunged from 45,942 in 1989 to 41,383 in 1990, and further again 
to 33,441 in 1991 - an overall drop of 27 percent. 
Phase III (1992-) The real explosion of the profession occurs only after 1992. 
That year marks one of the most important in reform China. It signifies China's 
13 The campaign lasted for seven months, beginning from August 1990 and ended at February 1991. It 
was reported that "unnecessary subsidiary offices" of 365 law firms were shut down pursuant to this 
notice (CD 22/5/91: 3). 
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emergence from the economic and political conservatism of the years after 1989. 
Early that year, Deng Xiaoping made his famous southern tour (nanxun) during which 
he re-asserted the need for a market economy and called for an acceleration of reform. 
Deng's remarks were subsequently incorporated into official policy. Later that year, 
the Ministry of Justice proposed ten measures for the reform oflawyers' work, one of 
which was to expand the trial program of co-operative law firms alongside state-run 
ones (CL 3/92: 3). This proposal was subsequently consolidated in a document 
detailing the directions of further reform (CL 5/92: 4-9). Still, this failed to greatly 
' f· 
expand the number of non-state-employed lawyers and oflaw firms. In Beijing, only 
fourteen new co-operative law firms were set up in 1992, the teams of 
non-establishment lawyers totaled only 110 (Dangdai sifa 5195: 21 ). 
Deng's speeches during his southern tour made a great impact on the 
ideological squabble over the supposedly capitalist nature of China's reform program. 
Deng made it clear that the concepts of "capitalism" or "socialism" had no direct 
bearing on a planned or market economy. Lawyers' lukewarm responses towards the 
cooperative law-firm system also forced the Ministry of Justice to adopt a more 
pragmatic approach in the reform of the lawyers' system. In June 1993, the then 
Minister of Justice, Xiao Yang, proposed to cease defining law firms in ownership 
terms (CL 8193: 3-6). This was subsequently put into words in the program of 
deepening reform issued at the end of the year, in which law firms were encouraged to 
determine for themselves their firm's proper organizational form and internal 
management, and its method of allocation of profits and losses (Tong Baogui 1996: 
507-14). Establishment of partnership law firms therefore found its terms of 
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reference, although this organizational structure was not formally recognized till the 
promulgation of the Lawyers' Law in May 1996. 
In any case, from 1994 onwards the number of new law firms rose 
dramatically, the majority of them being partnerships. For instance, 46 partnership 
law firms were established in Beijing in that year alone, amounting to 42 percent of all 
the non-establishment law firms (YJA 1995: 106). Among my informants who 
founded their own law firms, almost all of their firms were set up in 1994. The 
composition of the founders also suggests that the development ofpartnersQ:jps helped 
\'. 
draw legal talents to join the rank of lawyers. For example, one informant was a 
research director in the Beijing Bar Association before setting up his law firm. 14 
Another originally taught law at a university and two other partners in his firm had 
worked in state organs. 15 A third one was originally a division chief in a bureau of 
justice, and one of his co-founders was a procurator. 16 The greater potential for 
partnerships represents a step towards greater autonomy of the profession, and 
lawyers were not laggard to seize this opportunity to place some distance between 
themselves and the state. 
The urgency to provide China with sufficient numbers of lawyers for the vast 
populace also overrode the Ministry of Justice's concern to maintain the 
"organizational independence" of part-time lawyers. The 1993 program of reform 
expanded the pool of possible adjunct lawyers to the wider society other than just law 
institutes, though employees in the judicial system and state civil servants at large 
14 Interview No. 16, 1997. 
15 Interview No. 28, 1997. 
16 Interview No. 48, 1997. 
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were prohibited from filling the role. Thus, the ranks of part-time lawyers took on a 
growth momentum again and the number has kept increasing ever since. The pace did 
slow down somewhat in 1994, partly because of an ongoing discussion about having 
part-time lawyers gradually phased out. In Beijing, the Bureau of Justice formally 
announced it would restrict the development of part-time lawyers as a measure to 
encourage potential lawyers to tum full-time (CLN 9/8/94: 2). The immediate effect 
was that the number of part-time lawyers was reduced by almost 38 percent in 1995 
(YJA 1996: 51). But overall, the ranks of adjunct lawyers continued to expand at a 
,~·-
faster rate than that of full-time lawyers, and by 1996 they made up more'·than forty 
percent of the profession. 
The vibrant economy since 1992 also brought forth a huge potential market 
for legal services, in particular in terms of an increasing number of daily legal 
transactions as well as economic and civil cases. For instance, in 1995 there were 2.7 
million civil cases and 1.3 million economic cases, but lawyers were involved in only 
about 12 percent and 27 percent of these cases respectively (LCHR 1998: 85). In 
court cases (including criminal, civil, and economic cases), representation by lawyers 
has consistently been below twenty percent (Table 3.2). The pressure generated by 
this huge market has no doubt contributed to the increasing pragmatism of the 
Ministry of Justice's reforms. However predominant the state is, its policy-making 
gradually reflects a realistic recognition of the existence of market forces. Hence, 
whereas the rapid growth of lawyers is a direct response to relaxed state control, the 
policy changes are also mediated by the realities of the market. 
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Table 3.2 Court Cases Represented by Lawyers, 1990-2000. 
Represented by lawyers 
Year Total court casesa Number of cases Percentage 
1990 3,129,774 580,991 18.56% 
1991 3,131,375 472,183 15.08% 
1992 3,283,064 632,142 19.25% 
1993 3,630,253 690,223 19.01% 
1994 4,196,604 766,663 18.27% 
1995 4,818,468 863,584 17.92% 
1996 5,636,575 979,301 17.37% 
1997 5,636,030 1,162,416 20.62%(:~ 
1998 5,791,072 1,273,395 21.99% 
1999 6,130,747 1,367,586 22.31% 
2000 5,823,121 1,438,175 24.70% 
Note: •Cases of first and second instances. 
Sources: LYC, various years. 
Reactive Lawyers The agenda to expand the legal profession gives lawyers a 
role to play in legal reform. During the course of legal development, once the 
institutional barrier (the establishment quotas) was removed lawyers have reacted 
actively to subsequent policies that pertain to their own professional development. 
Even though the profession acts largely in reaction to changing state policies, the 
relationship is less than mechanical. Attention should be given to the differing 
reactions from the lawyers at every policy tum. Although lawyers in China might not 
themselves put forward any reform plan, they react to some policy changes with more 
enthusiasm than others, which helps shape the direction of reform to their own 
advantage. Lawyers are therefore "subsidiary actors" in the institutionalization 
process. For instance, when the program of co-operative law firms was first put 
forward in 1988 it received only lukewarm responses. But lawyers apparently took 
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more initiatives in forming partnerships when this began to gain recognition in 1994, 
indicating that they saw greater autonomy, both in organizational and in institutional 
terms, in the latter than the former. As a result, the period between 1992 and 1994 
witnessed the fastest growth in the number oflawyers, with their ranks rising by more 
than eighty percent. In Beijing, more than half of the practicing lawyers joined the 
profession only after 1992, and many of them went directly to work in partnership law 
firms, suggesting that they saw this organizational form as promising. 
The development in the numbers of Chinese lawyers also raisf? several 
interesting issues to studies of occupational recruitment and retention (e.g. Simpson et 
al. 1982, Evans and Laumann 1983). First, in addition of the growth of the legal 
market, Chinese lawyers apparently see the possibilities of dissociating from the state 
and the prospect of "independence" as a major "opportunity structure of an 
occupation." Second, the continual growth after 1992 illustrates the profession's 
strong retentive power, but it would be better explained in terms of "rewards" than 
"shelters," since the licensure system does not yet confer any advantages to the 
practicing lawyers. Third, the composition of the founders of partnership law firms 
discussed above implies that the retentive power of other legal occupations, like 
judges, procurators, or even law professors, is not as strong. Fourth, contrary to what 
Simpson et al. (1982) suggest, that occupations with higher educational requirements 
would likely recruit young workers than older ones, in China many people are well 
beyond their mid-thirties when they switch to become lawyers, indicating that factors 
other than just educational attainment are to be taken into account in the make-up of 
work qualifications. All these indicate that alternative explanations to occupational 
recruitment and retention must be assessed vis-a-vis the specificities of the 
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institutional environment and that a different operative logic is at work in a socialist 
labor market. This will be elaborated in chapter five. 
The Politics of Health Reform and "Inactive Doctors" 
In contrast to the refom1s that were underway in the legal sector, health reform 
developed a different momentum. Although a reversal of the anti-professional 
ideology called for the recruitment of medical experts to chair hospitals and 
departments (Henderson 1989), the state put less emphasis on the develop~ent of the 
profession. Increasing the number of doctors appears to be a response to a swelling 
population, and the ratio of doctors to the population is still low (Fig. 3.3 and Table 
3.3). Although there is a provision for private medical practitioners, in reality there 
are very stringent controls on who could join the ranks. Instead, the Chinese 
government stresses revamping the hospitals and the health insurance system. 
In response to the macro economic agenda to observe efficiency and to raise 
productivity, the health sector calls for an improvement in the management of 
hospitals and the health insurance system in order to "serve the people" in a more 
cost-effective way. Irrespective of the market orientation, however, the state at the 
same time maintains that health care is a public welfare good. Consequently it guards 
against entrepreneurial efforts by hospitals. Caught between this conflict between the 
market principle and socialist values, doctors find themselves having only a 
peripheral role to play and they have a weak niche to promote their own interests in 
the agenda of health-sector reform. 
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Figure 3.3 Growth in Numbers of Medical Personnel and Doctors, 1978-2000 (in 
10,000). 
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Healthcare reform begins with the notion of abandoning the Soviet practice of 
"socialized medicine,"17 the centerpiece of which was "the removal of 'capitalistic' 
medical practice whose earmark was the private practice of medicine and the 
fee-for-service payment" (Field 1991: 50). Under socialized medicine the cash nexus 
between the patient and doctor was eliminated and vigorous attempts were made to 
equalize accessibility and to provide almost universal basic care, although differential 
access to health care across regional and "class" differences was still found (Parmelee 
et al. 1982: 1394). But the purge of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution 
together with Mao's edict to put the emphasis of health care in rural areas had resulted 
in both a bloated yet substandard medical team and increasing difficulties in 
17 For an introduction to Soviet socialized medicine, see Field (1967). 
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Table 3.3 Ratio of Doctors to Total Medical Manpower and to Population 
Doctors as percentage of Number of doctors 
Year total medical manpower per 1,000 population 
1978 41.9 1.07 
1982 41.6 1.29 
1983 41.6 1.33 
1984 41.3 1.34 
1985 41.4 1.33 
~ ~~~-
1986 41.2 1.34 
1987 41.1 1.36 
1988 43.5 1.46 
1989 45.1 1.52 
1990 45.2 1.54 
1991 45.7 1.56 
1992 44.4 1.54 
1993 44.5 1.55 
1994 44.8 1.57 
1995 45.1 1.58 
1996 45.0 1.59 
1997 45.1 1.61 
1998 45.2 1.60 
1999 45.9 1.67 
2000 46.2 1.68 
Source: CSY 2001: 735. 
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accessibility to health services in urban areas. Hospitals were also running into huge 
deficits. Health sector reform in the eighties was therefore geared to rectify these 
problems. Moreover, the health transition and demographic changes underway in 
China called for a shift in health policy from emphasizing prevention to the control of 
chronic diseases in order to meet the mounting demand for treatment (World Bank 
1992). Policies of cost-containment and cost-recovery were therefore introduced. 
The healthcare enterprise in China has undergone tremendous changes in the 
past two decades. Private and joint-venture health institutions now ex!stf~iongside 
public ones. Management responsibilities are decentralized to the hospitals, and the 
state now assumes only an indirectly administrative role. In personnel arrangements, 
a competitive labor market is allowed. And the fixing of prices is no longer solely 
determined by administrative decrees and market mechanisms are also taken into 
consideration (CHP 2-3/94: 2-3). Table 3.4 shows the major policy platforms of 
healthcare reform promulgated by the state at different times, among which the three 
most significant areas of reform can be identified. 
Hospital Reform Health reforms aim first of all to restructure the management 
and financing of hospitals. In order to promote greater efficiency in hospitals, the 
state introduces a responsibility system through which hospital chiefs are allowed to 
exercise greater autonomy and bonuses are given to medical staff to reward 
attendance and hard work. At the same time, the state reduces its direct subsidies to 
hospitals and limit reimbursements for hospital deficits, so that hospitals must find 
ways to contain costs. Table 3.5 shows that the state's contribution to health care 
relative to its overall budget together with Mao's edict to put the emphasis of health 
care in rural areas had resulted had risen only during the first few years of reforms. 
Table 3.4 
Date 
25 Apr 1985 
14 Feb 1987 
9 Nov 1988 
23 Sept 1992 
15 Jan 1997 
Major Documents and Policy Platforms of Health Reform 
Policy Document 
MOH Report on Several 
Policy Problems of Health 
Reform 
A Synopsis of Health 
Reform During the Seventh 
Five-year Period 
An Opinion on Expanding 
Medical and Health 
Services 
Several Opinions on 
Deepening Health Reform 
State Councils Decision on 
Health Reform and 
Development 
Major Policy Platforms 
i) Expanding existing facilities and allowing doctors to work privately in off hours; 
ii) Decentralizing management responsibilities; 
iii) Encouraging development of private practitioners; 
iv) Consolidating health services in rural areas; 
v) Reforming the fee system and the health insurance system. 
i) Encouraging multiple forms of health care provision; 
ii) Rejuvenating health clinics and strengthening health organizations at the township and village level; 
iii) Insisting on the decentralization of management responsibilities; 
iv) Supporting private practitioners and allowing doctors to work privately in off hours; 
v) Putting prevention first and providing primary care on a fee basis; 
vi) Expanding education on traditional Chinese medicine, improving medical schools at the county level, and enlivening 
medical research institutes; 
vii) Reforming the fee system on a cost-recovery basis. 
i) Insisting on the contract responsibility system; 
ii) Allowing doctors to work privately in off hours; 
iii) Furthering reform on the fee system; 
iv) Encouraging hospitals to develop service-sector products (disan chanye); 
v) Upholding the principles to "serve the people" and to provide quality care. 
i) Reforming the management system and upgrading the provision of health services; 
ii) Expanding the sources of health finance and improving the fee system; 
iii) Expanding managerial autonomy on personnel arrangement; 
iv) Expanding the scope of serve-sector products and strengthening the economic power of hospitals; 
v) Reforming the health insurance system. 
i) Upholding the principle to "serve the people" and striking a balance between social efficacy and economic efficacy; 
ii) Reforming the urban labor health insurance system; 
iii) Developing community care; 
iv) Strengthening the provision of health care services in rural areas; ... .,, 
v) Integrating Chinese and Western medicine; ·• 1 
vi) Strengthening the team of medical personnel; 
vii) Expanding the sources of health finance; 
viii) Improving the system of health legislation. Co 
°' 
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Table 3.5 Healthcare Budget, 1978-1999.a 
Healthcare Budget Healthcare as Percentage of 
Year (100 million yuan) Total State Budget 
1978 22.42 2.02 
1980 30.16 2.49 
1981 32.74 2.94 
1982 37.66 3.27 
1983 41.95 3.25 
, rr-
1984 48.16 3.25 
1985 54.81 2.97 
1986 64.28 2.79 
1987 59.46 2.45 
1988 71.86 2.65 
1989 74.40 2.45 
1990 79.47 2.30 
1991 86.40 2.27 
1992 103.81 2.36 
1993 119.38 2.26 
1994 146.97 2.54 
1995 163.26 2.39 
1996 187.57 2.36 
1997 209.20 2.27 
1998 225.10 2.08 
1999 235.60 1.79 
Note: a Healthcare budget does not include reserves for public insurance 
program. 
Sources: CHY, various years. 
88 
Although a lot more money was being spent, there has been a relative decline in the 
health budget since 1984. State investment in health care includes operational grants 
to hospitals, subsidies to health clinics, funding for prevention and maternal-child 
care programs, professional middle schools, and training of hospital administrators 
etc. (World Bank 1997: 75). But direct state financing of hospitals has been reduced 
dramatically and covers only some of the basic personnel wages and new capital 
investments, which total approximately 25 to 30 percent of hospital expenditures 
(Hsiao 1995). In a cancer hospital in Beijing, the direct state subsidy was only three 
' fr 
million yuan in 1996, whereas wages for the team of 1, 700 staff alone cost 16 million 
yuan. 18 While enjoying greater autonomy, hospitals are left to their own devices to 
secure the requisite revenue for daily operations. Medical expenses therefore surge as 
reform proceeds. 
Although the Ministry of Health together with the State Pricing Bureau have 
twice raised medical fees, in reality the charges are still substantially below cost. A 
surgical operation that requires several medical staff to work for seven to eight hours 
charges only about 100 yuan ( CHP 9195: 11 ). In Beijing, registration fee cost just 0.5 
yuan and surgery such as appendectomy cost only 75 yuan in 1997(CCN11/6/97: 3). 
The state's commitment to keep health services accessible and affordable results in a 
fee structure determined largely by political and ideological instead of economic 
considerations. Because of the unreasonably low prices for consultations and surgical 
operations, hospitals find major sources of income from fees charged for diagnostic 
examinations and prescriptions. This results in "the rapid proliferation of hi-tech 
18 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
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medical equipment in hospitals [and] the over dispensing of drugs" (Yuen 1996: 
218). 19 Because of the higher profit margins from diagnostic examinations, hospitals 
tend to invest more on medical equipment but relatively less on human capital ( CHP 
2-3/94: 22). Consequently even county hospitals have advanced equipment found 
only in major hospitals in other countries. For instance, Beijing has more 
computerized tomographic (CT) scanners than the whole of England, and hospitals in. 
Nanjing have three times the number of CTs as in London (SCMP 2511199). A 
hospital administrator admitted to me that his hospital started to make ends meet only 
... r---·~. 
with the purchase of a CT scanner.20 Medical expenditure in 1978 cost 2.7 billion 
yuan in China, whereas in 1994 this amounted to 55.8 billion yuan (BR 29/4/96: 5). 
Pharmaceutical expenses account for more than sixty percent of the medical bill 
( CHP 10/94: 6), whereas registration fees make up only two to three percent and 
consultation fees ten percent ofhospital income (CHP 9/95: 11; CCN 14/4/97: 1). In 
the cancer hospital mentioned above, medicine contributed 48 percent of the 
hospital's 150 million yuan of income in 1996. A doctor earned only about sixty to 
seventy yuan a month from consultations, which he sarcastically commented that it 
should not be regarded as income but just "a kind of consolation."21 As it is stipulated 
that hospitals can charge a mark-up of fifteen percent of the drug price, doctors also 
tend to prescribe expensive drugs, and problems of receiving kickbacks from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are rampant (BYD 22/8/97: 1). 
19 See also discussion in Hesketh and Zhu (1997). 
20 Interview No. 51, 1997. 
21 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
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Hospitals in China are put in a quandary under the reforms, that they enjoy 
relative fiscal independence but not market autonomy. To promote greater efficiency 
and efficacy hospitals are asked to be financially independent of direct state subsidies. 
At the same time, in order to "serve the people" the fee structure is heavily regulated 
by the state, and hospitals enjoy little autonomy in utilizing existing resources both in 
terms of manpower and technology. To contain cost escalations and to curb the 
problems of kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies, beginning from the 
mid- l 990s there were calls to stop hospitals from selling drugs. Instead patients 
' 'f~ 
should get the prescriptions from separate pharmacies (yiyao fenjia). Under such a 
proposal, hospital income would definitely decline and doctors predict that they 
themselves would be economically worse off. 22 A hospital administrator made it 
plainly to me that such a proposal would wipe out the bonuses of his staff, since in his 
hospital prescriptions account for seventy percent of the medical bill in internal 
medicine and fifty percent in surgical treatment. 23 
Privatizing Medicine A direct corollary of the introduction of the responsibility 
system in hospitals is the privatization of medicine. Despite the effort to socialize 
medicine in the Maoist era, a small number of individual medical practitioners (geti 
xingyi) had long been allowed to exist alongside state-run hospitals. In 1958, there 
were about 41,000 individual practitioners throughout China. However, the majority 
was forced to give up their practices during the Cultural Revolution and less than two 
thousand of them, predominantly traditional herbalists, were allowed to practice 
22 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
23 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
91 
legally (Pang Ruicong et al. 1992: 5). In 1980, the Ministry of Health again allowed 
the legal practice of individual practitioners, but restricted the pool to those who had 
practiced in the past but were currently unemployed, or who qualified but currently 
were not working in any state or collective health organizations, or who were the 
retired medical personnel (MOH 1982: 201-6). In order to expand the supply of 
health services, the development of private practitioners and private clinics was 
endorsed in the 1985 policy document (MOH 1988: 1-6). 
However, the state imposes strict controls on who can undert{l~e private 
\'' 
practice. To preserve enough manpower in state health enterprises, university-trained 
doctors are generally not allowed to move to the private sector. Thus, private doctors 
are mostly at a lesser level, i.e. graduates from secondary medical schools, and they 
normally practice at the county and township levels. A study of the registered private 
practitioners in Guangzhou finds that fewer than twelve percent of the private doctors 
were graduates of medical universities. Moreover, private practitioners constituted a 
mere 1.5 percent of the doctors in the city, and the volume of care they deliver was 
only around 0.3 percent of that delivered by the state (Yuen 1992). Thus, the private 
medical market remains insignificant in the major cities. Moreover, private medical 
practitioners in China have already earned a bad reputation, which works to put off 
qualified doctors from joining the ranks despite a relaxation of controls in recent years. 
Cases of unlicensed, substandard, and corrupt practices are often reported, and 
concerns about fraudulent activities have been raised (e.g. PD 21/1/99: 10). Doctors 
currently working in public hospitals also cite the lack of institutional support as 
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constraining them from going private.24 This will be discussed in chapter 5 on the 
practice of doctoring. 
The 1985 policy document also allowed doctors to work for a fee in their spare 
time but charges must be in line with the rate set by the State Pricing Bureau and 
doctors were not supposed to receive more than sixty yuan a month from this (MOH 
1990: 959-60). A policy directive in 1989 further restrained doctors from 
participating in part-time services to not more than one working day, cumulatively, in 
a week (MOH 1993: 434-6). In any case, the doctors themselves -d~~not seem 
.... -
enthusiastic about moonlighting, as one of them commented that "good doctors would 
not have the energy to mopnlight."25 Thus, privatization does not seem to endow 
doctors the kind of opportunities and privileges enjoyed by lawyers, nor help in 
pushing forward their own professional development. 
Health Insurance Reform A third area of health reform involves the social health 
insurance program, which is blamed as the culprit of malpractices in drug 
prescriptions and hence a surge in medical expenses. There are two main types of 
health insurance schemes in urban China. 26 The Government Employee Health 
Insurance (gongfei yiliao) covers civil servants and employees in public agencies, 
college students, and disabled army serviceman. They receive largely free outpatient 
and inpatient health services at designated hospitals, and the charges are supposed to 
24 Interviews, 1997. 
25 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
26 The following describes the official policies of medical insurance in the urban area. In reality, 
however, it is found that the extent of the medical insurance coverage and the benefits provided by the 
seemingly uniform public and worker programs vary by individual and regional characteristics as well 
as by province and degree of urban development. See Henderson et al. (1995). 
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be reimbursed by the scheme's managing fund. In 1995, 30 million people were 
beneficiaries of this scheme and the expenses totaled more than seven billion yuan 
(CHS 2/95: 7). 
The Labor Health Insurance (laobao yiliao) covers employees in state as well 
as some collective enterprises whose dependants also enjoy a fifty-percent coverage. 
The Labor Health Insurance scheme is organized and financed by individual 
enterprises. Workers in large enterprises normally seek outpatient and inpatient 
services within their own hospitals. Most medium-sized enterprises als~;have their 
own clinics, which provide free outpatient services to their employees. Inpatient 
services for these and for smaller enterprises are provided by contracted hospitals and 
the charges will be reimbursed by the enterprises. In 1995, this scheme provided 
coverage for 140 million people and the expenditures amounted to 40 billion yuan 
(CHS 2/95: 7). These two schemes taken together, the medical bill came close to 
eighty billion yuan by 1997 - an increase of twenty-eight fold compare to 1978 with 
an average rate of 19 percent a year; whereas the average rate of increase m 
government revenue is only 11 percent a year ( CYD 7 /12/98; Yu Shui 1999). 
Such an explosion in medical costs was partly attributed to the provision of 
better quality care and the increasing use of sophisticated technology. Other factors 
such as a demographic transition and the increasing number of beneficiaries were also 
contributing to the escalation in costs (Liu and Hsiao 1995; Zuo Xuejin et al. 1999). 
But abuse of the system was also mounting. The indiscriminate use of expensive 
drugs as well as extended stays in hospitals were definitely drawbacks of the 
insurance schemes. As medical expenses were all covered, it was not unusual to find 
households stockpiling their first-aid boxes with all kinds of drugs they did not really 
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need (SCMP 2511199). To combat the malpractices and to reduce wastage in hospitals, 
the government began to experiment with pilot programs in different cities, with a 
focus on improving incentives in the system through provider payment reforms and 
coinsurance (World Bank 1997). Aiming at providing "wide coverage but at low 
cost," in 1996 the government introduced a national pilot program modeled after 
earlier experiments in Jiujiang and Zhenjiang (two medium-size cities on the Yangzi 
River in Jiangxi and Jiangsu provinces) by integrating "overall medical funds with a 
small personal contribution" (BR 29/4/96: 5). A risk-pooling fund was established 
' '(""··· 
and employees were also required to contribute from their wages a perceniage to their 
personal account. The immediate result is a reduction in medical expenditure. 
Between 1990 and 1998 the cost of medical service per person increased by 25.9 
percent each year, but the margin of increase dropped to 14.8 percent in 1999 and 
further down to 8.6 percent in 2000. Increase in the cost of medicine also dropped to 
6.1 percent in 2000 compared to an annual increase by 24.5 percent before (CD 
25/1/02). 
Inactive Doctors Recent studies have found that, internationally, doctors are 
not as influential in health policy-making as traditionally thought (Wilsford 1991; 
Immergut 1992a, 1992b), but they are nonetheless active participants in the 
discussion and formulation of national health insurance programs, and their voices are 
heard as an interest group. Chinese doctors, however, are relatively inactive in terms 
of the entire health reform agenda. Their relative dormancy is illustrated by the fact 
that many of my informants seemed unconcerned about a proposal that was being 
raised at the time of my research for a unified qualifying examination for doctors. In 
addition, they seemed indifferent to the imminent promulgation of the Doctor's Law, 
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which was eventually passed in June 1998 and was to take effect in May 1999. Even 
after the promulgation of the Law there was relatively little discussion about it in 
Jiankangbao (Health News). This was in contradistinction to the case of lawyers, 
since discussion about the Lawyer's Law proliferated in the Zhongguo /ashi baa 
(China Lawyer News) for a long time before and after its promulgation. 
Although the state, as an "institutional entrepreneur," has taken an active role 
in the development of health care services, doctors as the direct carrier of health 
services did not seem to have benefited much in their own professional de._v..elopment. 
... '' 
The health sector in China is so heavily regulated and led by the state that doctors are 
not allowed any niche to push forward their own agenda. Instead, it is the 
organization where doctors work, the hospitals, rather than the doctors themselves, 
that the state draws in as the "subsidiary actor" in the institutionalization process. 
Consequently, the role of the doctors is only peripheral. 
Concluding Remarks 
Economic development at the macro level has generated common institutional 
pressures for all sectors to reform. The actual processes ofreform at the sectoral level, 
however, follow their own inner logics that may not be entirely in line with the 
rationality of the larger economic reform. Drawing on insights from historical 
institutionalism, this chapter depicts the first "moment" of institutionalization of the 
sectoral models in China. In the area of law and medicine, I argue that reforms in 
these two arenas are path-dependent as a result of the differing histories. Whilst the 
medical system was regarded as an "achievement" under Mao, the legal system had 
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been dismantled and was (re)established almost anew when reform began in 1978. 
Consequently, the interest of the state in legal development is largely material and the 
pattern of institutionalization technical; whereas in the area of medicine the state 
could not possibly shed its past commitment to "serve the people" and hence its 
interest has to be normative and the institutionalization process an institutional one. 
Thus the meso-institutional environment facing the two professional groups is vastly 
different, and the extent oflawyers and doctors being able to participate in the reform 
of their own sector also varies. 
Adoption of different institutional models at the meso level generates 
important implications for the concrete policies pertaining to the development of the 
professions at the micro-level - the immediate institutional environment where the 
second "moment" ofinstitutionalization occurs. In the next two chapters, we shall see 
how lawyers and doctors face different institutional opportunities and constraints in 
the contested realms of education and practice. 
Chapter Four 
Supplying New Entrants: 
Professional Education and Certification 
The professionalization literature invariably sees an effort to limit the supply 
' '(:. 
of practitioners one of the central tenets of the "professional project." Quality control 
is the explicit concern but restricting competition is the implicit aim (cf. Larson 1977). 
This process is best captured in the Weberian notion of closure in status group 
formation. Frank Parkin (1974) reminds us that "by social closure Weber means the 
process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access 
to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles" (p. 3). This process of 
the appropriation of market opportunities is later developed by Parkin in terms of 
exclusion and usurpation (1974, 1979), and by Randall Collins in his elaborate 
analysis of educational credentials as the prime gatekeeper for organizational 
monopolies (1979, 1990).1 This "strategic approach" (Torstendahl 1990) has been 
seen by a number of other writers as the principal form of professional formation and 
hence collective social mobility (e.g. Berlant 1975; Parry and Parry 1976; Macdonald 
1985; Witz 1992; Meiksins and Smith 1993). In the words of Parkin (1979), 
Professionalization itself may be understood as a strategy designed, 
among other things, to limit and control the supply of entrants to an 
occupation in order to safeguard or enhance its market value (p. 54). 
1 For a further critique and elaboration of the closure theory see Murphy (1988). 
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Thus, the professional projects are "projects of occupational closure" (Witz 
1992: 39). The most commonly used exclusionary mechanism is that of education, 
and the battlefield is invariably located in the realm of higher education (Amark 
1990). 
In this literature, the agent of the professional project primarily rests in the 
occupational groups themselves. The analytical focus is usually framed in terms of 
interest group politics, and the questions are: How did the professional groups 
organize their interests? How did they contest the jurisdiction over a defined area of 
~1"· 
work? And, how did the group strategically maneuver to bolster its collective social 
mobility and material rewards (see in general Larson 1977; Starr 1982; Abbott 1988)? 
The role of the state has largely been ignored, or, if recognized, only when the 
occupational groups seek official recognition as well as enforcement of the use of 
credentials as social closure. An institutional perspective, instead, would be 
interested to see how actors, in this case the professionals, are acting within 
constraints embedded in the wider institutional environment that essentially structure 
their perceived interests and hence the subsequent choice of action. In socialist China 
in particular, these constraints are necessarily imposed by the state. Closure is not a 
professional strategy undertaken by the professionals themselves or their respective 
organizations. Instead, it is the constellation of state interests that determines the 
supply of professionals and the required credentials for professional practice, by 
maintaining a macro control over the educational realm as well as the licensure 
system. 
This and the following chapter therefore address the following questions: How 
do institutions at the meso level shape actors' capacities for action, policy-making, 
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and institution building at the micro level? How does state interest define and 
structure the course of professional development? More specifically, this chapter asks: 
To what extent does professional training and certification serve the agenda of 
sectoral reforms? How do institutional arrangements in legal and medical education 
open up differing opportunities and constraints for the professions? How does this in 
tum shape the interests of lawyers and doctors and hence their perception of choice of 
action? I argue that the differing logics of sectoral reforms structure the niches 
opened up to the legal and medical professions by setting the parameters and the 
course of change in the arena of professional education and ~e"fiification. 
Professionals are acting within constraints, and the kind of rationality they adopt must 
necessarily be context-bound. What is of interest is professional training and 
occupational licensing as the contested realm between the state and the professions. 
Higher Education in China 
The changes in the provision of professional education in China must 
necessarily be understood in the wider context of the structure of the higher education 
system. This is complex. Not only do there exist different types of higher institutions, 
there are also different jurisdictions governing these institutions. Thus, higher 
institutions in China can be characterized along different lines. First, China practices 
a two-tiers higher education system: a higher tier of universities (daxue) which 
usually offer four-year degree courses (benke); and a lower tier of colleges (dazhuan) 
which normally offer two to three-year diploma or associate degree courses (zhuanke) 
and are less prestigious. 
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Second, higher institutions in China are also differentiated by the way they 
structure knowledge (Hayhoe 1991). The comprehensive universities (zhonghe 
daxue), for example, Peking University and Fudan University, offer a wide range of 
arts and science disciplines. The polytechnical institutions, for example, Tsinghua 
University and Shanghai Jiaotong University, offer a broad range of applied sciences 
as well as engineering sciences. In addition to these two types, there are also 
institutions divided along sectoral lines for the service of specific sectoral needs, like 
medicine, law, finance, the production of steel etc. Beijing Medical University and 
' '(. 
the Chinese University of Political Science and Law fall into this category:' 
Third, higher institutions in China are also structured according to the 
administrative hierarchy, which determines their principal sources of funding. At the 
top of the hierarchy are a small number of universities directly under the State 
Education Commission of the central government (renamed the Ministry of Education 
in March 1998). The next tier comprises universities and colleges governed by other 
central ministries. At the lowest tier are universities and colleges under the 
jurisdiction of provincial and municipal authorities. Table 4.1 shows the distribution 
of regular higher education institutions in 1989, 1994, and 1998 according to these 
different characterizations. 
Like many other spheres of activity in China, higher education has for long 
been controlled by the state and is taken as a tool to achieve the goals defined by the 
CCP. During the politicized years of the Cultural Revolution, higher education was 
largely to serve the political-ideological goals of the party. When reform began in 
1978, the goal of higher education policy has shifted to serve economic production. C. 
Montgomery Broaded (1983) has found that references to economic development and 
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the creation of a strong country topped the goals of higher education mentioned in the 
People's Daily in 1978, suggesting the instrumental nature of higher education in 
China. 
j Table 4.1 Number of Regular Higher Education Institutions According to 
I Different Characterization, Selected Years. 
1989 1994 1998 
In terms of programs: 
Degree course 616 627 591 
Diploma course 459 453 , i'.A31 
... '' 
In terms of the structure of 
knowledge 
Comprehensive 49 70 72 
Polytechnical 286 297 271 
Sectoral 740 713 679 
In terms of administrative 
hierarchy: 
SEdC/MOE 36 36 45 
Central ministries 317 331 218 
Local authorities 722 713 759 
Total 1,075 1,080 1,022 
Sources: ESYC 1989: 20 &22; ESYC 1994: 16 & 18; ESYC 1998: 20 & 22. 
Since the 1980s, higher education in China has been expanding in order to 
meet the demand for qualified manpower in economic production. The government 
has relaxed its controls regarding the financing, student intake and course content of 
higher education, allowing greater institutional autonomy for universities and 
colleges. The 1985 program of educational reform delegated greater decision-making 
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power to higher institutions to accept students outside the state plan, and to take in 
students for "commissioned training" financed by enterprises 2 or self-paying. 
Establishing new local institutions for short-cycle courses and adult education was 
also given a boost (Cheng 1986; Hayhoe 1991; Yin 1993; World Bank 1997b). A 
1993 policy document deepened the reform by strengthening the fee-paying system, 
and privately-run tertiary institutions were given explicit support (CHE 10/94; Wu 
and Hayhoe 1995). 
The first wave of higher education reform in 1985 led to a proliferay,~:m in both 
the number of established institutions and of student enrollment. In 1985, there were 
1,014 higher institutions in China (Hayhoe 1991: 120). By 1989, there were 1,075 
(Table 4.1 ), and the number of students enrolled in university degree programs was 
1.32 million, with another 760,921 in diploma or associate degree programs. The 
student enrollment increased to 1.52 million and 1.28 million respectively in 1994. 
Note in particular the surge in the proportion of commissioned enrollment and 
self-supporting students from 11.86 percent of total enrollment in 1989 to 28.63 
percent in 1994 (Table 4.2). Irrespective of this expansion of higher education, 
however, in China the percentage of population who has a tertiary education remains 
low. In 2000, only 3.88 percent in the population aged over six have had a college 
education and above (State Council and National Bureau of Statistics 2001: 24). 
University and college enrollment accounted for only 2.5 percent of all students at 
various levels of the education system (CSY 2001: 657). 
2 In conunissioned training, enterprises paid the full cost for students whom they undertook on 
graduation. In 1985, about 50,000 fell into this category; and the number increased to more than 
226,000 in 1993, accounting for around 40 percent of the total students admitted (Wu and Hayhoe 
1995). 
Table 4.2 Enrollment in Regular Higher Education Institutions, Selected Years. 
1989 1994 1998 
-
Undergraduate Undergraduate Undergraduate 
enrollment Total enrollment enrollment Total enrollment enrollment Total enrollment 
Under the 
jurisdiction of: 
SEdC/MOE 215,103 16.28% 240,578 11.55% 222,757 14.69% 269,392 9.63% 359,710 16.10% 390,305 11.45% 
Central ministries 524,463 39.70% 673,263 32.34% 628,524 41.43% 956,168 34.16% 614,903 27.51 % 760,571 22.31% 
Local authorities 581,624 44.02% 1,168,270 56.11% 665,590 43.88% 1,573,079 56.21% 1,260,034 56.39% 2,257,888 66.24% 
Total 1,321,190 100% 2,082,111 100% 1,516,871 100% 2,798,639 100% 2,234,647 100% 3,408,764 100% 
Enrollment 
Arrangement: 
Enrolled according 
to state plan 1,231, 172 93.19% 1,799,977 86.45% 1,370,328 90.34% 1,992,964 71.21% 2,160,375 96.68% 3,219,275 94.44% 
Commissioned 
enrollment 71,197 5.39% 172,939 8.30% 70,505 4.65% 482,450 17.24% 30,310 1.36% 87,991 2.58% 
Self-financing 14,658 1.11% 74,089 3.56% 73,950 4.87% 318,674 11.39% 40,940 1.83% 96,178 2.82% 
Training courses 
for teachers and 
cadres 4,163 0.31% 35,106 1.69% 2,088 0.14% 4,551 0.16% 3,022 0.13% 5,320 0.16% 
Total 1,321,190 100% 2,082,111 100% 1,516,871 100% 2,798,639 1,00% 2,234,647 100% 3,408,764 100% 
Sources: ESYC 1989: 22-5; ESYC 1994: 18-21; ESYC 1998: 22-5. <t, 
....... 
~ 
I 
I 
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Beginning from 1992 the government tried to reshuffie the higher education 
sector by merging some of the higher institutions. And this restructuring was later 
extended to universities originally under the jurisdiction of different ministries, as part 
of a larger effort of the State Council to reshuffie the organization of its ministries and 
commissions (CD 10/11/98). One notable example is the merging of four universities 
in Zhejiang, namely, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou University, Zhejiang 
Agricultural University, and Zhejiang Medical University, into a colossal new 
Zhejiang University (CEY 2000: 935). Thus, in 1998 there was a decline in the 
' r.~ .. ~ 
number of higher institutions while the total student enrollment rose. The decrease in 
the number of commissioned enrollment and self-supporting students is attributed to 
the fact that the state in recent years has enlarged the enrollment quota within the state 
plan. For instance, in 1999 the Ministry of Education planned to admit 2.75 million 
new students, of which 1.59 million would be placed in regular higher institutions 
( CEY 2000: 182). The fee levels for students financed by the state, enterprises or 
themselves were also unified in 1994, and fees were raised across the board (World 
Bank 1997b: 3). 
Thus, in addition to the reforms underway in the legal and health sector, 
discussion of legal and medical education in China must also be situated in this 
broader context of the reform in the higher education sector. Up until March 2001, 
194 universities offered degree programs in law, and five of these were under the 
direct administration of the Ministry of Justice. In medical education, 99 universities 
offered various degree programs, and eleven of these were under the direct 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health (MOE 2001). In 2000, the total undergraduate 
enrollment was 147,963 in law and 304,984 in medicine (CSY 2001: 653). 
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Educating the Professionals: Quantitative Growth or Quality Control? 
Expansion of higher education in China is contradictory to the professional 
project, where restricting the supply of practitioners is one of the central concerns. 
Given the state control over higher education, professional training in China 
essentially falls short of the ideal-typical professionalism depicted by Eliot Freidson 
(2001), where the training of recruits is fully under the control of the occupation. 
Instead, educating the professionals lies primarily in the hands of the state, and it is up 
to the state to determine and control both the quality and quantity of new entrants, 
' 'f,~ 
defined by its perceived interests. 
Quantitative Expansion in Legal Education 
Most countries impose stringent educational requirements of lawyers in order 
to control entry into the profession. As early as the nineteenth century a university 
degree in law was required in most continental European countries. The American 
system is even stricter, as legal education is provided only at the graduate level, and an 
aspirant needs to complete four years of prior tertiary education. 
In China, however, in order to serve the economy the government called for an 
expansion of the legal profession, which was accomplished largely through the 
expansion of legal education at various levels.3 Thus, the process of closure is not 
evident among Chinese lawyers. Moreover, the legal profession is still very much 
3 For a comprehensive overview of the historical development oflegal education in China since 1949, 
see Chen Shouyi (1980), Lan Quanpu (1995: 85-152), and Tang Nungsong et al. (1995: 371-644). 
Macdonald (1980), Gelatt and Snyder (1981), Herman (1982), and Han and Kanter (1984) also provide 
informative description on the legal education in the early 1980s. 
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under the auspices of the state, and the lawyers' association is yet to establish its role 
in defining and defending the profession. 
Parkin (1979) has made it clear that any exclusionary measures have to be 
buttressed by state sanctions (pp. 138-41). Although the Ministry of Justice has been 
raising the educational standards of lawyers in recent years by implementing a 
national qualifying examination, its persistent concern to rapidly expand the 
profession makes it reluctant to adopt a closure strategy. In fact, the "credential" of 
lawyers has been compromised on behalf of quantitative growth. This is, clearly seen 
~·t· 
in the fact that a formal university legal education is not a prerequisite for becoming a 
lawyer. First, any individuals who hold a university (four-year daxue) degree, which 
need not necessarily be in law, are eligible to take the national qualifying examination; 
alternatively, a legal education in two- or three-year colleges (dazhuan), which results 
in a diploma or an associate degree in law, also suffices. 
In China, where the proportion of the population attending universities 
remains small, one might expect that a formal university education in law should 
provide students with the privilege to join the ranks of lawyers. This is, however, not 
true. The fact that there are not many law graduates in China does not give them any 
relative advantage to get into the profession. If education, and hence the monopoly of 
knowledge, is one of the pre-eminent features of professionalism, then Chinese 
lawyers score low in this respect. Legal education in China's higher institutions has 
yet to assume the kind of ritualistic function that Randall Collins talks about in 
facilitating the process of market closure. This is well reflected in the educational 
standards of Chinese lawyers, which remain relatively low over the years and do not 
live up to the sort of professional standard that one would have expected. For instance, 
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in 1996 only about thirty percent of the some 50,000 full-time lawyers held a formal 
law degree from universities, while another 55 percent had attended only a diploma or 
associate degree course in law at colleges (PD-OE 16/11/96: 6). If we look at the 
ranks oflawyers as a whole, in 1997, only 25 percent had met college standards, while 
just 1.5 percent were up to graduate levels.4 Only lawyers in cities like Beijing and 
Tianjin come closer to the professional norm. In Beijing, for example, among the 
almost 5,000 lawyers in 1998, 90 percent had a college education or above, of whom 
about 65 percent held a university degree and eighteen percent a post-graduate degree 
' '("..._·-
( CYD 12/3/99). Note, however, that the degree these lawyers held 'inight not 
necessarily be in law. Even in the economically developed coastal region of 
Guangdong, just about two percent of the total 120,000 legal practitioners held a 
degree in law (LD 3/10/97: 3), and presumably they were concentrated in major cities 
like Guangzhou and Shenzhen. In smaller cities it would be rare to find lawyers with 
a university law degree. In fact, one of the lawyers I spoke with is not even a college 
graduate but studied law only at a technical school (zhongzhuan). He was assigned to 
a state law firm in 1987 and sat for the qualifying examination in 1988. As provisions 
delineating the eligibility of candidates was not issued until 1992, he could be 
admitted to sit for the exam in 1988 in accordance with Article 11 of the Lawyers' 
Regulation, which would define him as someone who has gone through "professional 
legal training."5 
4 Notwithstanding these low figures, the Ministry of Justice was actually hoping to have one third of 
Chinese lawyers at the master's level by 2010 (Renmin luntan 1196: 10-2). In comparison, in 1996 
about eighty percent of the judges and 54 percent of the procurators were up to college standard (LYC 
1997: 49, 187). However, many of them could have attained this level through the internal training 
programs provided by the courts and the procuracy respectively. For a study of Chinese judges see He 
Weifang (1995). 
5 Interview No. 54, 1997. For a note on the possibly broad interpretation of the clause on "professional 
legal training" see Zheng (1988: 488). 
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In comparison, approximately 95 percent of the Soviet advocates had a higher 
education in law in the early eighties. Although this figure is somewhat misleading 
because higher education covers a wide spectrum of programs, members of the 
younger generation had mostly completed a five-year university law degree. And it 
was suggested that the Soviet advokatura would be universalized with 
university-level education in twenty years' time (Husky 1982: 202). This is, however, 
less likely to be achievable in China in view of the present complexities and 
irregularities found in the educational realm. 
As a public enterprise, higher education in the PRC has always been in the 
tight grip of the state. With an overriding concern to produce as many legal personnel 
as possible so as to overcome the shortage oflawyers, legal education had been given 
a boost. This has in effect resulted in legal education being plagued with institutional 
irregularities, making it ill-suited to serve the gatekeeping function of market closure. 
First, professional legal knowledge is delivered by a variety of institutions of 
differing levels. Although the number of universities offering a four-year 
undergraduate degree in law has increased from 44 in 1988 to 140 in 1995 and then 
again to 232 in 2001 (Lan Quanpu 1995: 101-2; CD 23/1/02), the number of law 
graduates churned out is consistently low (Table 4.3). Even if we include law 
graduates from three-year colleges, this still represents just about two percent of the 
overall graduates every year (Tang Nungsong et al. 1995: 441-7). In terms of student 
enrollment, about 2.2 percent of all university and college students majored in law in 
1997 (SCMP 711197; LD 3/10/97: 3). In 1996 the minister of justice spoke of 
increasing the number of legal courses offered by universities and colleges, and to 
have law students making up five percent of all university and college students by 
109 
Table 4.3 Number of Graduates in Law, 1982-2000.a 
Number of Graduates 
Year Total University College 
1982 1,238 
1983 3,113 
1984 3,103 
1985 5,367 
1986 7,329 4,161 3,168 
' '('..., 
1987 12,639 5,251 7,388 >,' 
1988 12,490 
1989 13,030 6,907 6,123 
1990 12,094 6,467 5,627 
1991 11,894 7,504 4,390 
1992 9,430 2,069 7,361 
1993 10,725 6,268 4,457 
1994 17,650 8,270 9,380 
1995 23,170 9,393 13,777 
1996 25,852 10,501 15,351 
1997 28,270 
1998 29,649 14,832 14,817 
1999 31,500 16,363 15,137 
2000 44,124 19,806 24,318 
Note: a Figures include only graduates from regular state-funded higher 
institutions. 
The actual number of graduates majoring in law between 1982 and 
1993 may be even lower than what the table shows, since before 1994 
the broader category of zhengfa, which literally means political 
science and law, was used in official statistics. The term zhengfa also 
implicitly connotes the politicization oflaw in legal studies. 
Sources: Tang Nungsong et al. (1995: 445); CEY, various years; ESYC, various 
years; CSY 2001: 654. 
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2000 (Renmin luntan 1/96: 10-2). This entailed the rapid development of adult 
education and vocational education, which are mostly conducted on a part-time basis, 
including correspondence courses, television courses, and part-time universities (BR 
6/5/85: 22-5, 33; Pitney 1988: 354-6; and Tang Nungsong et al. 1995: 456-61, 
599-613). In particular, the part-time correspondence schools have become an 
important source for the production of lawyers-in 1996 more than 16,000 graduated 
and another 60,000 students were emolled in the correspondence courses 
administered by regular state-funded higher institutions alone (ESYC 1996: 24). This 
' f""' 
was essentially the same strategy employed by the Soviet Union in the 193.0s when it 
sought to professionalize the legal system, which eventually resulted in a surfeit of 
lawyers (Husky 1988: 205-6). But the same has not yet happened in China, albeit one 
correspondence centre has already trained more than 400,000 people since it was 
founded in 1985.6 In 1995 the Ministry of Justice decided to further boost the 
potential pool of lawyers by holding national examinations for these correspondence 
students (Xinhua 8/5/95). While students were awarded a diploma in law at the 
college level upon passing all the requisite examinations, the entry requirement for 
these correspondence courses was quite lax, needing only graduation from high 
s~hool in order to be admitted (LYC 1990: 983-4). Thus, the system oflegal education 
in China is drawing students from two extremes. On the one hand, because of the 
increasing popularity of law in recent years, competition to enter law schools is 
6 The All China Lawyers Correspondence Training Centre (Zhonghua quanguo lashi hanshou 
zhongxin) was set up by the Ministry of Justice. The Centre established a three-year program 
equivalent to the college level in 1988. In this and the following years almost 76,000 students enrolled 
in this program. (LYC 1990: 983-4). In 1995, the Centre set up a new specialty on "lawyering" (liishi 
zhuanye) which is two and a half years. Upon fulfilling all the required courses students are recognized 
as college graduates and are eligible to sit for the national qualifying examination for lawyers ( CLN 
25/3/95: 3; 615195: 3; and 3/6/95: 3). Among the 400,000 students trained, about 10,000 had 
successfully obtained a diploma in law and 6,000 got through the national qualifying examination 
(CLN 11111/95: 1). 
Ill 
getting fiercer. At Peking University, the entry grade to the Department of Law 
remains one of the highest. The class of 1996 included eight students who had 
received the highest mark in the national university entrance examination in their 
respective provinces.7 On the other hand, legal education that is provided outside of 
formal universities is accepting students of differing standards, many of whom might 
not get through the university entrance requirements but nonetheless could enroll in 
the correspondence program. In addition, a training centre for lawyers was set up by 
the Ministry of Justice in 1994. It not only runs on-the-job training for licensed 
''('-· 
lawyers but also conducts a Masters degree program. Its graduates are ap;~oved as 
lawyers without necessarily sitting for the qualifying examination, and in effect 
supersedes the formal legal education. 8 Essentially, undergraduate training in law has 
failed to assume a dominant position. Instead, the main channel of legal education is 
quickly expanding outside the universities. 
Even among the regular universities, a major in law takes several forms, with 
the time spent in studying legal knowledge spanning two to four years. The most 
common form is the normal four-year degree course. The second is a double degree 
which altogether takes six years. This is practiced at a few renowned universities in 
Beijing such as Peking University, People's University, and the Chinese University of 
Political Science and Law. Students from other disciplines can apply to study law in 
their third year. They will then go through the entire degree course in law and will be 
awarded two degrees, from both disciplines, upon graduation. The third form oflegal 
education is practiced by Tsinghua University. Emphasizing the production of 
7 Interviews, 1997. 
8 For a background of this training centre see CLN (25/10/94: 1; 6/1/96: 1). See also Wang Zhenmin 
(1996: 94). 
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interdisciplinary legal graduates and an orientation towards a training in common law 
and foreign law, the School of Law admits only third-year undergraduate students 
from other departments. They will be awarded an LLB after a further training in law 
for two years (Tsinghua University School of Law 1995).9 The fourth method is one 
degree with two specialties, which at the time of this field research was being 
contemplated by the Central University of Nationalities. The idea is to coordinate the 
law program with the foreign languages department. The first two years would focus 
on training in foreign languages and the later two years in law. Another plan is to 
' '( -
coordinate with the department of economics. 10 The fifth is a second degre"e in law, 
which also takes only two years. Since all enrolled students already hold a university 
degree, the courses are designed in a very compressed way. For instance, a course on 
criminal law which carries 92 credit hours in a normal undergraduate four-year course 
takes about thirty for this second-degree course. 11 In view of all these different forms 
of training, leading to the same bachelor's degree in law, there are good reasons to 
believe that standards vary greatly among the degree-holders. The same problem also 
exists for the graduate programs (Fang Liufang 1997: 48-50). 
In addition, the institutional arrangement of the legal curriculum is inherently 
very complex. Up until 1998 students generally specialized in just one area oflaw- a 
result of the establishment specialties (zhuanye) within a department to cater for the 
very specific needs of centralized state planning in the 1950s. For instance, the Law 
Department of Peking University had offered four specialties in law: namely, law, 
9 Since there are discrepancies between the Chinese and English texts, reference here is made to the 
Chinese version. 
10 Interview No. 18, 1997. The first plan had already been approved and the second one at that time 
was being considered. 
11 Interview No. 24, 1997. 
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economic law, international economic law, and international law. Potential students 
applied to a specific specialty offered by the Department. This kind of specialization 
further weakened undergraduate training in law as an integrated whole. Changes 
were implemented in 1992, however, to allow students to apply to the Department 
directly and then to freely choose any one of the four specialties after admission. 
Students reported that they usually chose to do two specialties in order to increase 
their market value after graduation, 12 reflecting that they saw it as too narrow to know 
just one specialty. Because of the apparent defects of this system of specialties, in 
" ~(:...·--
1998 the Ministry of Education reshuffled the whole system into eleven major 
academic disciplines and 71 departments, and the number of specialties was reduced 
from 504 to just 249. In the area oflaw, original specialties like law, economic law, 
international law, international economic law, labor reform, commercial law, and 
criminal justice were incorporated into one general specialty in law (PD 18/8/98: 11). 
A structural corollary of these institutional irregularities and complexities in 
the realm of legal education is the relatively weak sense of professional identity 
within the legal community. Chinese lawyers do not display a high degree of 
homogeneity and consensus characteristic of a "community within the community" 
(Goode 1957). The failure oflaw schools in universities to monopolize formal legal 
training has significantly undermined its role as a socializing agent for a 
homogeneous self-image. The very diverse academic structures, including specialties, 
courses, credits, degrees etc. introduce far too many variables for students to possibly 
develop a common sense of occupational identity and to aspire to the same career in 
12 Interviews, 1997. 
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law. 13 This is compounded by the structure of the curriculum, which is not oriented 
towards professional and vocational training. The image and professional experience 
of lawyers and of other legal personnel like judges and procurators are seldom 
presented in the classroom. There is little structural connection between law schools 
and the wider legal community (Wang Zhenmin 1996), and a sense of identification 
with the wider legal community is not cultivated at schools. Consequently very few 
graduates actually choose law as their first posting. 
Since the mid- l 990s some Chinese legal scholars have begun to ¥£lice their 
'" 
skepticism about this strategic expansion in legal education. In contrast to the 
government stance of stressing the quantitative development of lawyers and hence a 
multifarious training in law, legal scholars began to speak for quality control. They 
saw the system as grossly mismanaged and in urgent need of overhaul. They were 
calling for a standardization in the provision of legal education, stressing the 
importance of a proper undergraduate training in law as a minimum requirement for 
entry into the legal professions, and suggesting that legal education should be 
positioned as professional training, with more emphasis on practical skills so as to 
foster a closer link between legal education and a career in law (e.g. Liu Zuoxiang 
1994; Wang Zhenmin 1996; Fang Liufang 1997; He Weifang 1997; Su Li 1997). 
Thus, a sense of professional closure was beginning to form. 
These proposals about the proper positioning of legal education all the more 
reflect the structural crisis faced by the legal community. Z. Bankowski and G. 
Mungham (1978) argued that "a political economy of legal education can usefully 
13 For a study of the development of occupational identification among graduate students see Becker 
and Carper (1956a, 1956b). 
115 
function as a prolegomenon to a political economy of the legal profession itself' (p. 
449). They showed that the debate over the content of legal education had coincided 
with one or more of the following three factors: when the profession has expanded 
sufficiently to create new centers for professional education, or a transformation of 
old ones; when the "material base" of the profession is threatened; and when 
previously "disenfranchised" groups demand access to professional services. In 
China, however, the crisis arises more from a disjuncture between knowledge and 
practice. Because of the formalistic character of the Chinese legal system, 14 legal 
' f'. 
training has tended to emphasize the rote-learning of black-letter laws '·~ith little 
attention devoted to skill in legal analysis and problem-solving. Consequently, a 
university education does not necessarily confer the students with any relative 
advantages in the actual practice of law. Law graduates are ill-prepared to work in an 
increasingly complex legal environment of a rapidly changing market society. 
Arguments over the reform of legal education and commitment to notions of a 
professional education versus a purely academic one15 show that law schools in China 
are beginning to seek a more active role in the construction of the profession. But 
their attempt is essentially constrained by the fact that the forms and contents of legal 
education are still largely subject to the governance of the Ministry of Education as 
well as the Ministry of Justice. Thus, although Burrage et al. (1990) see universities 
as one of the actors in determining the course of professionalization, the role the law 
schools in China could play is still to be seen. Moreover, while the reform proposals 
14 "Formalism ... means that the content oflaw is assumed to represent reality, with little if any inquiry 
permitted into gaps between the content and operation oflaw" (Potter 1998: 39). 
15 See Bankowski and Mungham (1978) for a discussion on the tension between "academic" and 
"professional" orientations in education and training for the professions. 
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can be taken as a potential first step in the direction of professional closure, perhaps 
more importantly they represent a conscious attempt of the scholarly community to 
protect the "material base" of university legal education and in effect to enhance its 
status. But this effort would be in vain so long as the state is intent upon expanding 
the supply of lawyers. Any closure attempt is also likely to face strong resistance 
from the middle and lower rungs of the profession itself as well as from the wider 
society, since a large number of practicing lawyers are not university-educated, and 
since many of the colleges also have vested interests in the provision oflegal training. 
Tightening Quality in Medical Education 
During the early years of the People's Republic, the mandate to "serve the 
people" called for increasing the quantity and upgrading the quality of doctors and 
other health professions. The years between 1950 and 1965 were characterized by a 
period of consolidation and development. All existing medical colleges became state 
funded, some were combined and some relocated, and as a result the number of 
medical colleges declined from 44 in 1950 to 31 in 1955 (Qian Zhongxin 1992: 892). 
Student enrollment, however, increased five-fold from 15,234 in 1949 to 82,861 in 
1965 (Gao et al. 1999: 769). In 1954, the Ministry of Health asserted that doctors' 
education should be concentrated in higher education. At the same time, medical 
universities were insulated from the burden of having to train lower-level medical 
personnel but could remain more in line with international standards of the day. They 
enrolled graduates of high schools for a period of study of five to six years, including 
an internship year. In this way, the medical profession was assured that the quality of 
medical education would not be compromised by its expansion. Elite schools like 
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Peking Union Medical College were allowed to maintain their high admission 
standards and previous curricula (Burris 1991: 68-9). The training of primary and 
intermediate-level health workers were left to secondary health schools (weisheng 
xuexiao) at technical middle school level (zhongzhuang), which enrolled mostly 
graduates of junior high schools for a period of study of three years, and graduates 
could work as assistant doctors (yishi). This category of assistant doctors was 
modeled largely on the Soviet feldshers - medical workers similar to military 
corpsmen (Sidel and Sidel 1982: 29). In 1965, 88,972 students were enrolled in these 
health schools (World Bank 1992: 96). 
This kind of professionalism in medicine resulted in a longstanding conflict 
between the profession and Communist Party administrators (Lampton 1977). 
During the Cultural Revolution, the elitist and urbane orientation of doctors came 
under severe attack, and there were deliberate attempts to deprofessionalize and 
proletarianize the medical profession. To "serve the people," doctors were mobilized 
to go to the countryside to serve the vast rural populace and to train local peasants as 
"barefoot doctors" to attend to medical needs in the villages. A young peasant needed 
only to have some basic formal education (usually primary or junior high school 
education) in order to be trained as a barefoot doctor. The training courses comprised 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and nursing (Pickowicz 1973). About 1.5 million 
barefoot doctors were trained during that period (Deng Yizhong 1990: 513). 
Medical universities ceased admitting students and were closed during the 
turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. In 1970, some medical universities reopened, but 
the curriculum was reduced to three years, and there were also no entrance 
examinations. Students admitted came mainly from the worker-peasant-soldier 
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(gongnongbing) classes. In 1975, there were 88 medical colleges and these had a 
student enrollment of 86,336. The figures for secondary health schools were 480 and 
139,113 respectively (CHY 1983: 71). 
The main dilemma in medical education in the early reform period was the 
decline in the quality of young doctors. University graduates from the Cultural 
Revolution period were compared unfavorably to the assistant doctors of earlier times, 
and upgrading courses were being developed to improve their knowledge and skills 
(Sidel and Sidel 1982: 67). A doctor who graduated at that time also adm~tted that he 
had not undergone any systematic training, and he was indeed grateful that the society 
had not cast aside his cohort entirely. 16 In contrast to legal reform, the quantitative 
supply of new entrants was less of an issue in the area of medicine (Table 4.4). The 
gradual increase in the number of graduates in the reform era was largely due to the 
expansion of student enrollment in the higher education sector. 
Since 1976, medical education has swung back towards higher-level training, 
with more emphasis placed on tertiary education. Similar to higher education in 
general, higher medical education comprises both university degrees and college 
associate degrees. Whereas the curriculum of three years of study for an associate 
degree in medicine was fairly standardized at the college level, the years of study 
required varied among medical universities in the early 1980s. Most universities 
offered a five-year curriculum for bachelor-level clinical training, but in some 
key-point universities it was six. In 1988 the curriculum was unified at five years. As 
an informant from Beijing Medical University, which originally practiced a six-year 
16 Interview No. 52, 1997. 
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Table 4.4 Number of Graduates in Medicine, 1977-2000.a 
Number of Graduates 
Year Total University College 
1977 34,860 
1980 17,656b 
1982 25,963 
1986 27,907 22,098 5,809 
1987 21,124 23,903 8 221 ' f.~ 
' 
1989 38,366 28,118 10,248 
1990 42,881 30,177 12,704 
1991 46,028 30,332 15,696 
1992 10,537 693 9,844 
1993 48,559 32,571 15,988 
1994 47,090 29,355 17,735 
1995 55,711 29,278 26,433 
1996 61,417 
1997 61,239 
1998 61,379 33,027 28,352 
1999 61,545 35,090 26,455 
2000 59,857 37,045 22,812 
Note: a Figures include only graduates from regular state-funded higher 
institutions. 
b This reduction in number of graduates is the result oflengthening the 
program from three to five or six years. 
Sources: World Bank (1992: 96); CEY, various years; ESYC, various years; 
CSY 2001: 654. 
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curriculum, explained, the award of the same degree with varied lengths of study 
caused controversies in the evaluation of job titles and wages. When the university 
switched to a five-year curriculum, there was essentially no major change in the 
curriculum structure, but courses were made more compressed and intensified. 17 The 
prestigious Peking Union Medical University, however, has always retained an 
eight-year curriculum. Although the training is regarded as bachelor-level training, 
students would be awarded a doctorate degree upon successful completion. 
In 1985 the Ministry of Health proposed to select a few key-point universities 
to try out a new seven-year curriculum mainly in western-style clinical medicine, and 
graduates would be awarded a masters degree upon completion. The rationale was 
that China was not lacking in bachelor-level doctors, but needed doctors at the 
graduate level who could become specialists. In 1988 fifteen universities were 
selected to implement this new curriculum plan (CHY 1989: 202). This is clearly an 
effort by the Ministry to upgrade the quality of doctors. Moreover, in the mid-l 990s 
the Ministry has planned to gradually phase out secondary health schools. In cities 
like Beijing and Shanghai the training of assistant doctors at health schools already 
had ceased in 1996. As the minister of health pointed out, it was necessary to raise the 
minimum entry requirement to become doctors at the associate degree level, and thus 
better serving the medical needs of a society in demographic transition (HN 29/2/96: 1, 
7 /3/96: 1 ). A hospital administrator whom I interviewed said that his hospital, which 
was located at the county level, no longer recruited assistant doctors graduated from 
17 Interview No. 21, 1997. 
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secondary health schools. 18 Thus, in the area of medicine we are actually seeing an 
attempt of professional closure initiated by the state. 
Contrary to popular belief that professionals would welcome the project of 
closure, this endeavor towards upgrading quality by the Ministry has actually drawn 
criticisms from within the profession. First, there was a humane concern about the 
rural population. Many of the doctors I talked to agreed that there was not a shortage 
in the supply of doctors in China but merely an uneven distribution across the nation 
since they tended to cluster in city-level hospitals. They commented that ~~~would be 
impracticable to abolish secondary health schools, and hence assistant doctors, as few 
university graduates were willing to work in the countryside. 19 As one of them said, 
It is not meaningful to talk about upgrading the entry level of doctors 
without first improving the conditions of hospitals. If we are to abolish 
secondary health schools, the precondition was that small and 
low-level hospitals no longer exist. I myself of course agreed that the 
higher the academic qualification of doctors, the better. But China's 
national situation doesn't yet allow that.20 
Second, some doctors did not see the elevated quality as actually serving their 
own interest, and dismay was shown towards the new seven-year degree program. 
The concern is a practical one. Medical graduates of the normal five-year program 
need to work as resident physicians (zhuyuan yisheng), the lowest-level physician in 
the hospital, for five years before they can sit for a state promotion examination to 
become an attending physician (zhuzhi yisheng) upon passing. Graduates of this 
seven-year program are, however, given the job title of attending physician once they 
18 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
19 Interviews, 1997. 
20 Interview No. 21, 1997. 
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are assigned to hospitals because of the higher academic degree that they have. This 
might therefore block the chances of promotion of existing physicians already in 
practice because hospitals also have quotas for promotion. Since most doctors are 
institutionally bounded to the hospitals, they therefore see this new institutional 
arrangement of medical education as threatening their own interests. Moreover, 
doctors lamented that these graduates might not be competent enough to assume the 
position of attending physicians. As one said, 
There is a big gap between the regulations and reality. It is x.e,.ry 
important for doctors to accumulate necessary clinical experience 
before they could become attending physicians. To be a doctor 
requires actual practice, and these graduates fall far short of that. Even 
if they hold a masters or even a doctorate degree, the internship year is 
still far from adequate for them to perform the job in a competent 
way.21 
In terms of student intake, it is generally acknowledged even within the 
profession that medicine does not attract the best students. In contrast to law, foreign 
languages, or finance etc., medicine is not considered a "hot" discipline sought after 
by students. The reason is clear. Although doctors command a relatively high status 
in society, medical practice in China does not offer the graduates a lucrative return. 
One doctor admitted, 
Being a doctor in China is a hard job. The working hours are long but 
the wages are low, and the welfare benefits are also not good. The 
only advantage is that the job, and the pay, is still relatively stable. 
Any society has to have doctors, so it is not affected by any changing 
economic conditions. 22 
21 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
22 Interview No. 30, 1997. 
l 
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Thus, unless students have a particular calling in medicine it is rare for medical 
universities to attract the kind of top students that were admitted by, say, the Law 
Department in Peking University. Newspapers reported that in 1995 medicine again 
became a hot discipline only because others like economics and finance had cooled 
down somewhat. That should have meant greater competition to get into medical 
schools. But the actual figure suggested something otherwise. For instance, Shanghai 
Medical University planned to admit 510 undergraduate students, but the admission 
rate was 2:1, which meant fifty percent of the applicants would be ?CC?epted. In 
~t· 
Beijing Medical University, the admission rate was even higher at just 1.5: 1 (HN 
9/7/95: 2). And both universities are considered key-point universities in the medical 
system. Whilst the pool of applicants was self-selective and "mediocre students 
would not dare to apply," this admission rate said something about the quality of 
medical students per se. 
Career Aspirations: "Boys in Suits" vs. "Boys in White'i23 
Research on law and medical students in the 1950s in North America found 
that the latter were more committed to a career in their profession and that they could 
not conceive of practicing anything but medicine (Thielens 1957). Similar findings 
were yielded when the study was replicated in the 1990s in the United Kingdom 
(Cavenagh et al. 2000). The authors argued that doctors are more available as role 
models as compared to lawyers in the students' formative years. Moreover, a degree 
23 The use of the word "boys" here merely paraphrases Howard Becker's classic study, Boys in White: 
Student Culture in Medical School (1961). It by no means suggests that students in law and medicine in 
China are predominantly male. 
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in law is more versatile and allows students to pursue many other career opportunities, 
whereas medical training provides no viable exit option for medical students. In short, 
the "boys in suits" - to paraphrase Becker (1961) - have a much wider spectrum of 
career choices, whereas their medical counterparts - the "boys in white" - have much 
restricted choices. Similar observations can be found in China. 
Discussion of career aspirations among university graduates was possible in 
China only after the Chinese government abolished its centralized job allocation 
system in 1992. Before that, graduates did not have much autonomy in deqi.._ding what 
'.' 
kind of a career they wanted to pursue. Whereas doctors were relatively clear about 
what lay ahead for them when they graduated, many lawyers in their thirties and 
forties spoke of being a lawyer as accidental, that they were simply "by chance" 
allocated to a state law firm upon graduation. By the 1990s students could exercise 
their free will to choose a career that they wanted to advance. Thus their career choice 
reflects all the more the kind of professional socialization they obtained, and their 
choice is essentially structured by the institutional arrangements of legal and medical 
education. 
Because of the institutional explosion in legal education and because a career 
in law not confined to law students, when they entered law schools many students did 
not see the study of law as a particular calling. Future prospects in law were seldom 
taken into account. Law, to them, was just another degree option that would allow 
them a wide choice of possibilities. As a law student put it, 
I was very determined to get into Peking University but did not have 
the slightest idea what law was about. I did arts in high school and 
there were not many choices for arts students. I am definitely not 
interested in economics, and it seems to me that anyone could study 
Chinese literature. At that time law was a hot discipline. That's why I 
chose law.24 
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Quite a number of other informants spoke of similar experiences. It is thus left to the 
law schools to craft what they want these students to tum into. But, as one law 
professor commented, law schools in China also did not have clear ideas of what they 
wanted to produce for the market. 25 As mentioned before, legal education in China is 
not oriented towards professional training. Consequently, professional socialization 
is weak. Rather, "extra-curricular" influences (Atkinson 1983; M. Johnson 1983) 
play a greater role in shaping students' career aspirations. In recent years i:l'.fereasingly 
more law students have worked as student helpers in law firms out of practical 
concerns. In fact, among some of the younger lawyers I spoke with, many started 
"helping out" at law firms when they were in their third or fourth year at law schools, 
and their early experiences with the work of lawyers tend to exert positive influences 
on their future career choice. 
Thus, unlike medical students, who usually have a good idea of what medicine 
is about and their career aspirations are therefore more clearly defined, not many law 
students in China actually choose to work as lawyers upon graduation. The strategy to 
expand legal education in order to boost the ranks oflawyers is apparently misplaced 
if law graduates, even if they have already sat for the qualifying examination, do not 
go directly into practice. Law students usually identify four possible career prospects 
for themselves: becoming licensed lawyers; state cadres in the judicial systems; 
corporate legal counsels; or simply working in the public sector or private 
24 Interview No. 32, 1997. 
25 Interview No. 19, 1997. 
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corporations. While these are common career choices for law graduates in other 
countries, what is distinctive in China is the extremely small number of graduates who 
chose to work as apprentices and then become licensed lawyers right away. 
Comparative figures are revealing. In Britain, roughly sixty percent of law graduates 
practice law in the private sector (Bankowski and Mungham 1978: 452). In 
Venezuela, a third of those who qualify enter private practice. In Brazil, 44 percent of 
law graduates became legal professionals in 1980 (Abel 1989: 94). In America, 
roughly about a third of law graduates are admitted to the Bar, and presumably strive 
' ..::· ... 
towards a career in law (Abel l 988b ). In China, however, among th; 180 law 
graduates at Peking University in 1997, only about five or six students went to work in 
law firms directly. The others mostly chose to work in banks or enterprises, or to 
become civil servants in state organs. And this did not imply that they worked as 
in-house counsels in private corporations or as government lawyers. Lawyers 
employed by the government as civil servants to advise on legal matters, to be 
distinguished from employees in the Ministry of Justice and the various bureaus of 
justice as well as lawyers in state law firms, were very few. For instance, in 1996 
Shanghai only hired 28 lawyers to work full-time as lawyers for the government ( CLN 
17 /4/96: 1 ). 
Ultimately the career choice of law graduates is an interaction between 
personal self-selection and organizational recruitment (Ladinsky 1963). While many 
students saw their choices of careers other than law as a demonstration of their own 
free will, as they were no longer subject to the national job allocation system, their 
choices were also highly structured by the present institutional constraints in getting 
employment in law firms. I shall elaborate this in the next chapter. 
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Thus, the "suit" that law students wear allows them a wide spectrum of jobs 
opportunities and they are not confined to a career specifically in law. The "boys in 
white," on the other hand, are more focused towards a career goal their white gown 
destined them to. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom that young man are more likely to aspire to 
become medial doctors, a study of career aspiration among junior-high students in 
1992 in China found that substantially more girls than boys wished so (Breaded and 
Liu 1996). This might have to do with the perception of doctors as\~ "caring" 
~> . 
profession, and hence woman's work. Several female doctors whom I interviewed 
admitted that it was their parents who made the choice for them, and who apparently 
held misguided conceptions about medicine. Two graduates of Beijing Medical 
University told me why they studied medicine: 
It was my parents' decision for me to go to medical school. In their 
view, girls are more appropriate to study medicine. And the entry 
competition was less fierce than, say, in the science and technical 
subjects in Tsinghua University. Medicine could be easier, and the 
workload could also be lighter. I myself didn't have any particular 
feelings - I didn't know much about medicine at that time. I didn't 
realize that studying medicine also requires a lot of hard work.26 
My parents thought that doctors are a caring profession and therefore 
suitable for girls. In the past, doctors also had stable jobs. Now of 
course it is a different story.27 
Unlike law students, the job prospects m medicine constitute an important 
consideration for potential medical students. A doctor observed, 
I did make a calculation about the job prospects when I applied to 
study medicine. There are now too many layoffs in other jobs, and 
26 Interview No. 30, 1997. 
27 Interview No. 31, 1997. 
people have to find their own way out. My parents were both 
university graduates, but they got laid-off too. To become a doctor is 
relatively stable. The job is relatively secure, and the housing 
condition is also not bad. I didn't think much about the low wage. 
Yeah, there are now many new rich, but you don't know when the 
policies would change again.28 
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Even for those who did not have a clear idea about medicine, once they got 
admitted they were socialized to become a doctor, since the several years of medical 
training did not leave them much choice in other jobs. A greater problem lies in a 
brain drain. In contrast to law graduates being drained to enter the commodity sector 
of the economy, medical graduates were drained abroad. A student at thel}festigious 
Peking Union Medical College reported that since 1993 students were required to sign 
an agreement with the school. The agreement stipulated that they were not to quit in 
the middle of their medical training and go abroad, as many of their predecessors had 
done. 29 A doctor whom I interviewed mentioned that two thirds of his classmates 
went to the United States upon completing the undergraduate training.30 How many 
of them would eventually go back to China to "serve the people" is unknown, but 
presumably their eventual return should help boost the professionals in the collective 
upward mobility project, and locally trained physicians might find themselves at a 
disadvantage. 
28 Interview No. 21, 1997. 
29 Interview No. 38, 1997. 
30 Interview No. 21, 1997. 
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Occupational Certification and Licensing 
In addition to education, the licensing system constitutes an important part of 
the process of professional closure. It is one of the strategies that an occupation 
employs in its continuing efforts to achieve and maintain the collective professional 
status and income of its members (Parkin 1979; Simpson et al. 1982; Macdonald 
1985). In addition, licensure also functions as a measure of informal social control, 
for it seeks to maintain the professional status by disciplining its members for 
malpractice or misconduct. In most countries where the licensin~;:;..system is 
administered by the professional bodies, both functions carry equal weight as they 
reinforce each other. However, in socialist society where the state commands an 
almost omnipotent control over the society, the system of licensure fits very well into 
the overall schema of social control over the professional members. In this vein, the 
function of control far outweighs the initial function of restrictive competition and 
legal monopoly over the production of goods and services. 
Certifying the Lawyers 
From the outset, registration of lawyers in China was mandated by the state. 
Chinese lawyers have needed to be licensed ever since the legal system was 
reinstituted, and the provision was subsequently tightened up and formalized in 1989. 
This licensing system involves two processes: an individual needs first to obtain a 
lawyer's credential and then to undergo a period of apprenticeship. There are two 
means to get a credential: one is through the national qualifying examination held 
since 1986, initially every other year and later annually since 1993; and the other is 
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through "approval" (kaohe). 31 This qualifying process poses an even greater 
challenge to the function of legal education in professional closure because a proper 
education in law is not regarded as a necessary prerequisite for one to be admitted to 
the ranks of lawyers. 
In countries where universities already serve an important gatekeeping 
function, further examinations might seem superfluous (Abel 1988: 9-18). This is not 
the case in China. Since the role of a formal university education in law is only 
peripheral in China, the Ministry of Justice increasingly saw the need to tighten up the 
\~<-' 
net as it realized that many practicing lawyers were substandard both in terms of 
experience and competency. A process of institutionalizing more objective 
determinants of competency was thus warranted. While in 1986 the examination was 
restricted to those who were already working as full- or part-time lawyers, it has been 
open to eligible candidates society-wide since 1988 (LYC 1989: 26). A university 
degree in law is not required. Instead, anyone who has acquired three years of legal 
education in an institution of higher learning or an undergraduate education in other 
disciplines can sit for the exam (Tong Baogui 1996: 397).32 
The qualifying examination has gained immense popularity in recent years 
and candidates come from all walks of life. Anecdotal newspaper reports suggested 
that over the years there have been quite a number of non-law trained candidates 
31 Kaohe literally means "assessment". Following Randall Peerenboom, it is translated here as 
"approval" to emphasize the fact that it is up to the relevant authority to decide and approve whether the 
applicant is qualified to practice (LCHR 1998: 17-8). 
32 In addition, Artice! 5(5) of this document provides that officials from state organs and the military etc. 
were also eligible candidates. Although this provision no longer holds, Article 6 of Lawyers' Law 
stipulates that people who attained "an equivalent professional level" are likewise accepted, essentially 
making the clause susceptible to possible arbitrary interpretation. In the 1996 exam the Ministry of 
Justice clarified that one is also considered eligible by passing 14 subjects in the correspondence 
program organized by the All China Lawyers Correspondence Centre (CLN 15/6/96: 1). 
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getting through the qualifying exam, and they gave the impression that it was possible 
to prepare for the exam in just a couple of months' time. Although many legal 
scholars argue for the necessity of would-be lawyers to have a formal university 
education in law, surprisingly many of the law students I spoke with did not see the 
need to preclude non-law majors to sit for the exam. Most of them shared the 
government's view that it would be impractical to impose such a restriction as China 
was still developing the profession. Moreover, they genuinely believed that the 
thoroughness of the test and the "low" pass rate have already assured the competency 
~ f,~-·-
of those who made it. They also saw themselves as having little advantage over those 
without a law background, since in their view law was more about practice than about 
what one learnt at school. 33 While this may of course be true, it again illustrates that 
law schools lack a jurisdictional command (cf. Abbott 1988) over the production of 
lawyers. 
From 1994 onwards the Ministry of Justice began to highlight the importance 
of establishing the examination system on a basis that is "fair, just, competitive, and 
selects the best" (LD 28/6/94: 2). No matter how the Ministry of Justice tries to 
institutionalize the qualifying examination as a fair and competitive mechanism to 
choose the most suitable, the concern to expand the profession is so predominant that 
it inevitably poses a paradoxical constraint on how well the exam could actually 
exercise its gatekeeping function. Table 4.5 shows that for most years the pass rate 
was well over ten percent. Moreover, this pass rate was very much subject to the 
manipulation of the Ministry of Justice. For instance, the pass level in both 1995 and 
1997 was set at only 240 out of a total of 400 marks (CLN27/l/96: 1; PD 14/12/98: 3.). 
33 Interviews, 1997. 
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In 2000, the Ministry changed the rule to instead certify a fixed number of candidates 
and hence the passing mark was lowered to 231 ( CYD 13/12/00). Clearly the 
examination allowed much room for the authorities to decide how many candidates it 
wanted to inject into the profession. Thus, given the loose requirement for eligibility 
to sit the exam and the sheer volume of successful candidates turned out every year, 
the qualifying examination might be little more than "a coarse filter" (Alford 1995: 
34). 
~ ~~~~ 
Table 4.5 Number of Candidates Passing the National Qualifying Examination. 
No. of Successful 
Year No. of Applicants Candidates Passing Rate 
1988 92,322 15,523 16.81 % 
1990 ~ 80,000a 12,756 ~ 15.95% 
1992 ~ 80,000a ~ 10,oooa ~ 12.50% 
1993 88,120 10,646 12.08% 
1994 116,378 11,600 9.97% 
1995 117,859 13,350 11.33% 
1996 127,111 4,238 3.33% 
1997 114,636 14,192 12.38% 
1998 142,284 15, 102 10.61% 
2000 185,169 21,700 11.72% 
Note: •Exact figures are not available. 
Sources: Zhang Zhiming 1995: 169; CD 17/6/98, 8/12/98; PD 14/12/98: 3; CL 12/98, CYD 13112100. 
In most countries where professional examinations are administered, taking 
the exam not only is the only route into the profession but it is also meant only for 
candidates who are drawn to the profession. Very often this is so not only because of 
the strict eligibility requirement but also because of the elevated status of the exam 
itself. Thus the examination is not only meritocratic but also exclusive - exclusive not 
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only to those who are not up to the standard but also to those who do not find a calling 
in the profession. In Randall Collins' terminology, the exam is a social ritual through 
which the profession is made "sacred" (Collins 1990). The qualifying examination 
for lawyers in China, however, does not function to exclude and deter those who 
merely want to get one more certificate for future career choice and may not 
necessarily join the ranks of lawyers. This can be illustrated by the composition of 
candidates. In the 1998 qualifying examination, forty percent were civil servants 
from party and state organs whilst another seventeen percent were staff from 
corporate enterprises. Only about nineteen percent of the candidates were university 
law graduates; and eighteen percent were without a law background (CYD 11110/98; 
CL 12/98). In 2000, the percentage of university law graduates taking the 
examination slightly increased to twenty percent; but still 28 percent came from party 
and state organs. The qualifying examination, as well as the work of lawyers, has yet 
to make the lawyering profession a "sacred" realm. 
Getting lawyers' credentials through "approval" (kaohe) raises an even bigger 
threat to quality control. In the early years, all lawyers came to practice through 
approval. Between 1982 and 1986, about 10,000 lawyers were qualified by approval 
(LCHR 1998: 30). But even after the establishment of the national qualifying 
examination in 1986, the system of approval continued to serve the function of 
flexibly adjusting the supply of lawyers. For instance, because of the desire to 
develop a pool oflawyers who were well versed not only in law but also in economics, 
foreign languages, and technology, in 1993 the Ministry of Justice decided to exempt 
individuals from taking the examination if they had obtained from abroad a bachelor's 
degree or above in law, finance, economics, real estate, intellectual property rights, or 
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business management (Tong Baogui 1996: 467-8). The reform program issued later 
that year further outlined the conditions of granting lawyers' credentials through 
approval. Consideration would be given to experienced staff of judicial bodies, legal 
research and educational institutions, as well as specialists in banking, patent and 
marine affairs. Individuals who held a master's degree in law and had already worked 
in a law firm for a year would also be given licenses (Tong Baogui 1996: 511-2). 
However, as the qualifying examination took shape, the continued existence of the 
approval system became subject to quite a lot of discussion over the years (CL 6/96: 
" ·(~, 
31-2). While its role and function is confirmed in the Lawyers' Law, the pool of 
experienced personnel from which approval could be made has shifted mainly to the 
faculty of law schools. Article 7 states that: 
A person applying to practice law who has acquired an undergraduate 
legal education in an institution of higher learning, or higher 
qualification, who is engaged in professional work such as legal 
research and teaching, or who has a senior professional title or is of an 
equivalent professional level, shall be granted qualification as a lawyer, 
upon approval by the judicial administration department under the 
State Council after evaluation and verification in accordance with the 
prescribed conditions (my italics). 
But the latter part of the clause still allows room for indiscriminate interpretation. 
Essentially, it leaves the door open to judges and procurators to be qualified as 
lawyers without sitting for the examination. In fact, in the first draft of the Lawyers' 
Law it had been suggested that judges and procurators with more than fifteen years' 
experience could be exempted (Zhang Geng 1997: 84). But objections were raised by 
members of the court system and the procuratorate on the ground that the standard 
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was too tough (LCHR 1998: 65).34 Whereas in many other countries the switch of 
roles among judges, prosecutors, and lawyers might not constitute a problem, as they 
form a relatively homogeneous legal profession with similar educational backgrounds, 
China has a specific historico-political background. In the past, demobilized military 
personnel have been transferred to the courts, and most of them did not have any legal 
training prior to their assumption of the role of judges.35 Many lawyers I ~poke with 
expressed their disdain towards those judges-turned-lawyers, saying that their only 
assets were their old guanxi with the courts instead of any professional competency. 36 
' f.~. 
Moreover, although the Ministry of Justice has specified that the authority to grant 
approval rested only at the provincial level (CL 4/97: 56), the exact criteria have never 
been clearly spelled out. Thus, the system of approval will remain a threat to the 
gatekeeping function of the qualifying process. 
Would-be lawyers in China are required to undergo apprenticeships before 
they can apply for a lawyer's license. The Lawyers' Regulation specified the period 
of apprenticeship as two years. But it has been reduced to one year ever since the 
introduction of the national qualifying examination. This was reaffirmed in the 1996 
Lawyers' Law. Apparently the requirement of a one-year apprenticeship is generally 
agreed upon, as there was little discussion about it during the course of drafting the 
Lawyers' Law, although after its promulgation there was a suggestion that two years 
34 One informant has said that they were still required to have eight years experience in judicial work, 
but he also mentioned that this is not written down on papers. Interview No. 18, 1997. 
35 The practice to place demobilized soldiers in the courts began in 1952 at a time when political 
reliability overrode all other concerns. As one informant commented, while it is not required for the 
courts to receive university graduates, they must take in demobilized military personnel. Interview No. 
18, 1997. For a discussion of the placement of demobilized military personnel in the courts see He 
Weifang (1995: 224-5), and Nanfang zhoumo (2/1/98: 9). 
36 Interviews, 1997. 
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of apprenticeship might be more appropriate (CLN2/11/96: 3). But this view failed to 
invite any discussion from the wider legal community, indicating that the apprentice 
system is yet to assume any significant role in its own right. 
Subsequent regulations on apprenticeship give detailed instructions about the 
system. A law firm receiving an apprentice lawyer must file with the local judicial 
administrative organ that would carry out periodic inspections of the apprentice. The 
apprentice should be supervised by a lawyer with at least three years' practicing 
experience and good political credibility, and the law firm should 19:ssess the 
apprentice in light of his or her personal conduct and professional capability. Upon 
completing the one year apprenticeship, the individual should submit a written 
application to the law firm which, together with its own recommendation, would be 
handed to the local bureau of justice for approval. However, whether these 
procedures are strictly followed in reality is open to doubt. For instance, an informant 
who held a full-time job in a state investment corporation but at the same time worked 
as a part-time apprentice lawyer freely admitted that he could always apply for the 
license as long as the law firm endorses his fulfillment of an apprenticeship. Since the 
bureau of justice seldom checked, and more importantly, the son of the law firm's 
director was his good friend, he saw little problem in obtaining it.37 Yet, his status as 
a part-time apprentice lawyer poses some ambiguity. 
A notice issued by the Ministry of Justice in 1985 clearly explained that an 
apprentice lawyer could not be appointed on a part-time basis (Tong Baogui 1996: 
203). But the complementary regulations of the Lawyers' Law on part-time lawyers 
37 Interview No. 39, 1997. 
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become self-contradictory in this respect. Article 2 states that part-time lawyers refer 
to those who have already obtained a lawyer's credential and practicing licenses, and 
that they do not need to leave their original positions but practice law on a part-time 
basis. Article 6, however, states that those who apply to practice law part-time should 
undergo a year's apprenticeship in the law firm that he wants to join. How this 
one-year apprenticeship is possible on a part-time basis is unclear. The case presented 
above is apparently not an isolated one, as another informant, a graduate student in 
law, was also a part-time apprentice lawyer, although he commented that his part-time 
' '(". ·~ 
status did not make any difference to the law firm as he spent most of the ti~e there.38 
For an individual who has passed the qualifying examination and fulfilled the 
required one-year apprenticeship, obtaining the license is just procedural. In China, 
licenses are issued only to practicing lawyers. However, given the fact that China's 
legal system allows laymen to act as representatives in civil and economic cases, the 
licensing system clearly does not claim the function of a "legal monopoly". Quite the 
contrary, Chinese lawyers are being "penalized" for registering with the authorities. 
In the words of a former official of the Beijing Bar Association, 
Full-time lawyers have to pay 4,500 yuan and part-time lawyers 3,500 
for the registration fee. . . . In reality many "lawyers" do not register. 
If a "lawyer" specializes in economic cases there is little chance for the 
license to be checked upon. It is only in criminal defense that the 
lawyer needs to present the license to the security bureau and/or 
detention centre when he visits the accused. Of course, honest lawyers 
would also register. 39 
38 Interview No. 24, 1997. 
39 Interview No. 16, 1997. 
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To register naturally means to succumb to the watchful eyes of the authorities. 
The yearly registration is an effective control mechanism that makes it easy to 
exercise punishment for recalcitrant behavior. A case in point is a lawyer who had her 
license to practice revoked for life because she called for the release of her husband, a 
political dissident (LCHR 1993: 47-8). In other cases involving human rights 
activists, defense lawyers often face the threat of having their licenses revoked (China 
Labour Bulletin, 9-l 0/98: 17). Thus, the licensing system in China clearly does not 
aim to provide shelters for its members. The retentive power of the profes~ion should 
' ,.. :;,.:., 
therefore be explained in terms of the relatively high economic rewards in the work of 
lawyers instead of any advantages conferred by the license (cf. Simpson et al. 1982). 
Certifying the Doctors 
Similarly to the legal profession, the power to certify the doctors lies not in the 
hands of the professional body but the state. In the past, because medical schools 
were all state funded and graduates practiced medicine within the state system, there 
were essentially no licensing examinations or certification procedures. During the 
early 1980s unified examinations were carried out for graduating students but only 
had it aborted after a short trial period. An official from the Ministry of Health 
explained that the ministry initially saw it necessary to ensure standardized quality of 
medical graduates in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. But then the 
examination ran into several problems: on the one hand, the exam could not actually 
assess the clinical aspect of doctoring; on the other hand, because of the emphasis put 
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on the exam by medical schools, it in effect affected the internship of graduating 
students. Because of this, the ministry formally cancelled the exam in 1983.40 
At the time of the field research, there was again call for a national unified 
certifying examination for doctors. But my interviewees seemed generally indifferent 
about it. There are two factors accounting for their apathy. First, Chinese doctors are 
very embedded in their work, so much so that they are surprisingly parochial in their 
social world. My interviewees did not seem to be interested in anything other than 
their immediate work and happenings in the working environment, i.e.- t~hospital. 
Most of them were unaware of such a proposal in certifying their juniors. Nor did 
they have any knowledge about the imminent promulgation of the Doctors' Law, 
which is supposedly a law intending to professionalize the medical profession. Only 
one interviewee had heard about it but he too simply dismissed it as trivial.41 To some 
extent, their ignorance could be attributed to the fact that very little discussion about 
the law actually appeared in medical periodicals and newspaper.42 This also showed 
that doctors as a social and professional group had little voice even over the drafting 
of law pertaining to their own practice. 
Second, to incumbent doctors their disinterestedness about such a unified 
national examination was also understandable since they would not be affected by it. 
Moreover, they themselves were required to undergo continuous assessment in order 
40 Telephone interview with an official from Department of Education, Ministry of Health, 1997. 
41 Interview No. 35, 1997. 
42 In fact, the Doctors' Law seemed to be drafted entirely in secrecy. In the annual Zhongguo weishang 
nianjian (Yearbook of Public Health in the People's Republic of China), only a very small paragraph 
could be found describing the progress of the draft law. And the official from the Ministry of Health 
did not even want to grant me an interview but only agreed to talk about it very briefly over the 
telephone. In fact, he seemed surprised to learn that I knew such a law was being drafted. 
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promoted in the hospital system. Because of this, they did not perceive the proposal 
as contributing to their status enhancement nor adding any extra burden on the new 
entrants. In fact, one doctor reported that her hospital had required all new recruits 
after 1996 to sit for an examination in their specialty every year.43 Thus, quality 
maintenance seemed already actively enforced in the hospital system. 
Arguably medical students should be more concerned about such a proposal to 
certify them since it affected them directly. But similarly to their seniors, students 
were not particularly anxious or enthusiastic about it. Again, since in rece?J years the 
hospital system had implemented various examinations for assessing new entrants, 
some students were already desensitized about it and merely likened the new proposal 
with the original graduate exam.44 
The proposal about a unified national certifying examination for doctors 
therefore failed to exert any broader implications on status enhancement or 
consolidating doctors as a professional group. Nevertheless, the proposal was 
attended to in the Doctors' Law, which was promulgated in June 1998 and took effect 
in May 1999. Article 8 stipulates that the state shall practice a certifying examination 
system for doctors, to be implemented by the Ministry of Health and administered by 
provincial health bureaus. This clause also suggests an anticipation of the gradual 
diversification, or in essence privatization, of the higher education system and hence 
the necessity to maintain quality control at the entry level of would-be doctors 
(Standing Committee of the NPC and MOH 1998: 30). 
43 Interview No. 17, 1997. 
44 Interview No. 21, 1997. 
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Article 9 of the Doctors' Law delineates the prerequisites to sit for the 
qualifying examination. Candidates are required to have at least a university degree 
in medicine and have undergone a one-year apprenticeship under the supervision of a· 
licensed doctor in registered medical institutions. For those who do not meet the 
above requirements, however, the Doctors' Law also allows them to be certified 
according to the appraisal system by health bureaus at the county level or above. 
According to the Ministry of Health, this clause serves to protect traditional medicine 
and at the same time thwart substandard and unlicensed practitioners (Standing 
" ~:-
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Committee of the NPC and MOH 1998: 40). But similarly to the lawyers by approval, 
this appraisal system in medicine in reality also provides a loophole for unqualified 
practitioners to get the necessary certificate. As my interviewees commented, 
"Anything goes [in China]." One doctor readily admitted that having the necessary 
guanxi with the health bureau was sufficient enough to get a license and establish a 
private clinic.45 It is therefore hard to imagine if the promulgation of the Doctors' 
Law would make any significant difference. 
45 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
Chapter Five 
The Practice of Lawyering and Doctoring 
This chapter deals with the second aspect of the micro institutional 
environment that has had an impact on the development of lawyers and do"._tors in 
China. This is the structure of their professional practice. By structure of professional 
practice I refer not to the actual work of the professionals but to the institutional 
arrangements that shape the practice of lawyering and doctoring in China. This 
includes the employment structure, the workplace setting and the alternative 
opportunities in private practice, the possibilities in job mobility, and the issue of 
work autonomy, etc. 
To embark on a career in law or medicine requires that an individual first get a 
salaried position in the profession. Before the 1990s university graduates were all 
assigned a job by the state. The national job allocation system required graduates to 
sacrifice their individual aspirations in return for the guarantee of a job after 
graduation. Even their choice of study in universities was very often not a voluntary 
decision by themselves. Informants spoke of taking majors at that time "independent 
of our own wills." Instead, it was up to the school leadership, after taking into 
consideration students' political activism (biaoxian) and their class background, to 
make the choice for them. Thus, among the lawyers I spoke to who began to practice 
in the eighties, most had embarked on a lawyer's career merely because they had been 
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assigned to a legal advisory office upon their graduation from university. Many of 
them would have preferred a job in the judicial system, which was considered "very 
stable" at that time compared to becoming lawyers. To these lawyers, then, their 
career path was not deliberately planned but only an unintended consequence of the 
state's assignment. Their "social biographies," defined as the relation between an 
individual's personal biography and the common experience of his cohort (Heinz and 
Laumann 1982: 173), are therefore very different from those who entered the labour 
market during the 1990s. Although students in the nineties could enjoy more 
autonomy in aspiring towards a future career, the abolition of the national job 
allocation system also made them pay a greater individual effort in order to compete 
in the labour market after graduation. Thus, for fresh graduates in the nineties, getting 
employed involved a lot of hassle not experienced by their predecessors of earlier 
cohorts. 
Coupled with the shrinkage in the job allocation system is the rise of labour 
markets. Because of the different institutionalization oflaw and medicine, the labour 
markets for lawyers and doctors vary in the ways they are organized and controlled. 
Drawing on Eliot Freidson's (2001) distinctions regarding a free labour market, a 
bureaucratic market, and an occupational market, we can speak of an "emergent 
professional labour market" for Chinese lawyers and a "bureaucratic labour market" 
for doctors. The constitution of these labour markets plays a part in facilitating or 
constraining the recruitment process of new entrants into the profession. 
Sectoral reforms in law and medicine also impact on how the work setting is 
structured, which in tum defines and constrains lawyers and doctors in different ways 
and to varying degrees. Since the onset of legal reforms, law firms increasingly have 
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lost the functional importance of the typical socialist work unit. This in effect allowed 
Chinese lawyers to quickly move into private practice once the state opened up that 
opportunity, which represented a step further away from state control but closer to 
professional independence. The monetary rewards available from a law practice also 
makes it possible for lawyers to move outside the work unit for the satisfaction of 
goods and services conventionally delivered by the state through membership of the 
socialist institution. On the other hand, doctors in China are more confined to public 
hospitals which still retain the features of a socialist work unit. Although its functions 
., ~:~~;~ 
have also been declining, doctors' dependence on it, or, to put it in a more categorical 
way, their perceived dependence on it, has worked to structure their perceptions of 
alternatives outside the hospital: that is, to engage in private practice. Consequently, 
the two professions have exhibited very different career lines. 
Getting Employed 
Occupations differ in their recruitment patterns. The recruitment process 
tends to reflect and reinforce the values and reference group orientation of the 
occupation. Once an individual is recruited, the occupation offers him a distinctive 
career line: i.e. there exists certain regularities in the sequences of jobs people have 
over time in a particular occupation. These sequences are very often defined by the 
structure of the occupation as well as the labour market (Spilerman 1977). Previous 
studies of recruitment aimed to account for the variables affecting successful 
recruitment, or the relationship between industrialization and the formalization of the 
recruitment process. Ida Simpson et al. (1982) found that expanding occupations and 
occupations that require high educational levels tend to recruit mainly young 
I 
., 
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employees. Whereas Jonathan Marx (1988) argued that it was misleading to conclude 
that formal recruitment procedures predominate in modem societies, smce 
recruitment involves both information dispersion and selection and these work 
differently depending on the size and the cultural setting of firms, I shall argue that 
these factors are all dependent variables of the actual constitution of a labour market. 
In the case of China, the differing recruitment pattern of lawyers and doctors emerges 
as a result of the way the labour markets are organized and controlled. 
The Logic of the Emergent Professional Labour Market for Lawyers 
According to Freidson's typology of "the occupationally controlled labour 
market," the occupation itself maintains control over the determination of 
qualifications for particular kinds of work and thus of the definition of the work 
(Freidson 2001: 72-3). At first glance, Chinese lawyers do not match this description. 
Lawyers as a group do not enjoy an exclusive right to determine the qualifications for 
performing legal work nor control over its own numbers. Instead, it is the state that 
unilaterally sets the requisite credentials for the pool of potential applicants to join the 
profession. But many lawyers are now engaging in private practice outside the state 
apparatus, and the state also interferes less in their daily routine of work. Lawyers can 
now freely engage in a direct remunerative relationship with individual clients and 
firms. As private practitioners, lawyers themselves are now employers in the labour 
market, and they can impose additional criteria upon the minimum entry level set by 
the state. The assessment oflawyers has also shifted from the hands of the state to the 
lawyers' association, which is supposed to be a professional association representing 
the lawyers. Thus, lawyers are increasingly gaining hold of the labour market, even 
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though it is still far from an occupationally controlled one. A professional labour 
market can therefore be described as emerging. 
Although lawyers do not have control over the qualifications and the number 
of potential new entrants, they seek to control the labour market by operating a 
different logic in the recruitment process. The "emergent professional labour market" 
of Chinese lawyers is to admit the most resourceful. If educational credentials are the 
dominant form of professional closure in other societies, then closure based on social 
capital, or social power, represents a variant in China. On the theory of sociaJ.tclosure, 
Raymond Murphy (1988) has commented that one serious limitation common to the 
work of all closure theorists is their neglect of the relationship among the different 
rules of closure and hence their failure to analyze how rules of closure are structured. 
Education by itself, as Murphy suggested, rarely gives entry to the most privileged 
class. Instead, the propertied classes determine the necessity, value, and nature of the 
credentials required for positions, thereby structuring the very nature of credentialed 
groups. Drawing insights from Murphy, social capital as a different rule of closure 
can give us a glimpse into how the law profession in China is actually structured. 
Social capital here refers to an individual's social resources. Although it is not 
explicitly defined as a closure strategy, it operates as an implicit closure mechanism 
nonetheless. The operative logic of the labour market for Chinese lawyers is thus less 
about educational credentials, although to an extent it is important, but more about 
whether the individual is resourceful or not in terms of his/her social networks. And 
here the prevalent theme of social connections, guanxi, in Chinese society creeps in 
(cf. Yang 1994; Yan 1996; Kipnis 1997). In contrast to the suggestion that the 
significance of guanxi has been diminishing in an increasingly legal-rational context 
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of economic development (Guthrie 1998), it is precisely the relative lack of guanxi on 
the part of new entrants that discriminates against their joining the private profession. 
Here, guanxi operates at two levels: first as an institutional substitute for the flow of 
information; and second, as social resources embedded in one's social networks. 
Although individual job applications are becoming more prevalent by the 
early 1990s because of the gradual withdrawal ofthe state's involvement in urban job 
allocations, the job market is less than an open one. An open network for the flow of 
job information and a fair system of job competition are not yet establishe~~~and job 
applications and examinations are not formally regulated. Public job advertisements 
are not often found in newspapers. A survey in China in 1998 found that whereas 
getting a job through a state assignment had fallen sharply in the 1990s, at only 39 
percent compared to over 90 percent in the seventies, only about seven percent of the 
respondents found their jobs through advertisements. Twenty-two percent reportedly 
got their jobs through their social connections, in other words, guanxi ( CYD 5/11/98). 
Although the so-called personnel exchange centres (rencai jiaoliu zhongxin ), 1 where 
those seeking new jobs can directly contact enterprises needing particular skills, are 
becoming more popular, these are ultimately very localized and hence regionally 
segregated. The same is true for job fairs (rencai zhaoping hui) organized by 
universities as well as the personnel bureaus for graduates and potential employers. 
Occasionally a bureau organizes job fairs for personnel in its own system. For 
instance, in 1995 the Beijing Bureau of Justice held a job fair in which seventy law 
firms participated (CLN 17/6/95: 1). Yet, open recruitment is still not widely 
1 The first such personnel exchange centre was set up in Shenyang in 1983 as a test case to allow 
increased rates of turnover and a more individual choice of jobs for engineers, economists, statisticians 
and other technical skilled staff in state industry (Davis 1990: 90-1). 
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practiced. On the contrary, direct job applications and personal networks became the 
predominant ways for job seekers to learn about desirable jobs in the 1990s (Bian 
1999: 269). Among all the lawyers I spoke to who had started practicing in the 1990s, 
only two got into a law firm in response to open recruitment; the others all landed their 
jobs through some kind of guanxi. Consider the following experience of a young 
lawyer: 
I got into this law firm by sheer chance. I had a casual acquaintance 
with a judge from Nanjing while he was taking a short-term course at 
Peking University, and it's through his introduction that I got into t{l~ 
firm. This was just a lucky coincidence and was not something 
planned. This judge was having meals with a partner from the law 
firm and he mentioned that he knew of a fellow Nanjinger who was 
studying at Peking University and his ability was alright. And the 
partner thought, OK, let's come and have a try. This was how I got 
recruited. Of course, getting introduced to the firm was sheer good 
luck. But being able to stay has to do with one's capability. 
And he went on to justify the use of guanxi: 
This kind of recruitment practices needs to be understood in terms of 
the present institutional arrangements in China. There is basically no 
assessment in the recruitment process. One's academic credentials do 
not carry much weight and therefore it is not necessary to examine 
them very formally. If one is not up to the standard one will quit the 
firm voluntarily. Very few law firms would advertise in the 
newspapers; if they do, it is because they could not reach out to get 
candidates. Many of my colleagues were recruited in strange ways. 
Very often it was through some very loose connections that they got 
into the firm for a probationary period. Some, however, just rang up 
the firm and got invited for an interview.2 
Another lawyer spoke of a similar encounter: 
I knew that one of the partners in the law firm was elected as one of the 
Ten Best Lawyers Nation-wide in 1995 and was very determined to 
get into the firm, but didn't get my way. Later on I got a job interview 
with another law firm and the interviewer, on knowing that my second 
2 Interview No. 32, 1997. 
language is Japanese, suggested that Z.L. (the law firm) might be more 
appropriate. So he rang it up. It so happened that the lawyers there 
were very busy and really in need of assistance, so they asked me to go 
over and try. So here I am, working in the law firm that I longed for, 
purely through luck and coincidence.3 
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The above accounts resonate with Mark Granovetter's (1973, 1974) renowned 
thesis on "the strength of weak ties". Whereas in the eighties, when job allocations 
were centrally imposed and strong ties were used more frequently to influence the 
job-control agent to secure a position in a desirable work unit (Bian 1997), people in 
the nineties more often found jobs through loose guanxi networks that made possible 
the dissemination of a wide range of information about jobs. The use of guanxi here 
must therefore be understood as an institutional outcome of the market transition in a 
socialist setting. Because of the decentralization of employment restrictions, there 
was an organizational void left by receding state regulations at a time when the new 
logic of the labour market had not yet been established. This created a niche for the 
use of guanxi as an institutional substitute for the flow of job information. Given that 
systems for advertising jobs were still in formation and the flow of job information 
not entirely open, the recourse to guanxi should therefore be seen as a rational 
alternative. 
But guanxi as an institutional substitute for the flow of information also works 
in another sense. Its predominant use in the employment process also had to do with 
the fact that a universalistic rationality in job competition, that is, through academic 
credentials, was not formally recognized. As explained by the young lawyer quoted 
above, academic credentials do not weigh much in the recruitment process. A study 
in Britain similarly found that "recruitment to private law firms is often decided by a 
3 Interview No. 33, 1997. 
150 
resort to particularistic and personal criteria" which "was accompanied by a certain 
distrust/suspicion of any evidence of real academic ability/achievement shown by a 
candidate" (Bankowski and Mungham 1978: 454). Whereas in England this was due 
to the social characteristics of older lawyers being trained outside of the university 
system, in China this might be partly explained by the increasingly rampant problem 
of inflated credentials (PD 2219198: 9; also Mingpao 1112/99). In fact, a partner of a 
law firm made it clear that he never practiced open recruitment for new staff but relied 
only on "referrals" through friends and colleagues.4 Apparently there was an element 
of trust in this system of "referrals." In this vein, guanxi also works as an institutional 
substitute for the employer to obtain information on how capable the applicant is. 
While Bian (1994b) suggested that "guanxi ... will prevail in manipulating job 
placement and job mobility process" (p. 999) in the years to come, this is not just 
because of a relaxation of bureaucratic controls over jobs or the difficulty to obtain job 
information on the part of job searchers. Instead, because of the existing irregularities 
in the labour market, potential employers also need the necessary guanxi to ascertain 
whether a candidate is suitable or not. Hence, the use of guanxi in getting information 
works in both ways. 
Guanxi also operates at a second level in the employment process: that is, as 
social resources embedded in one's social networks. Whereas the foregoing 
discussion is pertinent to all of the emergent labour markets in China, guanxi as social 
resources that affect the employment opportunities of newcomers is more peculiar to 
the legal realm. Although Beijing was one of the cities with the largest number of 
lawyers, it was often said that law firms there found it very difficult to hire potential 
4 Interview No. 28, 1997. 
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lawyers (CLN 28/1/95: 1). At the same time, school-leavers complained that there 
were few openings for them to embark on a law career right away. Thus, the path to 
becoming a lawyer seems to be quite winding, as a young attorney explained: 
In China, the career path of a lawyer is not a straightforward one. If 
someone enters a law firm immediately upon graduation, it is likely 
that he would be looked down upon. People would think that he got in 
simply because of guanxi . ... For really good lawyers in China, their 
career path usually goes like this: getting a degree from abroad; or 
gaining some working experience in state organs or other foreign 
trade-related enterprises such that they would have built up a certain 
extent of social relationships before becoming practicing lawyers. 5 
The mismatch between supply and demand is obvious - most law firms want 
an experienced and multi-talented lawyer while new entrants can only find work as an 
apprentice for a year before becoming a fully qualified lawyer. Apprenticeships apply 
largely to the comparatively big and well-established law firms. Small firms, which 
constitute the bulk of the law firms, are usually unwilling to take in apprentice lawyers 
because of their constraints in both finances and manpower. In 1995, eighty percent 
of the law firms in China comprised less than ten people, including both full-time and 
part-time lawyers (Lushi yufazhi 11195: 13-4). In 1997, more than 150 out of the 227 
law firms in Beijing comprised less than ten lawyers, 51 had 11 to 20, and only 21 law 
firms had more than twenty people (CLN25/6/97: 2-4). 
But more importantly, fresh graduates from schools are not "resourceful." 
Resourcefulness can be understood in two senses. First, to employ their own term, 
fresh graduates did not have an 'yuan - which literally means "sources of business" -
that is, they did not have the necessary guanxi in the wider society that could bring in 
5 Interview No. 32, 1997. 
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prospective business for the law firm. This has to do with the institutional 
arrangement of the law firm, which according to the Lawyers' Law is to function as a 
collective entity. Lawyers in China are not supposed to accept cases by themselves. 
All cases should be undertaken exclusively by the law firm, which would then 
authorize and commission a lawyer to handle the case (Tong Baogui 1996: 13). Thus, 
a resourceful lawyer would not only bring in business to himself but to the entire firm. 
While in reality this is not very often observed - many lawyers still receive cases by 
themselves and the procedure of going through the firm is a mere formality - there is 
then still a problem of income and revenue. Except for apprentices and 1ssistant 
lawyers, who receive a fixed monthly salary, other lawyers in salaried positions are 
paid through commissions (ticheng). A lawyer explained the normal practice in 
Beijing, 
A lawyer gets fifty percent of the charges if the case comes from his 
own networks, and the remaining fifty percent goes to the firm. If the 
case comes from someone else in the firm but is commissioned to the 
lawyer, he gets twenty percent only. This is generally the principle 
used in Beijing.6 
Thus, a lawyer who was not resourceful would find it very difficult to sustain him or 
herself. This was also what deterred most law graduates from engaging directly in 
practice. Even if they go through the one-year apprentice, their social networks would 
still be limited to those of the law firm. It pays off to instead first spend a few years 
either in an enterprise or a state organ to widen their social and occupational networks 
and thus enrich their resources. 
6 Interview No. 24, 1997. 
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The emphasis laid on the resourcefulness of new entrants to the benefit of the 
law firm also takes on a second meaning: that is, good interpersonal relationships, 
again guanxi, as social resources. A lawyer who worked in a property development 
company for a couple of years before practicing law articulated the difficulty facing 
fresh school-leavers: 
In China, fresh graduates from universities would not know how to 
practice law... This has to do with the way the society is run. 
Graduates here must first go to work for an enterprise in order to 
understand how businesses actually operate ... Otherwise it would be 
almost impossible to represent an enterprise or an individual client in . 
legal activities. In other countries you have rules and regulations t?{ 
follow. In China even if we also have many rules and regulations we 
don't often follow them. Very often we work according to some 
non-institutionalized logic.7 
It is clear that he was referring to human factors that are crucial in conducting 
legal business, such as good relationships with personnel in both the courts and the 
government. In fact, another lawyer who responded to an open recruitment 
advertisement suggested that it was his "five years of work experience in the court" 
which really got him the job among the more than twenty applicants, some of them 
graduates from elite law schools like Peking University and some back from overseas. 
In his view, his past work experience no doubt earned him the necessary social 
connections that were deemed to be useful by the law firm. 8 This, however, also 
poses an obstacle to the professionalization oflawyers in China. Randall Peerenboom 
observed that "many lawyers find it easier and often more effective to rely on personal 
relations and connections rather than legal analysis and arguments to achieve their 
goals" (LCHR 1998: 66). It is not so much a problem of the lawyers but the 
7 Interview No. 46, 1997. 
8 Interview No. 24, 1997. 
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institutional reality in China that such connections are often necessary to obtain 
information from the courts and various government organs. A new entrant without 
any work experience in state organs or the wider society would be disadvantaged in 
this respect. 
The Logic of the Bureaucratic Labour Market for Doctors 
Except for a few who practiced traditional Chinese herbal medicine, doctors 
who began practicing before the 1990s were, similar to all other occupations, almost 
'\~. 
\' 
all assigned by the state to work in hospitals. The abolition of the national job 
allocation system in 1992 did not radically change this recruitment pattern. Unlike 
the lawyers, doctors in China need not resort to means other than their academic 
credentials to get their first post in medicine, since the labour market is still by and 
large a bureaucratic one. According to Freidson (2001), a centrally planned market 
goes hand in hand with a bureaucratic labour market on the national level. A 
bureaucratic labour market is 
created by staff members of a hierarchy, specialists in personnel 
management, design, and planning who are responsible to the ultimate 
authorities of the bureaucratized state ... rather than to the producers 
or consumers of their products .... [I]t is monocratic in structure with a 
systematic division of labour composed of positions or jobs whose 
tasks are defined by written rules and which are arranged 
hierarchically (or vertically) as well as functionally (or horizontally). 
Access to those positions or jobs, as well as to transfer and promotion 
between them, is determined by specified impersonal criteria of 
competence as well as by other formal personnel policies (pp. 67-8). 
In this type oflabour market, the division of the labour force is planned, and wages are 
specified for each officially established and recognized category or worker. 
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Whereas the Chinese economy is no longer centrally planned after two 
decades of reform, the national health system is still very much planned, financed, and 
supervised by the Ministry of Health. In this regard, medicine is still a bureaucratic 
service largely under the control of the bureaucratic state. Private practice is only 
allowed to a limited extent. Chinese doctors have few alternatives but to work in 
hospitals and thus put themselves under the direct control and supervision of hospital 
administrators. In terms of job allocation, the system of "mutual selection" 
(shuangxiang xuanze) instituted after 1992 did not alter much the recruitment process 
' \~-. 
for fresh medical graduates. In fact, an administrator of a county hospital C'onfided 
that up until 1997 central allocations of candidates were still practiced at his hospital. 
Graduates from medical colleges and universities and even some from secondary 
medical schools were assigned to the hospital regardless of the hospital's actual need. 
In his view, the hospital must still be subject to the authority of the higher jurisdiction 
and was therefore obligated to carry out the duties of job assignments. The hospital, 
indeed, did not enjoy much autonomy in personnel matters.9 
Even when the system of "mutual selection" is practiced, the recruitment 
pattern is still defined by specialized training and educational credentials. Due to the 
very specific nature of medicine, and since the Ministry of Health has seriously 
guarded against a relapse to the rapid but substandard expansion of medical personnel 
during the Cultural Revolution, medical institutions must necessarily draw their 
formally-trained talents from medical schools. Moreover, private medicine 
constitutes only a tiny proportion of medical provision in China. Figures from the 
Ministry of Health show that in 1995 there were only 71 private hospitals nationwide, 
9 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
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providing a total of3,289 hospital beds (ANHS 1995: 42). As the majority of hospitals 
in China are state-run, the pool of clients is basically guaranteed and does not depend 
on the doctors' own resourcefulness. They thus face much fewer institutional 
constraints in this regard. 
Another feature of the bureaucratic labour market for doctors concerns the 
subsystem of hospitals within the broader health system. As higher education 
institutions are organized along different lines, so too are hospitals. For instance, 
medical universities under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of ~ealth are 
• ' ~? 
affiliated with hospitals in the same administrative hierarchy. Recruitment to these 
hospitals tends also to favor graduates from the affiliated university. A doctor 
reported that when she graduated from Beijing Medical University in 1994, she and 
many of her classmates were recruited by the same unit since it is affiliated with the 
university. 10 Graduates of Peking Union Medical University also tend to work at 
Peking Union (Xiehe) Hospital, Fuwai Hospital, and Zhongliu (Cancer) Hospital, 
since they are of the same subsystem. 11 Thus, mutual selection or not, both the 
hospitals and the graduates have only limited choices. Moreover, as hospitals have a 
more established institutional history than law firms, the demand for doctors is much 
greater than the supply of new entrants. For instance, Shoudu (Capital) Medical 
University in Beijing reported in 1994 that the number of their graduates was not 
enough to fill up the places left by retiring doctors at its nine affiliated hospitals (HN 
12/6/94: 2). Zhongshan Medical University in Guangzhou also reported that in 1995 
the supply and demand ratio for its graduates was 1: 1.2 (HN 917195: 2). As a 
10 Interview No. 30, 1997. 
11 Interview No. 38, 1997. 
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consequence, there is a good reason why labour market for doctors is still very much 
controlled by the bureaucratic state. 
The Workplace Setting: Firms Versus Work Units 
The organization of the workplace also structures the way lawyers and doctors 
perceive the differing opportunities and constraints in their own development and 
hence their choice of action. Discussion of the recruitment pattern in the last section 
' '(~, 
suggests that the operating logic of the emergent professional labour market for 
lawyers poses an institutional barrier for fresh law graduates. However, for 
incumbent lawyers, the immediate work environment - the law firms - has allowed 
them the leeway to take advantage of the relaxation of policies in legal reform. By 
contrast, although fresh medical graduates find it relatively easy to embark on a career 
in medicine, the hospital setting works to limit their perceived alternatives. Taking an 
institutional approach, the difference shall be explained by changes in one of the 
fundamental socialist institutions, the work unit, or the danwei system. 
Post-Mao reforms have not only brought about the rise of labour markets but 
also wreaked havoc on the institutional structure of work units. Before the onset of a 
market economy most urban Chinese worked in a danwei, which served both political 
and social functions (cf. Walder 1986; Bian 1994; Shaw 96; Lu and Perry 1997). The 
.i 
. I 
i danwei took care of its people from cradle to grave. It not only encouraged employees 
in the unit to develop an organized dependency on their superiors but also on the 
danwei for collective consumption. The danwei was also highly politicized. The 
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cellularization of Chinese society had enabled the party-state to exert considerable 
political and social control over its urban populace. 
Moreover, employees were allocated to work organizations rather than to 
types of occupations. Occupational attainment was pursued only after a person 
entered a work unit. Thus, the first job became the most important component of an 
individual's career development, and getting into a good work unit became all the 
more important (Lin and Bian 1991; Bian 1994). 
However, since the 1980s the functions of a self-sufficient work, ufut have 
been in decline. The acceleration in the transition to a market economy has 
diminished the need for the provision of goods and services by the work unit. Thus, 
the work unit as an institution is less constraining than before. When a work unit 
ceases to provide medical care and retirement pensions, the functional importance of 
the work unit on individuals recedes. This is precisely the case with the evolution of 
law firms in China. 
From "Legal Advisory Offices " to "Law Firms " 
When law firms were first re-established in the late 1970s they were called 
"legal advisory offices" ([ala guwenchu). The 1982 Lawyers' Regulation defined 
legal advisory offices as institutional units (shiye danwei) under the organizational 
leadership and professional supervision of the judicial administrative organs of the 
state (Article 13). Institutional units are non-production, non-profit-making units. 
Stipulating a law firm was to be an institutional unit and not an enterprise unit meant 
that the provision of legal services was to serve social rather than economic causes 
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(Chen 1992: 132-3). It also rendered law firms financially dependent upon state 
funding. Thus, an early law firm resembled the typical socialist work unit. They were 
under the tight control of the government, and membership was restricted according 
to establishment quota (bianzhi) and the system of job assignment. Lawyers, as "state 
workers," received their salaries as well as a wide array of welfare provisions from the 
state. 
In 1983 Shenzhen took the initiative to change the name of legal advisory 
offices to "lawyers' firms" (liishi shiwusuo), the use of which was later legitimized at 
~,so 
a national conference of judicial administration in 1984 (Zhang Geng 1997: 20). 
While many commentators regarded these two terms as having no substantial 
difference (e.g. Pitney 1988: 325; Chen 1998: 132), the change should be taken as 
more than just semantic. It represented a recognition of the full range of services 
provided by lawyers. It also served the purpose of differentiating law firms from the 
legal advisory units within enterprises and governmental organs. According to a 
comment in Gaungming Daily, "Lawyers should not identify with the state organs 
like the Security or the Procuracy, they should not perform a dictatorship function" 
(quoted in CNA 1988: 9). The term "lawyers' firms" also implies that China needs 
more than just "legal workers" but lawyers who have the expertise to offer their 
services to society at large. 
Concomitant with this change in name was that since 1984 newly established 
law firms were encouraged to be responsible for their own profits and losses, rather 
than be financed by the state. Whilst this relaxation of state control helped spur a 
growth in the number of law firms and of lawyers, since a personnel quota and state 
funding was no longer required, it also meant that the social and welfare functions 
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long associated with a work unit were also declining. Although in 1986 the Ministry 
of Justice specified that lawyers were still entitled to free medical services and a 
pension at public expense, in reality not all bureaus of justice followed this rule. As a 
lawyer noted to me, from 1986 onwards they were essentially denied their previous 
but received only a monthly salary from their state law firm. 12 To these lawyers 
therefore, the danwei as a fundamental socialist institution has lost much of its 
significance. When state employment no longer suggests financial stability and 
welfare security, there is no reason for them to stay with the state law firm if they can 
"' .,,..~ 
find alternatives. This explains why many lawyers were quick to jumt{ at the 
opportunity to dissociate themselves from state control by establishing private law 
firms in the 1990s. 
Hospitals as Work Units 
In his seminal study of medicine, Eliot Freidson (1970) has discussed how the 
organization of the work setting affects the professionals' performance as well as job 
satisfaction. But the work setting of hospitals in China affects doctors more than that. 
The structure of hospitals as work units not only has a bearing on doctors' 
professional lives but also their private lives. Gail Henderson and Myron Cohen 
(1984) have documented how a Chinese hospital, as a work unit, impacted both the 
formal and informal lives of its members and their relations with patients from outside 
the unit. As their study was conducted during the late 1970s, we could expect that 
much of what they described would have changed when reforms proceeded into the 
nineties. Because of the relatively relaxed political environment, political and 
12 Interview No.54, 1997. 
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administrative controls over individual members have lessened. Members are 
allowed chances of mobility which were normally denied in earlier decades. More 
importantly, because of the fiscal restructuring of the health system, hospitals are now 
responsible for their own financial well-being and cannot rely entirely on state 
funding. Welfare provisions in the hospitals are declining, but this is compensated by 
changes in the incentive system which allow staff at the hospitals a higher wage than 
before. Despite these changes, however, hospitals in China, unlike the law firms, still 
retain much of the institutional structure of a work unit. 
The rationality to "serve the economy" in legal reform is carried through by 
the lawyers. To foster a greater momentum for the development of the ranks of 
lawyers, law firms are restructured to allow more people to join the team. In medicine, 
it is another story. The rationality to "serve the people" in health reform rests 
basically with the hospitals as the functioning units. This essentially stipulates that 
public hospitals are to remain as institutional units - non-profit but service oriented. 
Hospitals remain therefore under the jurisdiction and close supervision of the 
Ministry of Health. For instance, during the mid-1980s there was a campaign to 
identify "civic-minded hospitals" (wenming yiyuan) - an aspect of hospital reform 
directed to "serve the people." Medical staff was demanded to serve the populace 
wholeheartedly and to put social efficacy as the first priority (CHY 1986: 125). 
Regardless of whether hospitals carried out the campaign only in the rhetorical sense 
or not, the issue here is that hospitals, as work units, continue to be a vehicle through 
which party and state policies are pursued. 
In terms of welfare provisions, although the functional importance of hospitals 
has also been declining, doctors still consider this as important. Many of the doctors I 
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interviewed had been allocated an apartment by the hospitals, as most of them were 
middle aged doctors and had worked in the hospitals for more than ten years. In 
addition, welfare benefits such as medical care and a retirement pension are still 
provided for. Hence, to those already on the beneficiary list this aspect of the hospital 
as a work unit still structures their perception of alternatives, and they perceived few 
parallel perquisites in private practice. 
The Opportunity Structure in Private Law Practice 
Reforms of the system for lawyers since the mid- l 980s have made the notion 
of law firms as institutional units fall short of reality. In 1993, without explicitly 
abandoning the notion of institutional units, law firms were re-categorized as 
professional intermediate organizations serving the socialist commodity economy 
(LYC 1994: 1-9). Clearly the state shies away from recognizing the entrepreneurial 
nature oflegal practices even though the private sector in law is gaining a bigger share. 
The legal definition of lawyers has also changed accordingly. The 1981 Lawyers 
Regulation defined lawyers in China as "state workers." When the Lawyers Law was 
promulgated in 1996, it recognized lawyers as "practitioners who ... provide legal 
services to the society." Although this still falls short of recognizing them as "free 
professionals," it nonetheless endorses their distancing from the state and thereby 
legitimizes the legal status of private practice. 
Private practice has been deemed to demonstrate a profession's independence 
from the state. Although studies on solo practitioners showed that they usually make 
up the lower echelons of the legal profession (Ladinsky 1963) and thus are more 
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vulnerable to market forces and the control of their clients (Heinz and Laumann 1982; 
Anleu 1992), lawyers in China still see the possibility of engaging in solo practice as 
exemplifying the ideal of the autonomous individual relatively independent of the 
organizational control of the state. But solo practice is not allowed in China. A 
complementary regulation of the Lawyers' Law on the registration and administration 
of law firms made it clear that all law firms, regardless of the nature of ownership, 
must comprise at least three full-time lawyers (CL 4/97: 54-5). Over the years there 
were recommendations that lawyers should be allowed to engage in solo practice, 
citing the unique nature of lawyering which requires only the lawyer's pr~fussional 
knowledge and little else (Laodong zhoubao 12/3/93: 3; CLN 514195: 4). But the 
provision governing solo practice was deleted at the last minute before the Lawyers 
Law was passed (Zhang Geng 1997: 178; see also LCHR 1998: 53-4). The Ministry 
of Justice argued that conditions were not yet ripe for lawyers to practice alone, thus 
essentially upholding the collective nature oflaw firms. 
Law firms with sole proprietorships do exist although their development is not 
actively encouraged. In official accounts these individual law firms are referred to as 
"firms bearing a personal name." At the end of 1995, there were about fifty such law 
firms in the country, representing about 0.7 percent of all law firms (Qing Feng 1997: 
245). The first individual law firm was established in Shanghai in May 1988 with the 
initiation and support of the chief of Shanghai bureau of justice (Zheng and Li et al. 
1997: 387-9; also Mingbao 17/7/98), at a time when the experimental program of 
co-operative law firms was just implemented but not yet widely practiced. The 
Beijing Bureau of Justice had taken a more cautious attitude, however, and the first 
sole proprietorship was approved only in April 1994. In three years' time this 
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increased to seven. But development of individual law firms ceased thereafter. 
According to an official of the Ministry of Justice, these firms could not retain their 
best staff since those capable would not want to work under the name of a particular 
lawyer. Existing individual law firms were, however, allowed to continue to 
practice. 13 
With the few exceptions of sole proprietorships, lawyers in general are either 
in salaried positions in state-funded or private law firms or partnerships. Reforms of 
the lawyer system has seen an increase in the number of law firms in China..._~d the 
\,' 
rapid growth since 1992 is a direct response to state approval of setting up 
partnerships (Fig. 5.1). In 1991, the number of private law firms accounted for less 
than two percent of the total; in 1997, they accounted for more than one-third of all 
law firms (Table 5.1). 
In the mid-1990s, newly formed private firms contributed to most of the 
growth in the professional legal establishment. In 1996, they accounted for all the 
growth in the numbers of law firms. By comparison, in 1996 the number of 
state-owned law firms experienced a small net decline for the first time (Pei 1998: 
9-10). In Beijing, all state law firms were privatized in 2000; and Shanghai followed 
suit in 2001 (CYD 24/9/01). At present, it is estimated that up to half of the total law 
firms in China are private (CD 23/1/02). 
13 Interview No. 40, 1997. 
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Table 5.1 Growth of Private Law Firms, 1991-97a 
Year Number Percentage of Total 
1991 73 1.95% 
1992 198 4.74% 
1993 505 9.85% 
1994 1,193 18.59% 
1995 1,625 22.42% 
1996 2,655 32.12% 
1997 2,927 34.68% 
Note: a From 1998 onwards the Yearbooks cease to provide 
separate figures for private and state law firms. 
Sources: LYC, various years. 
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The alternative of a private practice is not only facilitated by state sanction. 
Indeed, the work-unit system also helps to structure the perception of opportunities or 
constraints in private practice. The establishment of private law firms not only 
attracted lawyers from state law firms but also qualified personnel from the judicial 
and court systems. Those who switched to private practice are driven in part by the 
obliteration of welfare provisions in their original work unit, to the extent that they 
saw no essential difference between the two. Conversely, where benefits continued to 
be enjoyed by members of work units their choice is constricted. An official of the 
Ministry of Justice admitted that people of his age (mid-forties) had alre'idy got 
dependent on the unit, to the point that they did not see private practice as an actual 
alternative. In his words, 
The major problem is housing. When you quit the government you 
will have to give up the apartment, and it could cost you three to five 
hundred thousand yuan to buy one in the property market, not that 
many people could afford that. And of course there is the problem of 
social welfare. I can't afford to lose everything. To work in state 
organs is still relatively stable. Even though the wage is not high, the 
job is secure. 14 
However, quite a number of his younger colleagues in their twenties and thirties had 
already quit to join private teams of lawyers since they were not yet high enough on 
the seniority ladder to benefit from the kind of welfare enjoyed by my informant. 
Even lawyers in state law firms tended to refrain from private practice if they were 
already the beneficiaries of state welfare. Consider the following: 
If the opportunity arises I would also consider setting up a partnership 
law firm with friends. But now is not the right time. I already have 
housing from the firm. If I quit, I would have to return it. The salaries 
you earn from other law firms might not be enough for you to buy an 
14 Interview No. 41, 1997 
apartment in the property market. In Beijing, private lawyers 
generally earn an annual income of about 100,000 yuan. The better 
ones could earn 200,000 yuan. But it would still be difficult to buy an 
apartment with this level of income. Many lawyers in partnership law 
firms did not see this as a problem mainly because most of them are 
native Beijingers so their families are all in Beijing. So they already 
have their own housing, or their spouse has housing. 15 
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Private practice, however, offers lawyers the vision ofrelative work autonomy 
from state interference in their daily routines. State law firms are still very political in 
nature. One lawyer described how "state law firms are still under the jurisdiction of 
the district government as well as the supervision of the bureau of justice, and much 
time has to be spend on various meetings and conventions." When he moved to a 
private law firm, he found that his time could be spent entirely on real work, and both 
his job satisfaction and performance were enhanced.16 From the vantage point of the 
partners, the firm also enjoys autonomy not only in personnel matters but also in 
administrative and financial matters. In their view, there are too many "grandpas and 
grandmas at state law firms," meaning that they have many supervisory organs to 
report to. 17 Private practice allows them the kind of autonomy that the professional 
ideal embraces. 
Proliferation of private law firms also says something about the job mobility 
of lawyers. Consider the experience of the following lawyer: 
I was originally teaching economic law at a university, and qualified as 
a lawyer in 1988. Afterwards I was practicing as a part-time lawyer 
and later became a full-time one. I had worked in partnership law 
firms, and later on founded a partnership with some friends. But it 
broke up after a year. Now I am working in an individual law firm. 
15 Interview No. 49, 1997. 
16 Interview No. 37, 1997. 
17 Interview No. 27, 1997. 
This is somewhat rare in Beijing because most would not want to 
assume a salaried position if they had been a partner. 18 
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Decentralization of the employment structure allows greater mobility between jobs. 
But the freedom to move around also creates problems. Published commentaries 
complained that the mobility of lawyers has been doing harm to the development of 
law firms. Comparison oflaw firms in Beijing between 1996 and 1997 presents some 
revealing evidence on this. Of the 220 law firms registered with the Beijing Bar 
Association in 1996, 41 did not appear on the public list of firms in 1997, either 
because they had disintegrated or had not passed the annual review pro~s. In 
addition, 48 new law firms sprang up (CLN3/7/96: 3-4, 25/6/97: 2-4). The number of 
law firms swelled to 345 in 2000. Between 1998 and 2000 the number of law firms 
increased by 17.3 percent, whereas that of lawyers increased by 21.5 percent, 
presumably every single percentage increase in lawyers is accompanied by an almost 
parallel increase in law firms (CYD 12/3/99; Beijing tongji nianjian 2001: 502). 
Many lawyers admitted that job mobility at their firm is quite frequent. In Zhejiang 
province, for example, the number of law firms doubled between 1988 and 1995 
while the number of lawyers grew by only 25 percent; of the 44 private law firms set 
up in 1993, more than half had undergone personnel changes in the composition of the 
partnership (CLN 31/5/95: 4; Liishi yu Jaji 8/95: 34-7). This kind of constant 
disintegration and collapse of law firms also renders them difficult to consolidate and 
to further develop. In fact, this has also been singled out as one of the challenges 
facing Chinese lawyers in China's accession to the World Trade Organization (CD 
23/1102). A natural consequence of this is that young fresh graduates with law 
18 Interview No. 50, 1997. 
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credentials also find it hard to get the necessary apprenticeship in law firms so that 
they could be trained to become qualified lawyers. 
The Institutional Barriers in Private Medicine 
Private medicine in China is called "managed-in-society medicine" (shehui 
ban yi), in contradistinction to public hospitals and clinics which are state-run. 
Although private medical practice has always been allowed in China, in reality private 
practitioners are constricted to traditional Chinese herbalists and lower level'!doctors. 
University graduates of Western medicine are few and far between among them. 
Development of private practitioners and private clinics was endorsed in a policy 
document issued in 1985, but it restricted the pool to the "idle medical personnel" 
including "ethnic doctors," herbal practitioners, and retired personnel (MOH 1988: 
1-6). In 1988 the government expanded the pool by detailing the eligibility and 
practice of private practitioners. Qualified personnel (defined by either educational 
level or by assessment) who had worked continuously in public hospitals for three 
years are eligible to apply for private practice (MOH 1990: 413). In 1995, there were 
about 170,000 private practitioners in China, accounting for only 3.3 percent of the 
nation's medical personnel. More than half of them practiced in rural counties, thirty 
percent were doctors and 25 percent were assistant doctors (ANHS 1995: 42, 50). 
Half of the private practitioners had graduated only from technical schools and hence 
practiced mainly at the county and village level, thirty percent are retired personnel, 
and twenty percent are the original barefoot doctors, now renamed rural doctors (PD 
2111199: 10). 
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In theory a doctor could resign from a public hospital and join a private team. 
In reality the work unit system renders "exit" an unrealistic choice. The work unit 
system presupposes permanent employment at the hospital. During the 1980s there 
was still a tendency in a work unit to "own" its staff (cf. Henderson and Cohen 1984: 
82). To tender a resignation requiring the approval of the unit leader would prove 
difficult for doctors. In recent years the personnel system is more relaxed and greater 
mobility of medical staff is observed. Yet few doctors would contemplate the "exit" 
option. Major welfare provisions such as housing, medical care, and retirement 
' t.·~. 
pensions are still provided by the hospitals. To quit means that doctors have to forfeit 
all these, something few of them could afford. One who had worked in the hospital 
for 14 years before he was allocated an apartment was not ready to give it up.19 
Others, as doctor themselves, were well aware that falling sick in China nowadays 
could be costly. A doctor explained, 
It is still more secure in a state work unit. We have worked in the 
hospital for so long that we grew to depend on it. You know, it costs a 
lot to be sick nowadays. Even if I am a doctor, when I fall sick I still 
need to attend a hospital. It is more convenient to be an insider.20 
The doctor went on to argue that their situations were not comparable to lawyers. 
Whereas the monetary reward from private legal practice could compensate for the 
welfare provisions lawyers would have to give up when they quit the state sector, in 
medicine the market is more regulated: 
Doctors are not like lawyers. The law is a new profession and in China 
there is no established model for it. It is therefore much easier for them 
to try anew and they can charge a high price for their service. In 
medicine it is another story. Medicine is so established that it is not 
19 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
20 Interview No. 7, 1997. 
possible to charge a high fee even in private practice. But to establish a 
private clinic requires a lot more capital input than a law firm. So the 
risk involved is greater.21 
171 
The original work unit system constrains private medicine in another respect. 
The functional monopoly assumed by public hospitals in China renders doctors scant 
functional autonomy in their work. According to Freidson (1970), functional 
autonomy is defined as "the degree to which work can be carried on independently of 
organizational or medical supervision, and the degree to which it can be sustained by 
attracting its own clientele independently of organizational referral or referral by 
other occupations" (p. 53). Doctors in China lack autonomy in both aspects. On the 
one hand, the public work unit provides medical care facilities to its members and 
they must attend designated public hospitals in order to be reimbursed. It means that 
the pool from which private clinics or hospitals could draw their clients is limited to 
residents outside the work unit system. Doctors therefore worry that they would not 
be able to secure a sizable clientele in order to sustain their practice. In this vein, state 
·medicine as an established institution structures not only patients' choices but also 
doctors' perceptions of the viability of practicing outside the state system. 
In Beijing there are very few private practices. There is no market for 
it. Beijing has a high concentration of hospitals, far more than other 
cities, and many of them are also renowned. Private clinics would find 
it hard to survive here. There is also the problem of reimbursement. In 
the south where there are more private enterprises, private 
practitioners could find a niche.22 
On the other hand, the functional monopoly of public hospitals in China in the 
provision of medical facilities results in the lack of institutional support for private 
21 Interview No. 7, 1997. 
22 Interview No. 30, 1997. 
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medicine. Whereas hospitals everywhere provide a whole range of services from 
consultation to diagnostic formulation to therapeutic treatment, clinical laboratories 
and radiology etc. are also provided in the private market. In China, however, the 
hospitals monopolize even the most basic diagnostic examination, and a referral 
system between private clinics and public hospitals for laboratory tests is lacking. 
Given the tendency of both the doctors and patients to resort to diagnostic 
examinations, it is hard for doctors to imagine their role as providing only 
consultations and prescribing drugs. One doctor expressed her view in this way, "A 
\ 
doctor cannot open up a clinic just to check for the flu."23 Clearly they see the';upport 
of diagnostic examinations as integral to their practice, but these are lacking in the 
present institutional arrangement of private medical practice. 
In addition, the relatively bad reputation held by private medicine in recent 
years helps to put off doctors to join a private team. In their view, this has to do with 
the lack of close institutional scrutiny at the local level. Problems identified in private 
medicine include unlicensed practices, over-prescription of drugs, poor services, and 
substandard facilities (HN 21/1/94: 3). In 1990, a rectification campaign was carried 
out, in which 3,727 private clinics and 12,739 individual practitioners were forced out 
of business (CHY 1991: 47). 
Solo practices are especially held in low regard: 
The size of the clinic is small and facilities are also substandard. Solo 
practitioners' professional level is low. Mostly they are authorized by 
local health bureaus to open a clinic. There is supposed to be due 
23 Interview No. 4, 1997. 
I 
process to ensure they meet the requirements, but well, you know, here 
not everything works according to what is stipulated. 24 
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Because of the effect of the work unit system coupled with the lack of 
functional autonomy, horizontal job mobility of doctors is infrequent. Even though 
the state has relaxed much of its control over personnel since the nineties, it is still 
relatively rare for doctors to move among hospitals, not least because hospitals are 
still very much under the auspices of the government. Although doctors generally 
agreed that it was relatively easy to leave compared to before, they also confided that 
there was no better place to go than the hospital where they were working. A~hospital 
administrator noted, 
Very seldom would doctors quit a hospital. Now that it is a market 
economy, and given that our hospital is doing well economically, it is 
considered a decent place to earn a stable income.25 
Essentially he was noting not only the importance of job stability but that doctors 
might find it difficult to adapt to the competitive market economy outside the hospital. 
Some doctors have other explanations. A doctor, in their view, should strive for 
advancement in their professional skills, and this could only be attainable at 
established hospitals. A higher wage in the private sector is therefore not their 
concern. A doctor at a renowned specialized hospital said, 
Now it is not difficult to leave the hospital at all. Although the 
personnel system has been relaxed a lot, seldom would a doctor quit, 
maybe fewer than one each year. Why? The small private hospitals do 
not have status, and doctors working there find it difficult to make their 
names known. They would have their skill easily discounted.26 
24 Interview No. 7, 1997. 
25 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
26 Interview No. 8, 1997. 
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Other doctors observed that disappointment with doctoring did drive some people out 
of the profession: 
There are doctors quitting the hospital, mostly the young fresh 
graduates. Some might join other hospitals. But more often they tum 
to pharmaceutical companies and become salespersons. The wages 
are higher and the job is less strenuous. . . . When I was young I 
thought doctoring was a respected profession. Now I would think 
otherwise.27 
To the younger cohort, the monetary reward associated with doctoring can be 
a crucial consideration. An informant who aborted her medical career explained, 
- "-~ ~> . 
I didn't expect that the work environment of hospitals was so boring 
and rigid. The everyday work was so ritualistic that it was not 
challenging at all. I simply felt that I was not interested and medicine 
could not realize my potential. At the time when I applied to the 
medical university I didn't realize this. Now I work in a 
pharmaceutical company and I earn several hundred yuan more. . . . It 
is very easy to leave the hospital. We attended universities as 
state-funded students, and at Beijing Medical University the "training 
fee" (peiyang fei) was 2,500 a year. When I was recruited by the 
hospital I signed a five-year contract. Since I breached the contract I 
had to pay back the training fee (minus the number of years already 
served in the hospital) and compensation fee (weiyuejin). The 
compensation fee varies among work units. For my original hospital it 
was 1,000 yuan a year. I served three years before I quit, which meant 
I had to pay 5,000 yuan of training fee and a 2,000 yuan compensation 
fee, which made a total of 7 ,000 yuan. According to policies one could 
go as one likes. It is just a matter of money. If, however, I switched to 
another hospital, I needed only to pay the compensation fee but not the 
training fee. . . . Yes, once I quit I could not be a doctor again, but I 
don't have any regrets.28 
Constraints imposed by the work unit system cease, however, when the 
doctors retire. Thus, we find many retired doctors from public hospitals joining the 
joint-venture hospitals in recent years. In fact, many·doctors contemplate joining the 
27 Interview No. 12, 1997. 
28 Interview No. 31, 1997. 
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private market only after they retire. A doctor of thirty years who practiced at county 
level said, 
I would consider joining private medicine when I retire. In China 
medical personnel retire at sixty. If they have a proper medical 
credential they could apply to the health bureau to become a private 
practitioner. . . . I don't consider the clientele a problem at all. I have 
been working in the hospital for so long that I have developed a certain 
level of status. . . . The government is not really very strict towards 
private practice. At the county level one needs only to establish an 
outpatient clinic with one or two attending physicians. The 
government also has regulations specifying the size and the hygienic 
condition etc. But most of the time it is very easy to get around this 
provided that you have the necessary guanxi.29 \, 
Career Lines 
Given the differing employment structure and niches in private practice, we 
can expect that lawyers and doctors in China would exhibit very different career lines 
in terms of the common work history that members of the professional group share. 
Career patterns within the law firms or hospitals depend not only on the individual's 
capability but also on the opportunities offered by the organizational structure as well 
as the structure of the internal labour markets, i.e. higher-level vacancies are only 
opened up to incumbent employees (Althauser and Kalleberg 1990; Rosenbaum 
1990). Beyond the organizational boundary, however, members of the professional 
group share more or less the same career history. 
29 Interview No. 53, 1997. 
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Fig. 5.2 depicts the career lines of lawyers and doctors in China. Whereas 
university graduates (not necessarily in law) could become practicing lawyers upon 
passing the qualifying examination and fulfilling the required apprenticeship, very 
few of them actually choose to do so. Instead, the "normal" career path is for them to 
first work outside the legal realm in order to gain not just work experience but also the 
necessary social networks. The chances of getting a salaried position in private law 
firms is mediated by one's accumulation of social resources that can be brought into 
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the firm. Eventually some of them would be promoted to become partners or to set up 
their own partnership law firm. 
To the doctors, however, alternative employment, i.e. to engage in private 
medicine, is normally foreseeable only after they retire. The institutional constraints 
exerted by the functional monopoly of public hospitals still exist, but retirees can 
contemplate joining a private, small hospital since they are at least free as retirees 
from the constraints imposed by the work unit system. 
\ .. 
'<'. 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
In a very recently published article on the relationship between the state and 
professions in China, Edward Gu (2001) has set out to examine the question of 
"whether the state has incentives to take actions to impose or impede certain 
institutional changes aimed at promoting professional autonomy" (p. 171). This 
doctoral dissertation argues against Gu's contention that professional autonomy, even 
if in only a few sectors, is a conscious undertaking of the state aimed at instilling 
institutional changes. However close a profession is to the market-oriented reforms 
and hence the recipient of greater tolerance by. the state in the development of 
professional autonomy, the profession can only gain such autonomy through its own 
active engagement with the state. Gu's argument generally ignores the professions as 
interested actors. The process of professionalization must necessarily entail both 
government sanctioning and government regulation. But if a profession achieves 
relative professional autonomy during the course of development, it is the result of 
tacit negotiation and renegotiation over the scope and direction of state policy 
changes. In this vein, one must look at the interconnectedness of state and society and 
to see both as active actors in themselves. 
This study argues that the dynamics of professional development must be 
understood in terms of the actors' institutional embeddedness. It is through the 
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actions and reactions on the part of the state and the professions that the parameters of 
professional development are cultivated, shaped, and, in some instances, expanded. 
The dissertation contends that there is no fundamental causal relationship between 
professionalization and economic development. Instead, the broader context of 
China's reforms has exerted differing impacts on professions, mediated by the 
specific institutional arrangements at the sectoral level where an individual profession 
is located. One must therefore look at the institutional specificities that are conducive 
to the profession to develop in one arena but not in the other. 
Arguably, professionalization in China must necessarily be state-led and the 
kind of professionalism at issue is essentially one of instrumentalized professionalism 
(J arausch 1990). Law, being closer to the instrumental and pragmatic purposes of 
economic development, is understandably given a longer rein in its own development. 
Medicine, on the other hand, is still formally committed to the ethos to serving the 
people. But professions are not to be understood as mere instruments serving the 
larger purposes of the state. The rise of professions in China represents the increasing 
heterogeneity in society, which is no longer passively acted upon by the state. 
Although professions in China are still short of initiating changes of their own, 
depending on the specificities of the institutional environment their reaction or 
inaction towards state policies in effect helps shape their own course of development. 
Making references to institutional specificities also bears on two broader 
issues. One concerns the study of changing state-society relationships in China, and 
the other concerns the Chinese routes to professionalism. 
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Retreating State, Fragmented Society 
In the past decade or so studies of the state-society relationship in China have 
been dominated by the civil society versus state corporatism models. Proponents of 
the former found strong arguments for a civil society in China in the social changes 
unleashed by the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping more than two 
decades ago ( e. g., Yang 1989; White 1993a, 1993b ). One of the most important 
consequences of economic reform, they noted, is its creation of a significant space 
that allows the development of societal organizations. The urban private sector in 
China is burgeoning. Urban life in China has been changing and state control over 
residence, travel, and employment has over time been relaxed (cf. Davis et al. 1995). 
All this, they have argued, favors the development of civil society, which was taken 
very generally to mean a realm of autonomous activities outside the party-state 
structure (e.g. Ostergaard 1989; Gold 1990; Strand 1990; Sullivan 1990; McCormick 
et al. 1992; Perry 1992; Whyte 1992). 
Transplantation of the concept of civil society onto Chinese soil is not without 
problems. The first problem has to do with the ideological overtones. Arguing for the 
existence of a civil society in modem China and then detecting signs of its revival in 
the reform era parallels earlier efforts in Chinese historiography to search for the 
"sprouts of capitalism" in pre-modem China. Essentially it echoes the same 
theoretical and comparative fallacy that there is only one universal path of historical 
development: that is, capitalism; or, in the present debate, the establishment and 
development of a civil society conducive to democratization. It does not take into 
consideration the differing historical and socio-political trajectories in different 
societies. 
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A more substantive problem has to do with the way civil society was 
employed and applied to the Chinese context. Very often the concept was used in an 
ambiguous manner, simply referring to the existence of a whole range of 
organizations outside the state apparatus. This goes beyond the most elemental sense 
of the term defined by Taylor as the existence of "free associations not under the 
tutelage of state power" (1990: 98). (Taylor noted that civil society in this minimal 
sense exists not only in the West but even under Leninism, thus making the concept 
devoid of any theoretical or explanatory significance.) 
Another problem associated with the application of civil society to China has 
to do with its preconceived relationship vis-a-vis the state. It is generally seen as in 
direct opposition to the state. It is in this last critique that other scholars found a state 
corporatist model more appealing. Various studies have acknowledged that the state 
and civil society in China are not at all bifurcated. Rather, the boundary between the 
state and social organizations is often vague and indeterminate, their relationship 
ambiguous and in many cases a symbiotic one. In particular, it has been argued that 
the many intermediate associations that have arisen during the reform era are neither 
voluntary nor autonomous. Instead, they are highly dependent on the state and hence 
are very much subject to state penetration and control (cf. Chan 1993; Pearson 1994; 
Unger and Chan 1995 etc.). 
However, a simple civil society or corporatist argument essentially blurs the 
rich diversity produced in the multiple arenas of the state and society. The nature of 
state power has been changing from authoritarian to regulatory. The more than two 
decades of reform policies have seen a retreat of the state from the organization of 
social life. The state is no doubt still domineering where it wishes to be, yet it is no 
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longer omnipresent as before. But the retreat of the state is not at the same pace or to 
the same extent in every aspect of organizational life. It is in this sense that we need to 
dissect the state and situate it in its specific social and institutional settings. 
Similarly, although there have generally been gams in terms of societal 
autonomy as a result of the state's retreat, the benefits are not shared evenly across the 
board by different constituencies. The economic reforms have advantaged some 
social groups at the expense of others. Both the civil society and state corporatist 
models have tended to project society as if it is a unitary whole autonomou~Jrom or 
penetrated by the state. Yet the two decades of reforms has resulted in a society far 
more fragmentary than before. For instance, we can no longer speak of a working 
class but of workers who are now very much divided among vastly different social 
statuses and opportunities. Likewise, even within the general professional class, 
professions operate in differing niches of institutional opportunities and of constraints 
in their interactions with the state. This kind of social fragmentation is qualitatively 
different from mere social differentiation in the sense that in a differentiated society, 
even though there exists a terrain of plurality of interests, there is also a conscious 
effort by different social forces to defend the interests of each other. This is the true 
essence of a democratic civil society which embodies not only institutions linked to 
fundamental rights like association, assembly, and speech that differentiate and 
stabilize it, but also movements in the forms of collective action required to defend, 
reproduce, and expand its potentials (Arato 1991: 5; see also Cohen and Arato 1992). 
Such a terrain, however, is lacking in China. In a fragmented society societal actors 
cultivate and pursue their own interests along the lines of social cleavages, but the 
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pursuit of alliances among social groups in defending their different interests is barely 
seen. 
On Professionalism 
Finally, in terms of professional development, this dissertation does not intend 
to argue which profession in China is more professional. Indeed, both lawyers and 
doctors fall short of being the professions if we are to adhere strictly to the traits 
delineated by the earlier approach of social scientists toward professions. This is 
especially the case since no professions in China can really claim to possess organized 
autonomy in the provision of their services. This study simply takes note that lawyers 
and doctors differ in their courses of professionalization, and the difference should be 
understood in terms of their embeddedness in specific institutional settings and their 
engagement with the state. But there is in fact no one single route of 
professionalization in China. There can be "imitation, involution, or innovation" 
(Stark and Brust 1998: 4), depending on how the professions interpret their interests 
and then organize their actions vis-a-vis their environments. What is at issue, and 
what this dissertation has stress, is to see how strategic choices, often highly 
contingent, are made and how they in effect shape further policy courses. 
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